

# DIALOGUE FOR PEACE

## Somali Programme



## A Vote for Peace

**How Somaliland Successfully Hosted its  
First Parliamentary Elections in 35 years**



**Academy for Peace and Development**  
Akademiga Nabadda iyo Horumarka

Hargeisa, Somaliland

**APD Hargeisa, Somaliland:**

Phone: (+252-2-) 520304

Thuraya: +8821643338171/

+8821643341206

email@apd-somaliland.org

**APD Burco, Somaliland:**

Phone: (+252-2-) 712980/81/82

Thuraya: +8821643341202/

+8821643341204

peaceandresearch@hotmail.com

<http://www.apd-somaliland.org>

## Acknowledgements

**Editor: Ralph Johnstone, The WordWorks**

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Front cover photo: Men and women line up to cast their votes in Hargeysa

Back cover photo: Each new MP was provided with a 'resource pack' by the APD, including a camel bag and a copy of the WSP/APD book, *Rebuilding Somaliland: Issues and Possibilities*.

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# Dialogue for Peace

How WSP International and its three partners are working to consolidate peace and support better governance across the Somali region

Rebuilding a country after conflict is about far more than repairing damaged buildings and re-establishing public institutions. Fundamentally, it is about restoring the people's trust and confidence in governance systems and the rule of law, rebuilding relationships at all levels, and providing the population with greater hope for the future. These processes are all critical to the consolidation of peace and security in fragile post-conflict situations. When they are neglected, the threat of conflict re-emerging is very real.

In this sense, state-building and peace-building are potentially contradictory processes – the former requiring the consolidation of governmental authority, the latter involving its moderation through compromise and consensus. The challenge for both national and international peacemakers is to situate reconciliation firmly within the context of state-building, while employing state-building as a platform for the development of mutual trust and lasting reconciliation. In Somali region, it goes without saying that neither of these processes can be possible without the broad and inclusive engagement of the Somali people.

WSP International – recently renamed the International Peacebuilding Alliance (Interpeace) – launched its Somali Programme in the northeastern part of Somali region known as Puntland in 1996. It subsequently expanded its programme to Somaliland in 1999, and to south-central Somalia in 2000. Working with highly respected local peace-building institutions established with the programme's support – the Puntland Development Research Centre (PDRC) in Garowe, the Academy for Peace and Development (APD) in Hargeysa, and the Center for Research and Dialogue (CRD) in Mogadishu – WSP has employed a highly successful 'Participatory Action Research' methodology to advance and support interlinked processes of peace-building and state formation. WSP's experience in the Somali region over the past decade indicates that the understanding and trust developed through the PAR methodology can help to resolve conflicts directly, while at the same time building consensual approaches to address the social, economic and political issues necessary for a durable peace.

As well as groundbreaking research throughout the Somali region, the Dialogue for Peace programme has provided unique opportunities for the three partners to engage with each other in collaborative studies and shared projects. In 2004, the CRD and PDRC teams agreed to combine their efforts in a jointly-managed peace-building programme. While managing its component of the Dialogue independently, the APD has continued to collaborate with the other two institutions on key technical and methodological issues. Over the past two years, the three partners have met regularly with WSP's Somali programme team to plan and coordinate their respective activities, as well as with a 'Dialogue Support Group' comprising the programme's donors at the European Commission, DfID, USAID, Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Italy and Denmark.

The Dialogue's consultative process has involved extensive consultations with all sectors of society, from national-level political and business leaders to local elders and community leaders, youth and women's groups, NGOs and civil society organisations. Its Participatory Action Research has provided for an inclusive, consensus-oriented dialogue led by local actors and facilitated by Somali research teams based at each of the partner institutions. The discussions have been documented in written and video form, and every effort has been made to engage the local media and disseminate the findings as broadly and objectively as possible.

Initial consultations by each partner institution were based upon detailed ‘actor and conflict mapping,’ which enabled the programme to identify local and regional priorities for dialogue, as well as respected leaders to guide and promote the dialogue process. At the Project Group meetings held in November 2004 by PDRC and CRD in Nairobi and by APD in Hargeysa, several areas of focus, or ‘entry points,’ were agreed upon for research and discussion in each area. For APD, the focal areas were: democratisation; decentralisation of governance; and resource-based conflict. The PDRC’s areas of focus were: democratisation; public fund management; consolidation of the Mudug Peace Agreement; and reconciliation. The CRD’s focal areas were: security and stabilisation; the roles of the business sector and civil society in peace-building; and reconciliation.

At the outset of the main ‘consultative phase,’ Working Groups of primary stakeholders were established to guide the work on each focus area and to develop plans of action. The groups’ activities included: information gathering and analysis; the identification of key local, regional and national actors whose views or engagement would be required; consultations through interviews, workshops, informal and formal meetings at local, inter-regional or national levels; and the engagement of resource persons to provide particular expertise on complex issues. Extensive consultations over a period of a year or more were essential to ensure sustained public interest and to raise key issues to the level of political decision-makers. Each of the partners also organised regular forums for public discussion of topical issues of concern, as well as engaging in informal liaison as a means of conflict prevention.

This report forms part of a final series of publications designed to formally ‘package’ the findings of these consultations – both as a record for those involved, and as a formal presentation of findings and recommendations to the national and regional authorities and their supporters. Together with a short documentary film on each of the focal areas, it is also hoped that these publications will provide a practical platform for the sharing of lessons learned during each of these groundbreaking consultations.

In response to requests from different stakeholders, including members of the different governance structures, the Dialogue for Peace also set out to take its ‘research-for-action’ beyond the stage of recommendations to include more material contributions to peace- and state-building. One example was the reduction of tensions in Sool after a high-profile exchange of prisoners between Somaliland and Puntland, following extensive behind-the-scenes mediation supported by the APD and PDRC. To ensure that such practical hands-on support will continue into the next phase of the Dialogue, WSP has also initiated a comprehensive programme of managerial training, technical capacity building, and fundraising support at each of its partner institutions. And of course, it is continuing to provide practical opportunities for the three institutions to meet together and with other like-minded organisations in order to support other initiatives to foster long-term peace for the Somali people.

# The Parliamentary Elections in Somaliland

## 1. Introduction

On September 29<sup>th</sup> 2005, the people of Somaliland went to the polls to choose a new parliament for the first time since 1969. The elections for the 82-seat House of Representatives symbolised not only the final stage in Somaliland's laborious transition from clan-based power-sharing to multiparty politics, but – in a very real sense – the arrival of a competitive, democratic electoral culture in the country. As well as the hopes and aspirations of up to 3.5 million Somalilanders, the elections clearly held major implications for the long-term prospects for democratisation across the Horn of Africa.

Since its local council and presidential elections, held in December 2002 and April 2003 respectively, Somaliland's transition to multiparty democracy had been widely regarded as “two-thirds complete.” However, the final phase of this democratic transition was in many ways the most critical – and the most vulnerable. The fact that the presidential election had been decided by the extremely narrow margin of 80 votes – less than 0.01% of the total – and that the losing parties had received 58% of the vote, had continued to threaten political turmoil in the country. Until the opposition political parties, which were absent from the parliament, were able to actively contest parliamentary seats, it was clear that Somaliland would continue to function as *de facto* single-party state.

It was also clear that the postponement of parliamentary elections beyond 2005 would have raised the spectre of civil unrest in a territory widely regarded as an island of peace in this war-weary region. Some opposition leaders had already threatened a “people's revolution” in the event that the elections did not

materialise. Holding the poll was clearly vital for the stability of the state of Somaliland.



As part of a huge effort to reach the widest possible audience, a voter education handbook was developed and 5000 copies were distributed to regional and district electoral offices and to civic organisations in May 2005

However, while the elections represented a foundation for future political stability, they also posed serious threats to prospects for democracy and stability if they failed. And the chances of failure – of flawed or irregular elections, which would betray the trust of the voting public – were much greater than during the presidential elections. So it was not only important to hold the elections *per se*, but to be seen to have a peaceful, fair and transparent electoral process.

## Historical Context: The Road to Peace

A former British protectorate in the Horn of Africa, Somaliland declared its independence from the rest of the Somali Republic in May 1991, after the Somali National Movement (SNM) contributed to the armed struggle that led to the collapse of the military regime of Siad Barre. Although still unrecognised by the international community, the people of Somaliland have cultivated a unique and relatively successful breed of “homegrown” political and social development, which has created generally better social and economic conditions than those prevailing in other parts of Somalia.

The population of Somaliland is broadly estimated at between 1.7 million and 3.5 million people, the majority of whom still practice traditional nomadic pastoralism. The inhabitants belong to four principal clans: the Isaaq, Gadbuuris, Ciise and Harti. Despite its relatively steady development, Somaliland continues to suffer from poor social services, limited health coverage, and dilapidated or non-existent economic infrastructure.

From the beginning, Somaliland has been managed through an essentially traditional, clan-based (*beel*) political system, characterised by inclusive quasi-proportional representation and consensus-based decision-making. In contrast to the more inclusive system of clan representation, a multiparty electoral system inevitably introduced the concepts of “winners” and “losers” – which, with the enduring weakness of the judiciary and law enforcement authorities, raised a very real risk of post-election disputes escalating into violence.

The first stage of Somaliland’s democratic development began on May 31<sup>st</sup> 2001, when a national constitution was overwhelmingly approved by public referendum. The constitution declared Somaliland an independent republic, with a president who appoints a cabinet of ministers, a National Assembly, and local governments.



Members of the National Electoral Commission, media associations and the APD at a ceremony marking the signing of the Media Code of Conduct on July 18<sup>th</sup> 2005

The Somaliland parliament comprises of two houses: the House of Representatives (*Golaha Wakiillada*) and the House of Elders (*Golaha Guurtida*), each with a total of 82 members. The House of Representatives is elected by popular vote, whereas the mechanism for selecting the members of the House of Elders is still undecided.

A year later, in May 2002, President Maxamed Xaaji Ibraahim Cigaal died suddenly while on a private visit to South Africa. The vice president, Daahir Rayaale Kaahin, was named his successor. The

departure of Cigaal from the scene appeared to provide a more open political playing field – and quickly persuaded opponents of the democratic process to participate in it.

On December 15<sup>th</sup> 2002, Somalilanders went to the polls for the first time in over three decades to vote in local council elections. Six political organisations – Asad, Hormood, Kulmiye, Sahan, UDUB (Urrurka Dimoqraadiyadda Ummadaha Bahoobay), and UCID (Ururka Cadaaladda iyo Dimoqraadiga) – contested the elections, and on December 23<sup>rd</sup> the National Electoral Commission declared UDUB, Kulmiye and UCID as the three national political parties to contest presidential and parliamentary elections.

After the mandate of the government was extended, on April 14<sup>th</sup> 2003, nearly half a million Somalilanders voted in very closely contested presidential elections. When the result was declared five days later, the incumbent, Daahir Rayaale Kaahin, had won by a margin of just 80 votes. It was the kind of margin that could have led to civil disorder, and it was a testament to the peaceful aspirations of all Somalilanders that, when the Supreme Court upheld the results, they were quickly accepted by the people.

## Partners in Peace-Building

In the run up to Somaliland's parliamentary elections, WSP International and its local partner, the Academy for Peace and Development (APD), were given a unique opportunity to work with the country's National Electoral



*Vice President Ahmed Yousuf Yassin for UDUB, the Chairman of Kulmiye, Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud Silaanyo, and the Chairman of UCID, Faysal Ali Waraabe, sign the Electoral Code of Conduct for the political parties, witnessed by the Chairman of NEC, Ahmed Haji Ali Adami, on July 18th 2005*

Commission (NEC) in laying the groundwork for a free and fair election. The APD already had a deep and widely respected involvement in Somaliland's nascent democratisation process: from bringing the government and opposition together in a public debate before the groundbreaking 2001 constitutional referendum, to hosting consultations on a vital Code of Conduct for the local elections, and providing domestic observation teams and training for party agents in the run up to the presidential elections.

In 2002, the APD had conducted in-depth research of four critical 'entry points,' applying WSP's Participatory Action Research (PAR) in wide-ranging studies on the decentralisation of government institutions, the legacy of the war on Somaliland's families, the role of the mass media in political rebuilding, and efforts to regulate the livestock economy. The findings of the research were detailed in four short documentary films and four research papers, which were later published in a book.

In April 2004, the Academy began to work closely with WSP on research into four further entry points under its Dialogue for Peace (DfP) programme: decentralisation, the electoral process, constitutional review, and natural resource-based conflicts. Both partners' commitment to reconciliation and democracy in Somaliland had earned them the respect of the NEC, which in March 2004 had approached them to help lay the logistical foundations and act as a transparent conduit for international funding for the parliamentary elections.

The overall purpose of the APD's intervention was to assist the NEC, the Somaliland Government, its political parties, and other national and local actors in ensuring that the parliamentary elections would be held in a manner that was considered – by international standards – to be free, fair, transparent and peaceful. The specific objectives of the APD and WSP's support through the DfP programme included:

- *Holding the elections with the least possible delay.* Both the opposition parties and members of the public had expressed concern about continuing delays in the electoral process. The Dialogue for Peace provided a forum for the public and other concerned groups to maintain pressure on the government, the parliament, the NEC, and the political parties to keep the process on track.
- *Improving the legal environment of the electoral process.* The DfP programme provided technical and legal assistance to the Somaliland parliament to review and reform the electoral law and procedures in order to ensure a conducive legal environment for the holding of fair elections.



- *Improving the political climate ahead of the elections.* The programme's uniquely neutral position enabled it to facilitate constructive inter-party dialogue on potentially divisive issues, engaging key groups and institutions in the resolution of any emerging issues that threatened to derail the process.
- *Ensuring the staging of free, fair and peaceful elections.* By facilitating regular consultations between the NEC, political parties and the government, the DfP programme helped to maintain confidence and order in the run up to the election, and to generate a consensual Code of Conduct to govern the behaviour of competing parties and their supporters during their election campaigns.
- *Broadening awareness, understanding and engagement at all levels.* Through a concerted public awareness campaign and consultations with civic organisations and media institutions, the Dialogue for Peace sought to help raise public awareness of the importance of the elections, and to encourage the constructive and non-partisan involvement of civic and media organisations. The Academy also used its audio-visual unit to contribute to effective dissemination of critical public information.
- *Promoting, sharing and disseminating the DfP's achievements.* Throughout its 30-month course, the programme sought to share the valuable lessons it was learning with both international donors and local partners, including NGOs and civic organisations involved in peace-building and democratisation.

In November 2004, the WSP/APD National Project Group Meeting in Hargeysa brought together more than 80 delegates from the Somaliland central and local government, the Houses of Parliament, civil society organisations, and other concerned groups to ratify the parliamentary elections as a critical and relevant entry point for the future political stability of Somaliland.

## 2. Issues and Stakeholders

### 2.1 Key Issues

#### Electoral Law

From the outset, the main obstacle to Somaliland's parliamentary elections has been the absence of a formal electoral law. In 2001, lawmakers had been unable to reach a compromise on the controversial and potentially divisive aspect of the law pertaining to the allocation of parliamentary seats to Somaliland's six regions. The primary concern in the run up to the parliamentary elections was whether parliament would be able to resolve this key aspect of the law in time.

The absence of both a reliable census and a recent precedent was compounded by competing clan interests. With current power-sharing arrangements favouring the representation of smaller clans in the House of Representatives, it was natural that members from the larger clans would be more supportive of the election – hoping that it would increase their representation. The smaller clans, by contrast, were less supportive, fearing that the elections would reduce their representation – as had happened in the local council elections. The challenge for Somaliland – as with much of Africa – remains developing an electoral system that gives a vote to each person, while at the same time producing a fair representation of clan or tribal groups.

Likewise, the representation of women and marginalised groups, who constitute the traditional occupational castes known as *Gabooye*, and who were widely regarded as among the greatest losers in the local elections, became a major issue in the run up to the parliamentary elections. Local women's groups and other civic organisations campaigned hard to include provisions in the electoral law that would improve the chances of women and marginalised groups gaining greater representation in the new parliament. Several women's groups, such as the umbrella Nagaad, formally requested parliament to introduce a quota to ensure their fair representation in the new house – a request that was rejected on constitutional grounds (Article 22.2).

The other major predicament concerned those areas of eastern Somaliland that were deemed too insecure for voting to take place, namely parts of Sool and Sanaag regions. Although the Harti inhabiting these areas had not fully participated in the local or presidential elections, their participation was deemed more important in the parliamentary elections, in which national representation would be elected through the political parties. However, voting in the disputed areas was to prove a major hurdle for the election organisers.

Two other critical pieces of legislation that the lawmakers felt were necessary for the passage of an electoral law concerned the delineation of Somaliland's regions and districts and the 'Hargeysa City Charter.' But, like the issue of seat distribution, officials in the Ministry of Interior faced great difficulty in delineating regional and district administrative boundaries, because these boundaries were closely associated with traditional clan territories – and any 'new' demarcations could be seen as altering these territories. In the event, despite several appeals to the Minister of Interior, these two bills were never forwarded to parliament by the government for debate or enactment.

#### Election Management

While the seven commissioners who made up the National Electoral Commission had no previous experience in running elections, they had been gaining in confidence and authority in the formative stages of the electoral process. However, they had faced strong criticism from some quarters, particularly

during the period following the presidential elections, when allegations surfaced of fraud, vote-rigging and external pressure (ICG, 2003; African Rights, 2003). In the run up to the parliamentary elections, questions continued to be raised by the opposition parties concerning the competence and impartiality of the NEC commissioners.

Concern was also voiced about the lack of resources and administrative capacity for managing the elections – and how these might affect a transparent outcome. Securing sufficient funding was to prove one of the NEC’s greatest challenges, with the government committing only 30 percent of the projected election costs and no immediate commitment from the donors.

The other persistent problem was the alleged use by the ruling UDUB party of public resources for its election campaign. Despite vehement denials, there was plenty of anecdotal evidence to suggest that UDUB was using public funds and the media for its own electoral ends (Bradbury, Abokor and Yusuf, 2003; ICG, 2003). Without the establishment of an enforceable code of conduct to “level the playing field,” it was feared that a closely tied election result would prove hard to swallow.

As in previous elections, the question of voter registration remained a major point of contention, with repeated calls for the NEC to initiate a registration process to prevent vote-rigging or multiple voting. However, early efforts by the NEC, the government and municipal authorities to explore the possibility of a registration exercise in Hargeysa concluded that, without national IDs, it would not be feasible to introduce reliable registration in the time available. The absence of voter registration meant that the distribution and allocation of polling stations would remain a contentious issue.

The quality of indelible ink was also an issue, particularly as the ink used in the presidential elections had proved erasable, enabling some voters to cast more than one ballot. Improving the quality of the ink used in the parliamentary elections was seen as critical to prevent any further voter fraud.

Voter education was another key challenge throughout the electoral process. With high rates of illiteracy, there was a critical need to tell voters – by radio or through other community channels – about the importance of, and procedures for, casting their votes. In a land with such limited resources and means of communication, and with such a scattered and nomadic population, this ‘civic education’ remained one of the greatest challenges facing election organisers.

Another overriding concern was the provision of training for regional and district commissioners, polling staff and party agents. And there were growing calls – in the wake of concerns over the competence of councils elected during the last elections – for an official ‘vetting’ of the parliamentary candidates nominated by each party.

Unlike the two previous elections, the locations and the number of polling stations proved a very contentious issue. Both the candidates and clan leaders had reached the conclusion that the number of votes polled would depend upon the number of stations assigned to each clan area. The NEC thus faced enormous pressure from both candidates and local leaders to provide more polling stations in their individual areas.

One critical event in the run up to the elections involved the surprise nomination by the two opposition parties, Kulmiye and UCID, of a staunch government critic, Maxamed Xaashi Cilmi, to fill the vacancy in the NEC left by the death of one of the commissioners. When Xaashi’s nomination was rejected by the president, and Kulmiye refused to nominate another candidate, UCID broke rank with Kulmiye and submitted a second, undisclosed nominee, who was eventually approved by the parliament. The impasse was later overcome with the compromise that Kulmiye would nominate one of two additional commissioners, increasing the NEC membership from seven to nine (although, in the event, this did not materialise).

## Security

Although Somaliland has been a relative beacon of peace and stability, security remained an overriding concern throughout the electoral process. The assassination of four international aid workers by militant radical groups (Ms. Annalena Tonelli and Mr. and Mrs. Eyeington in October 2003, and Ms. Flora Cheruyiot in March 2004) appeared to many to be a concerted bid to undermine Somaliland's stability and political transition (ICG, 2005). Following the assassinations, the UN evacuated all of its international personnel from Somaliland and the European Commission advised its INGO partners to leave, pending improvements in the security situation. Despite the arrest of most of the culprits and the creation of a Special Protection Unit within the Somaliland police force to provide security to aid organisations, the threat of attacks by militant groups has since remained a major concern throughout the international community. These security concerns were to return a week before the elections, when police detained a number of alleged militant radicals, with several more fleeing the scene in a gun battle in Hargeysa.



*District boxes with electoral materials bound for polling stations: box DA5 is on its way to Gabiley District, Hargeysa, two days before Election Day*

The threat of armed conflict also continued to hang over the eastern regions of Sool and Sanaag, which had seen an increase in the build up of military forces from neighbouring Puntland. A particularly violent clash on October 29<sup>th</sup> 2004 on the outskirts of Laas Caanood led to casualties on both sides, and put Somaliland on a war footing. Fortunately, as time went by, the war of words subsided, but the disputed area continued to be full of troops – and tension. The election of the former Puntland leader, Abdulaahi Yuusuf, as the President of Somalia in October 2004 continued to fuel the threat of instability between Somaliland and Puntland.

## The Political Environment

Political tensions between the government and the main opposition parties, Kulmiye and UCID, continued to cast a shadow over the national political environment in the run up to the parliamentary elections. The government's occasional use of autocratic and "undemocratic" practices to stymie freedom of speech and expression also threatened to derail the electoral process (CIIR/ICD, 2004).

In particular, the opposition challenged the legality of the National Security Committee, which had powers to detain citizens without charge for up to 90 days and had handed out one-year jail terms to 150 students who had demonstrated against the president in May 2004. The NSC was considered unconstitutional by the parliament, and local human rights groups and members of the diaspora had demanded its abolition.

In order to put to rest vigorous public debates on the impact of the Somali National Reconciliation Conference taking place in Kenya, the Minister of Interior issued a decree on July 19<sup>th</sup> 2004 temporarily banning all political debates and meetings organised by civic groups on the issue, including a conference in Burco for local intellectuals to discuss the impact of the Somali National Reconciliation Conference in Kenya. The minister also revoked the registration of the Centre for Creative Solutions, a local NGO, which was organising such debates, and ordered all political parties to confine their meetings to their respective

premises. Many civil society organisations, however, saw this as an unconstitutional infringement of their civil liberties.

Another event that raised questions about Somaliland’s commitment to democracy and human rights was the controversial trial of Samsam Axmed Ducaale, who was arrested in August 2004 for falsely claiming to be the niece of the vice president. There were allegations that she was maltreated in custody and her trial on terrorism and espionage charges became a source of national embarrassment, with human rights activists and a *Guurti* member detained and her four lawyers thrown into jail (Rakiya Omaar, African Rights, 2004).

### Nomination of Candidates

The approval of three political parties – UDUB, Kulmiye and UCID – to contest the presidential and parliamentary elections presented a unique opportunity for Somaliland to move away from clan-based governance to a democratic multiparty system. The aim was to promote inter-clan unity and to prevent the proliferation of political parties along clan lines, as had happened in the Somali Republic in the run up to the 1969 elections.



Women queue to cast their votes in Hargeysa

However, given the pervasive nature of clan structures and the poor development of individual parties’ machineries, many analysts believed that candidate nomination would prove a daunting task. With so many competing clans’ and sub-clans’ interests, juxtaposed with individual and urban-elite agendas, party candidate nomination would invariably be controversial and potentially divisive for the individual parties and their supporters.

## 2.2 Key Stakeholders

### The President

As the major source of executive power in Somaliland, much of the fate of the parliamentary elections hinged upon the stewardship and the commitment of the president and his government. Although the president had publicly pledged to hold the elections in 2005, the electoral timetable continued to hang in the balance until February 2005, when – just three months before the current parliament’s term was due to expire – the president referred its controversial electoral bill to the Supreme Court.

Up until this eleventh-hour reprieve, the president had come under growing pressure from the opposition parties and other government critics, who had grown wary of the back-and-forth machinations over the electoral law. They had several reasons to be suspicious. First, the president feared the possibility of losing the election to the opposition – particularly Kulmiye, which might try to impeach him (CIIR/ICD, December 2004). Second, he was getting signals from his Awdal constituency not to interfere with the issue of parliamentary allocations, unless he was going to support their interests. Third, it was becoming clear that some members of his government were pursuing a deliberate policy of “*xaallad abuur*” (“creating crises”), in order to give the government an excuse to indefinitely postpone the elections.

The Academy for Peace and Development, meanwhile, continued to maintain close links and personal contacts with the president – in recognition of the overriding importance of his leadership to both the process and the outcome of the upcoming elections.

### The House of Representatives

The House of Representatives (*Golaha Wakillada*) was responsible for the passage of the electoral law that formed the main legal constraint to the parliamentary elections. To be fair to the lawmakers, reaching a compromise on the distribution of parliamentary seats that would be acceptable to all constituencies was an enormous – if nigh impossible – undertaking. As well as their own competing clans' and sub-clans' interests, the absence of a reliable census meant that it was simply not possible to prove or disprove the claims of each constituency.

The political parties and individual sceptics, however, saw this as a poor excuse. They argued that the lawmakers were trying to cling to their seats for as long as possible, fearing that they would not be re-elected. If they were acting in the interests of the nation, the critics said, the issue of the distribution of parliamentary seats would have been politically and consensually resolved.

In the latter half of 2004, the House of Representatives found itself mired in an internal controversy that polarised the chamber. Suspicion and mistrust between the members twice led to the resignation of the Speaker and his First Deputy, although on both occasions their resignations were withdrawn. For their part, 43 of the lawmakers forwarded a motion calling for the removal of all the house leaders, accusing them of creating chaos and suspicion among the members.

Throughout the election process, the APD continued to maintain strong working relations with the house leaders, the sub-committee responsible for drafting the electoral law, and individual lawmakers, by providing them with informed and reliable technical support and external expertise.

### The House of Elders

The House of Elders (*Golaha Guurti*) was specifically designed to foster peace and security by upholding Somaliland's customary law and Islamic faith. The *Guurti* is charged with advising the government on any disputes or perceived shortcomings in its administration, and with reviewing legislation from the House of Representatives, which it may refer back to the house with requests for revisions or clarifications. In keeping with its dispute-resolving authority, the *Guurti* has played an open and non-confrontational role throughout the democratisation process.

Since 1997, the *Guurti* has become increasingly politicised and has seen more than 20 of its "old guard" replaced by younger members. When its renowned chairman, Sheekh Ibrahim Sheekh Yusuf Sheekh Madar, died in July 2004, a politician and non-*Guurti* member, Sulaybaan Maxamuud Aadan, was elected as the new chairman – bolstering the chamber's political nature and, in the view of many older members, deviating from its traditional roles and responsibilities.

### The Political Parties

In order to promote inter-clan unity and prevent the proliferation of political parties along clan lines – as happened in the Somali Republic in the run up to the 1969 elections – the constitution of Somaliland permits only three national political parties. These three parties, elected in the 2002 local elections, are the ruling party UDUB (the United Democratic People's Party), Kulmiye (the Unity Party), and UCID (the Justice and Welfare Party).

The parliamentary elections drew strong support from all the political parties, particularly the two opposition parties for which it presented the first opportunity for national level representation. In an attempt to move the process forward, the three parties on August 4<sup>th</sup> 2003 released a joint statement on their unified position on the election and other national issues, including the economy and security. In their statement, the parties pledged to hold the elections as soon as possible, and to cooperate with all of the institutions involved. They also committed to the following specific recommendations:

- The House of Representatives will continue to have 82 seats, as stipulated in the constitution;
- Regional allocation of these seats will be based upon the 1960 allocations, with one seat in 1960 proportionally equivalent to 2.5 seats today;
- The electoral bill should state that the allocation of seats for the next parliament will be based upon a comprehensive census, and there will be voter registration;
- The electoral law should contain a provision to address non-voting districts;
- The electoral law should be passed and completed within six months from August 1<sup>st</sup> 2003.

Despite these concrete proposals, however, none of the parties appeared to have the structural mechanisms in place to ensure their implementation. The two opposition parties – however strong in their condemnation of the government, parliament or the NEC – did not appear to have the capacity to match their bold statements with corresponding action.

### The National Electoral Commission

The NEC is an independent body created to administer the elections, which was established under Presidential and Local Council Elections Law No. 20 of 2001. Of its seven commissioners, three are appointed by the president, two are nominated by the *Guurti*, and the opposition parties nominate the remaining two. All appointments must be approved by the House of Representatives. Their term of office is five years.

Having conducted two elections with mixed results, the NEC was determined that the parliamentary elections should run smoothly. Since nearly all the commissioners had been involved in the previous elections (with the exception of one who passed away in September 2004), the NEC had gained considerable experience in the legal, logistical and financial aspects of election management.



*Voter instructions were posted at all 985 polling stations throughout Somaliland*

Since the presidential elections in April 2003, the NEC had been working to improve the environment for the parliamentary elections, consulting widely with the political parties and civic organisations, and drawing up a workplan to specify the tasks expected of each party. (In April 2004, the commissioners were also invited to visit South Africa, to witness firsthand the lessons learned during that country's national elections.) Early on, the NEC also developed a proposed election budget, which it submitted to the government and potential donors.

Despite these positive developments, however, the precarious middle ground occupied by the Commission meant that it was largely denied the political space or support to move the process forward. If it dealt strictly with the government, it was accused of being an extension of the opposition. If it was seen to “go soft” on the government, it lost opposition trust and confidence. So the NEC, and particularly its chairman, had to develop its own delicate balancing act, remaining “hard” on the government but in a non-confrontational manner, while at the same time reassuring the opposition of its impartial progress and authority.

As in the previous elections, the APD worked closely with the NEC throughout the electoral process, in collaborative efforts to provide the Commission with technical and political support, and to assist in securing funds. Ultimately, the success of the electoral process depended upon the critical collaboration between the NEC and the political parties, with the support of the Academy, and the immense public will for peaceful and fair elections.



*Prospective voters wait patiently to cast their ballots*

### The Media

The media in Somaliland enjoys a remarkable degree of freedom in comparison with many other countries in Africa. At present, there are several privately owned newspapers and one owned by the government. There are also several privately owned TV stations, together with a state owned TV station and radio station. Although there is no law against the private ownership of radio stations, in practice the government has not yet permitted the operation of any private radio stations.

Both the private and state owned media were strongly criticised by the government and the opposition for their coverage of the previous elections. With no institution in charge of monitoring or regulating the press, there were no means for wronged parties to seek redress for biased or erroneous reporting. State control of the radio airwaves meant that the ruling party monopolised radio coverage, while private newspapers and TV stations were accused of favouring the opposition parties.

With two rival journalists’ associations, the APD had to deal with the press through each association in parallel. The APD assisted the NEC and the BBC World Service Trust in drawing up a Media Code of Conduct to govern the behaviour of the press during the elections – and to encourage open and accurate reporting of events.

### Civil Society

From the outset of the electoral process, civil society organisations took a lead in addressing some of the most pressing issues, including civic/voter education and domestic observation. The APD was among those institutions that played a critical role in mediating among political organisations, and between them and the NEC. These negotiations helped to produce a Code of Conduct, through which all parties pledged to abide by the decisions of the NEC and the outcome of the elections.



The Academy worked with the leading civic organisations – Nagaad, Cosongo, Havayoco, and the Forum for Peace and Governance (Fopag) – to expand their capacity for comprehensive monitoring of the election process, as well as attempting to establish a secretariat to assist in coordinating their activities with those of the NEC. However, the proposed secretariat did not materialise, with some observers stating that it was something Somaliland’s civil society was not yet ready for.

## The Public

With very high rates of illiteracy, a largely nomadic population, and a long history of colonial domination, democratic misrule and dictatorial repression, very few of Somaliland’s residents have had any direct experience of democratic elections. Despite this, Somaliland has been able to conduct two relatively free and transparent elections, and the parliamentary elections had attracted widespread public enthusiasm and pressure to “get it right.” For this reason, the APD planned several civic education workshops to broaden the scope of public awareness, understanding and engagement in the election process, as well as public debates and discussions on specific aspects of the political process.

Despite the absence of a reliable census, voter registration or effective voter education, the desire of the Somaliland public to have a fair and successful election undoubtedly made a real difference to the electoral process.

## International Actors

International support for Somaliland’s parliamentary elections was regarded as critical to their success. Fortunately, the international community became interested when the process was at a critical junction, and its political support and commitment to fund the election came when most needed. The APD has played a significant role in encouraging international involvement throughout Somaliland’s democratisation process, developing both direct and indirect relationships with international partners to promote the exchange of information, technical support, and various collaborative and coordination activities.

The first international entity to become involved in Somaliland’s electoral process was the *British Embassy in Addis Abba*, which funded the consultant employed to assist the Somaliland Parliament in drafting the electoral law. The British Ambassador to Ethiopia and other senior diplomats soon became frequent visitors to Hargeysa, and were particularly active in helping to ease strained relations between the government and opposition parties at times of political tension.

In Nairobi, meanwhile, a *Democratisation Programme Steering Committee* brought together various international supporters of Somaliland’s electoral process, including the European Commission (EC), DfID, Denmark, Norway, Switzerland and USAID. Through WSP channels, the Steering Committee received regular updates on the progress of the elections from the APD.

*WSP’s Project Management Team* provided various technical inputs to enhance the administrative capacity and efficiency of the NEC, providing an effective link between the NEC and APD/WSP International. APD and WSP also worked closely with *Progressio*, then known as International Cooperation Development (ICD), which was designated to coordinate the activities of more than 70 international observers.

Vital support was also received from the *International Republican Institute (IRI)*, which the APD assisted in training the political parties’ national and regional campaign committees. The *British Broadcasting Corporation’s World Service Trust*, another long-term supporter of Somaliland’s media groups in terms of training, with the help of the British government, worked with the APD to host a three-day workshop at which local media representatives developed and approved a Media Code of Conduct for the elections.

### 3. Activities

By October 2004, with just five months remaining to the original scheduled date of the elections, and nearly 18 months after the presidential election, Somaliland found itself “back to square one” in its preparations for its long-awaited parliamentary elections. The Electoral Law for the Parliamentary Election, which held the key to the holding of the elections, had not been enacted, and the issue of seat allocation was still far from resolved. Naturally, people were looking for someone to blame, and finger-pointing began.

The parliament, in particular, drew strong criticism for dragging its feet and pursuing its own self-serving agendas. The public, the NEC, CSOs and the opposition parties all questioned the commitment of the government and the president – particularly for not pushing parliament to pass the electoral law. The opposition parties, despite their vociferous criticism, however, had not come up with any practical suggestions – other than the chairman of Kulmiye proposing to divide the House of Representatives according to the votes received by each party during the presidential election. The public and CSOs, for their part, were not sufficiently proactive to push parliament and the government to take action.

While there was clearly an urgent need to develop a mutually acceptable electoral law, it appeared increasingly unlikely that such a law could be devised and approved in time for the elections. Facing a real risk of the entire electoral process collapsing, the Academy for Peace and Development initiated a series of formal and informal activities designed to assist the various stakeholders to get together and resolve their differences in order to move the process forward. The major activities, held between April 2004 and October 2005, are described in the following chapter.

#### Participatory Workshops

The most obvious means for bringing the various parties to the same table were participatory forums to discuss the main themes and challenges facing the elections. Between March and July 2005, the APD hosted seven workshops on the electoral process – six of them in Hargeysa and one in Boorome. The workshops targeted all the main stakeholder groups, from the government and parliament, to the NEC, the three political parties, elders, women’s groups, the local media, and civic organisations. Each workshop



*Extensive civic education ensured that everyone knew they had the right to cast a secret ballot for their chosen candidate...*

was designed to encourage the participants to share and compare their different perspectives, to negotiate priorities, and to build consensus on the “right way” of moving the process forward and ensuring free, fair and peaceful elections. The workshops also reviewed and endorsed a Somali-language Voter Education Manual and the Media Code of Conduct, and explored ways of expanding the role of civic organisations and the training of parliamentary candidates.

#### Public Forums

Since 2001, the APD has been hosting monthly public debates and discussions on the political process and other relevant issues through its ‘Forum for Civic Dialogue.’ The Academy’s role in these forums is principally as a facilitator and provider of neutral space in which ideas can be aired freely and objectively. Each forum has been designed to allow local institutions and civic groups to present their cases to the public, in order to

educate citizens on issues affecting their lives and their future, while also allowing individuals to openly air their opinions and concerns. Some of these forums have led the public to successfully exert pressure on Somaliland's leaders. For example, when the House of Representatives passed the controversial electoral bill in January 2005 inhibiting the election, the Academy organised a forum to publicly debate the bill and to turn the spotlight on the lawmakers. Key ministers, party representatives, women's groups and civic organisations all attended a highly charged public debate, at which speaker after speaker publicly challenged the MPs to desist from blocking the election process. The debate was credited with forcing the lawmakers to reverse their positions. Two months later, the parliament passed an electoral law that would pave the way for elections.

After the amendments to the electoral law were passed in April 2005, the APD hosted two further public debates that addressed several other critical electoral issues, including the impact of the electoral system on clan representation and equity, and the exclusion of women from party nominations.

### Consultative Meetings

As another integral component of the APD/WSP peace-building methodology, the Academy had since May 2004 been holding regular consultative meetings with some of the principal players in the electoral process, including the president, senior party and parliamentary leaders, civic leaders, and representatives of the international community. These meetings, designed to exchange information, share concerns and explore ways of resolving critical issues, also included several one-on-one meetings between the APD and senior leaders.



*....and only to vote once, thanks to the widely publicised use of indelible ink to mark the fingers of those who had voted. The ink was only visible under UV light and here, electoral officials check a prospective voter's finger*

The consultative meetings followed a regular system of “afternoon consultations,” which the APD had hosted with the government, political parties and the NEC in the run up to the local and presidential elections, and which had culminated in the signing of a common Code of Conduct among the parties. When both Houses of Parliament passed the controversial electoral bill in January and February 2005, the APD resurrected these afternoon meetings at its premises to assist the NEC and the three political parties to address the “irresolvable” issue of the distribution of parliamentary seats.

By May 2005, with a consensual electoral law finally passed and funds for the election secured, the Academy began to host more inclusive twice-weekly discussions between the three political parties, the NEC and sometimes government officials in order to develop a Code of Conduct to govern the behaviour of the parties, their candidates and supporters during the elections. The first phase of these meetings lasted until mid-July, with a second phase dealing with the issue of non-voting areas in Sool and Sanaag continuing into August. As well as developing the Code of Conduct, these discussions undoubtedly helped to diffuse political tensions and to improve the political environment in the run up to the elections.

### Support to Key Stakeholders

Having provided direct financial assistance to the NEC, through a contribution from the Westminster Foundation for Democracy, in 2002-03, the APD was committed to providing direct support to the key actors involved in the parliamentary elections, as well as helping them secure assistance from other supporters. This support to stakeholders, including the NEC, parliament, political parties and the media, included:

- Presenting recommendations to the parliamentary sub-committee responsible for drafting the electoral law;

- Providing an external expert to the parliament, with the support of the British Embassy in Addis Ababa;
- Channelling funding to the NEC from international donors;
- Hiring an external consultant to assist the local media to develop a code of conduct, with the support of the BBC;
- Assisting the International Republican Institute to organise training workshops for the political parties, and helping in identifying local trainers and translators;
- Providing transport to representatives of the political parties during the selection of the regional and district electoral commissioners;
- Holding six one-day training workshops for the candidates in each region on the electoral Code of Conduct;
- Helping the NEC identify local NGOs that could provide specific assistance during the election; and
- Assisting in the development of a Voter Education Handbook.

### Support to Peace and Assessment Missions

With mounting concern about the potential for election-related insecurity in some areas, particularly in Sool and Sanaag, the APD volunteered to transport a 'Peace and Assessment Mission' to each of these regions. The Academy also sponsored two peace missions: to Ceergaabo in Sanaag at the request of the NEC, and to the north of Hargeysa City at the request of the House of Elders. The former aimed to persuade the Wersengali leadership, which had expressed dissatisfaction with the number of seats allocated to non-voting areas, not to boycott or disrupt the election process. The second aimed to urge the participation of several communities that had been outraged by the cancellation of six polling stations in their area, after the government and the NEC had failed to determine the regional demarcation of these constituencies.

### Behind-the-Scenes Activities

Given the enduring volatility of Somaliland's political climate, the APD was closely and constantly monitoring the progress of the upcoming elections, in order to take appropriate action whenever it threatened to go off track. These lesser-known, "behind-the-scenes" interventions included requesting the international community and donors to maintain pressure on the country's leaders and opposition politicians to refrain from combative stances or statements that could jeopardise progress towards the elections. The Academy also maintained a close and constant dialogue with the NEC, the president and the political parties to devise mutually acceptable solutions to emerging issues.

### The Audio-Visual Unit and the Media

The APD's Culture and Communication Unit videotaped all formal public events and activities related to the electoral process, including the workshops and debates, and provided this footage to the local media to promote its dissemination. Extensive media coverage of a crucial debate in January 2005, right after the parliament passed a controversial version of the electoral law, turned out to be a major turning-point in the entire electoral process, when it galvanised the public to exert greater pressure on the lawmakers to find a solution. The lawmakers finally heeded this message and began to work more proactively with the president to finalise the electoral bill.

The Culture and Communication Unit was also instrumental in informing the public of voting procedures, which were much more complex than those employed in the previous two elections. Its widely disseminated voter education film not only informed the public of how to vote, but also explained the specific roles of the police, the NEC, the political parties, and civic organisations in the elections. The film was shown on the new National TV channel, while mobile film shows also toured major towns and villages.

## 4. Achievements and Impacts

Despite the success of the presidential election in April 2003, Somaliland's efforts to build a "complete democracy" continued to face recurring threats in the two years that followed. The election of the House of Representatives, originally scheduled to take place in mid-2003, was postponed until early 2005. Even with this extension, it was becoming clear that the 82 members of parliament were not all committed to ensuring that the elections actually took place. The main stumbling block was an incomplete electoral law, which contained several contentious issues, particularly regarding the distribution of seats in the legislature. Because Somaliland had no proper census, and lacked voter registration, the distribution of seats between the country's six regions had become very divisive. A sub-committee assigned to resolve the impasse was unable to devise a compromise. The deadlock led to a great deal of frustration among members of the opposition parties and the NEC. As months slipped into years, the election date grew closer with no signs of an electoral law to govern the process.

*"The political parties wanted the election to take place more than the parliamentarians. Some MPs in both houses did not want the election to take place as they wanted to safeguard their seats. But the political parties saw the election as key to their very survival."*

Ahmed Haji Ali Adami  
Chairman, National Electoral Commission

In August 2004, following intense pressure from the NEC, the president set the date of the election as March 29<sup>th</sup> 2005, which would allow for the results to be finalised before the expiry of the current parliament's mandate in May 2005. By October 2004, however, the Speaker of the House, Ahmed Adan Qaybe, realised that they would not be able to resolve the impasse internally, and submitted an official request to the APD to provide technical assistance in facilitating the formulation of a viable electoral law. With financial support from the British Embassy in Addis Ababa, the APD and WSP identified a Salvadorian lawyer, Ruben Zamora, who had extensive experience in drafting electoral laws for countries undergoing democratic transitions. Mr. Zamora arrived in Hargeysa in mid-November 2004 and immediately set to work on a new law with a special ad hoc committee assigned to the project.

After consulting with all the major stakeholders, the consultant was able to make suggestions for each of the eight issues that had emerged as stumbling-blocks in the original process. On December 27<sup>th</sup>, a draft electoral law was distributed to the House of Representatives for review, with three different options proposed for resolving the controversial issue of seat distribution (for the full text of Mr. Zamora's draft law, see [www.apd-Somaliland.org](http://www.apd-Somaliland.org)). However, the new draft immediately became a political battleground, pitting the majority of the house members against a handful of leaders who were stridently opposed to the new law. Some MPs and members of the sub-committee of internal affairs, which had initially been responsible for drafting the law, challenged the legality of the new ad hoc committee. Some opposition politicians objected to the proposal to increase to nine the number of NEC commissioners, as the two additional commissioners would be nominated by the president and the *Guurti* and would therefore be "pro-government."

The distinction between the two camps was striking. The proponents of the process were largely conciliatory and willing to iron out any differences between the two sides. However, most of the opponents were highly confrontational, and many of their objections appeared specifically designed to create a "*xaalad abuur*" ("political crisis") to torpedo the entire process.

In a speech before a joint session of the two Houses of Parliament on January 12<sup>th</sup> 2005, the president urged the lawmakers to pass the new electoral law within a week so that the parliamentary elections could

take place as scheduled on March 29<sup>th</sup>. But when the House of Representatives responded by passing a law, to the dismay of the public it transpired to be so full of caveats – including the holding of a national census and voter registration exercise before the election – that it would have been impossible to stage the election within the remaining timeframe. This time, however, the members of the House of Representatives had sorely misread the public mood. The passing of the new bill was met with an outpouring of denunciation both inside and outside the country. The house members were now regarded as political pariahs – more concerned with preserving their own positions than serving the national interest.

In an editorial on January 29<sup>th</sup> 2005, the *Somaliland Times* stated: “By passing this law, the parliament has shown that it is either so desperate to cling to office that it will risk anything, or it is so out of touch it had no idea that the public would react so negatively to its action.” The public now turned to the president to use his leadership to press the *Guurti* to reject the bill and return it to the Lower House. On January 25<sup>th</sup>, however, the president unexpectedly left the country for South Africa. His departure at this critical time made the public even more suspicious, and questions were raised about the extent of his “collaboration” with the parliament over their bill.

To keep up public pressure on the parliament, and particularly the *Guurti*, the APD promptly organised a public forum to debate the controversial bill. The debate, attended by key ministers and MPs, members of the three political parties, women’s groups and civic organisations, was highly charged and confrontational – with members of the public staging an all-out offensive against the MPs. As usual, the lawmakers defended themselves by heaping blame on the government and the NEC, which in turn publicly denounced the MPs. The Minister of Finance summed up the public mood by declaring that “our political destiny will not and cannot be held hostage by 62 MPs” – the number who voted for the controversial electoral bill.

This statement, which dominated the front-page headlines the following day, sent shockwaves throughout Somaliland. Many UDUB MPs’ supporters felt that they had been abandoned by the government. Even the chairman of the *Guurti* went so far as to publicly accuse the APD of stirring up public animosity towards the parliament.

On February 5<sup>th</sup> 2005, the *Guurti* followed the House of Representatives by passing the controversial electoral law with a two-thirds majority. In doing so, the *Guurti* publicly broke rank with the president and the government in an unprecedented and openly hostile manner. However, once again, the public rose to the occasion, with a variety of civic organisations openly accusing the *Guurti*’s members of personally jeopardising the peace, security and political future of Somaliland.

### Resolving the Distribution of Seats

The political uncertainty in which the country now found itself called into question the commitment of both Houses of Parliament, as well as the president himself, to the democratisation process. From the APD’s point of view, the leadership of the president, together with the involvement of the NEC and the three political parties, was needed now more than ever. With the president outside the country, fortunately the vice president and the NEC leadership rose to the occasion. The vice president told the NEC and the three political parties: “It is your call, as you are the main stakeholders in the election process.” February 2005 would prove to be a critical month for the very future of Somaliland.

Both the NEC and the APD felt that the three political parties were in the best position to solve the controversial issue of seat distribution. In the second week of February, the APD hosted a week-long consultative meeting between the NEC and the parties to seek common ground on the issue. After a tough series of negotiations adjudicated by the NEC chairman, the parties agreed to a minor modification of the 1960 arrangement, through which seats had been distributed to regions according to the size of their

populations or for political reasons (that is, to appease certain interest groups). The parties also agreed to stick to the March 29<sup>th</sup> election deadline, and to disregard the obstructive provisions of the two chambers of parliament, where the general perception was that many MPs were fearing they would not be re-elected.

Despite protestations from the people of Awdal, who felt the 1960 arrangement did not allocate them sufficient seats, the joint agreement was to prove a crucial breakthrough. The three political parties had succeeded where both the government and parliament had failed: to reach an acceptable compromise on the distribution of seats in the House of Representatives.

The question remained as to why the government and parliament had failed in this endeavour. The plausible explanation offered by several observers was that, for the government’s part, both the president and the vice president were facing growing pressure from their own clans – the former to get more seats for Awdal, the latter not to accept any reduction for Saaxil, which was likely to lose some seats due to demographic changes since 1960. As for the parliament, clan interests were even more acute, with MPs under immense pressure from their clans to defend their respective positions and seats.

Table 1: Agreed Distribution of Parliamentary Seats

Region	Seats
Hargeysa	20
Togdheer	15
Awdal	13
Sanaag	12
Sool	12
Saaxil	10
Total	82

However, to all intents and purposes, the political parties’ agreement on the distribution of parliamentary seats would count for nothing unless the president accepted the new arrangement.

### Ratifying the Electoral Bill

Upon the president’s return from South Africa, the APD team met with him in Djibouti, where they updated him on progress at home. The president expressed disappointment at the decision of the *Guurti*, which had given him an undertaking before he left to amend the law. And he reassured the Academy of his personal commitment to moving the electoral process forward on the ground.

Meanwhile, the opposition parties had stepped up their pressure on the government. The leadership of both Kulmiye and UCID laid the blame squarely on the shoulders of the president, who they said should personally bear the responsibility for any consequences arising from the lack of an election. The chairman of UCID pointed out that, if parliamentary elections were delayed, there would be no legal government or parliament, while the chairman of Kulmiye called for a nationwide demonstration if there were no elections on March 29<sup>th</sup>. Although the public had mixed feelings towards the opposition parties, all agreed on one thing: the fate of the country now hinged on the president.

Under mounting pressure, Rayaale referred the electoral bill to the Constitutional Court, after accusing the two houses of sabotaging the election for the sake of their own political careers. On February 26<sup>th</sup>, the Constitutional Court duly ruled in favour of the government, ruling that some articles of the bill contravened

the constitution by hindering the holding of national elections. Although the decision was widely hailed by the government, the opposition and the public at large, the new *Guurti* chairman, Suleybaan Maxamuud Aadan, and some MPs in the Lower House continued to publicly lambast the president.

The government was now divided on the legal status of the electoral bill, with some saying that elections could simply be held under the law with the contentious clauses removed, while others argued that the law – and particularly the new article on the distribution of seats – should at least be ratified by the House of Representatives. While the majority supported the joint solution of the three political parties, others, reportedly including the president, wanted to hold the election and then allocate seats afterwards based upon each region's performance. Divisions ran even deeper over the issue of Sool and Sanaag, with some supporting the nomination of local MPs, others favouring postponement, and others still proposing that the seats be divided among the three parties on the basis of the proportion of valid votes gained by each.



*Despite the long queues, the public demonstrated remarkable patience in waiting to cast their votes...*

With so many issues colliding, the government eventually moved to postpone the elections without fixing a new date. On March 27<sup>th</sup>, the president forwarded a series of proposed amendments to the electoral law to the House of Representatives, which was requested to approve the law – without the involvement of the *Guurti*. The amendments included the allocation of parliamentary seats in accordance with the political parties' joint agreement. On April 2<sup>nd</sup>, the house approved the proposed amendments, with the exception of the proposal to increase the size of the electoral commission, thus paving the way for the

election. (Although the house wanted to increase the NEC to nine members, with Kulmiye nominating one of the new commissioners, the president's opposition to this proposal eventually saw it rejected.)

Another issue of contention was whether it would legally be possible to hold the elections on September 15<sup>th</sup> without extending the term of the Lower House, which was due to expire at the end of May. However, in the event, it was mutually agreed to extend the term of the house, through a special resolution by the *Guurti*, until October 17<sup>th</sup>.

### Securing International Support

A major concern throughout 2004 and 2005 was whether the elections would receive financial support from the international community, and particularly from those who had supported the two previous elections. The NEC was able to meet the donors twice in Nairobi, although on each occasion the donors did not commit either funding or more general support (CIIR/ICD, December 2004). That being said, however, there were positive signs that the final report of the external advisor on the electoral law, Ruben Zamora, did help to generate greater international interest in Somaliland's democratisation process.

For its part, the APD continued to inform the donors and other international supporters through WSP International of ongoing progress in the run up to the elections. By late 2004, the donors had agreed in principle to fund the elections, and formally requested the NEC to identify a suitable international partner through which its funding could be channelled. The NEC in turn approached the APD and WSP International, which competed with other international institutions for the opportunity and was ultimately selected by NEC. WSP saw this as a natural "spin-off" from its work with the Academy and the Somaliland community in general.



Working with the NEC, WSP developed a formal programme and final budget to guide the funding of the elections by the EC, Switzerland, DfID, Norway and Denmark (with USAID providing support for the training of political parties through IRI and for civic education). Once the funds had been committed in April 2005, WSP and the APD put in place several mechanisms to ensure that the funds were channelled efficiently and transparently to the NEC. These included: project-specific financial policies and a procedures manual that was developed collaboratively with the NEC and WSP; a three-way accounting system between WSP, APD and the NEC; separation of international funds from State funds in NEC’s financial management; and stringent cashflow mechanisms that ensured both necessary cashflow and effective accountability. In order to avoid the impression that WSP and the Academy were “running the show,” a team of international and domestic experts was appointed to be stationed at the NEC’s offices to act as a formal interface between the NEC and APD/WSP. In Nairobi, the Democratisation Programme Steering Committee, chaired by the EC, met regularly for briefings on the progress of the electoral process and to guide management of the process (see Annex 4 for the Terms of Reference).

**Establishing a Political Code of Conduct**

The need for a Code of Conduct to guide relations between the political parties in the run up to the elections was clearly illustrated by a series of events that exposed a deepening rift between the government and Kulmiye. On April 4<sup>th</sup> – just two days after the electoral law was finally agreed – the Somaliland police raided Kulmiye’s offices in Hargeysa to search for transmission equipment allegedly used to broadcast a controversial radio station called Horyaal. Although no such equipment was found, the police confiscated a laptop computer. When it became clear that neither the premises nor the computer had anything to do with Radio Horyaal, Kulmiye’s leaders immediately suspended all links with the government, claiming it was trying to create an “*xallad abuur*” (“political crisis”) to block progress towards the election.

In order to contain the crisis before it spiralled out of control, efforts to mediate between the government and Kulmiye began in earnest. While the president privately admitted that the raid had been a mistake, however, he did not publicly apologise until mid-May – by which time the opposition had already mounted a serious challenge to his presidency. For some time, reports had been circulating that more than 40 MPs, with the financial backing of Kulmiye, were planning to table a motion to impeach Rayaale. On May 9<sup>th</sup>, the day they were supposed to introduce the measure, however, the first Deputy Speaker adjourned the house for 45 days on procedural grounds to deter them. The closure divided the lawmakers and their leaders, leading to skirmishes between some of the MPs and the sealing off of the premises by security forces.



....even when they had to wait in the baking sun

The war of words between the government and Kulmiye continued to intensify, with Rayaale accusing certain leaders of offering \$1,500 to MPs to impeach an elected president. The government also used the state-owned media, particularly its radio stations, to vilify the opposition. Kulmiye in turn countered with its own “propaganda,” accusing the government of leading the country towards civil war.

*General principles:* Discussions on a Code of Conduct for the election began in the midst of this acrimonious environment. The two previous elections had both been run under such codes, although these had not been signed into law and were regarded more as “gentlemen’s agreements.” This time around, several parties had expressed a desire for a legally binding Code of Conduct. Once again, it was left to the parties to develop their own code under the auspices of the NEC, with the APD hosting their consultations.

Twice-weekly meetings on the code took place between mid-May and mid-July, with a second phase dealing with the issue of Sool and Sanaag continuing into the second week of August. Despite the ongoing hostility between the government and Kulmiye, the opposition party did attend all the meetings – although they did not hide the fact that they considered them an exercise in futility. The ruling UDUB party, however, remained more upbeat, even appearing ready to distance itself from the government. The NEC, too, seemed determined to do whatever was deemed necessary to boost the opposition’s confidence in the Code of Conduct.

The NEC chairman, Ahmed Haji Ali Adami, who was adjudicating the discussions, warned the party representatives against letting residual “political tensions” derail the process. The discussions revolved around three main issues: seeking common solutions to loopholes in the electoral law; instigating measures to monitor the use of public resources; and assigning seats to the non-voting areas of Sool and Sanaag. Despite a generally cordial and constructive tone, the discussions were punctuated by occasional flare-ups between the government/UDUB and Kulmiye. Mr. Zamora, in particular, was extremely concerned that the continuing hostility between the parties could yet derail the electoral process. However, when the APD invited him to one of the meetings on the Code of Conduct, Mr. Zamora was impressed to find the same groups who were attacking each other in the press sitting side by side, cordially discussing issues pertaining to the election. He was quoted as saying that he found it very difficult to understand the Somalilanders’ psyche.

While the participants had little difficulty resolving the issues concerning the election process and the loopholes in the electoral law, they faced an uphill struggle in dealing with the more controversial issues of public resources and Sool and Sanaag. Ensuring equal access to the public media and the government’s use of other public resources proved to be particularly contentious. The NEC proposed the formation of an independent body under its auspices to monitor the media and the government’s use of public resources. During the campaign period, the three parties would be given equal allotments of time on public radio to air their programmes. However, Kulmiye argued that the period of equal media access should begin right away. If public media channels remained biased towards the ruling party, Kulmiye said, the NEC should not use them to carry out any civic education programmes on its behalf.

The NEC concurred with Kulmiye’s standpoint and pressed the government to make radio stations fair and accessible to all, even before the campaign got underway. As a result, the president issued a directive to the Ministry of Information to give all parties equal access to the radio. One of the immediate outcomes of this decree was the groundbreaking broadcast of an entire speech by the chairman of Kulmiye on Radio Hargeysa, which was widely regarded as a very positive development by all. However, despite this positive outcome, Kulmiye continued to protest about radio propaganda directed against them – and Radio Hargeysa continued its occasional attacks against Kulmiye.

Finally, on July 18<sup>th</sup>, the vice president and the two chairmen of Kulmiye and UCID signed the Political Parties Election Code of Conduct in a ceremony organised by the APD. The signing was hailed as a clear demonstration of the three parties’ commitment to the elections – and a vital step in the country’s march towards multiparty politics.

The new code contained several groundbreaking additions, which made it a clear improvement on its predecessors. These included: the establishment of an Election Monitoring Board under the auspices of the NEC; the allocation of equal airtime for all political parties on Radio Hargeysa; and the establishment of a clear timetable for public political rallies.

*Women candidates:* While the new constitution had affirmed the rights of women to vote and hold public office, this was another issue that appeared likely to raise heckles on the male-dominated political scene.

The 2002 local elections had proved that cultural beliefs and tradition still stood in the way of equitable participation in Somaliland politics, with only two women elected among 300 councillors. However, since then, there had been strong advocacy for greater women's participation, with several women's groups calling for quotas to ensure parliamentary seats for women. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the lawmakers refused to establish such quotas on constitutional grounds. A proposal by the international consultant to create a proportional system for male-female representation in the party's candidate listings was also dismissed by the MPs.

As the whole nomination exercise was rapidly turning into a "clan affair" – which naturally discriminated against women – the parties had difficulty in honouring pledges to increase female candidacy. When the APD and WSP asked the NEC to press for a clause in the Code of Conduct to allow for more women candidates, none of the party representatives appeared enthusiastic to address the issue. For the representatives, it was unrealistic and impractical to nominate large numbers of women, as they were seen as unlikely to generate votes. However, they did agree to include a statement in the code calling on parties to encourage women's contention.

*Sool and Sanaag:* One of the most contentious issues in the run up to the elections concerned the allocation of seats to non-voting areas in the regions of Sool and Sanaag, and Buuhodle District in Togdheer. It took the three political parties and the NEC a whole month to resolve this issue. What made the allocation of seats to non-voting areas particularly difficult was a combination of conflicting party and clan interests, compounded by legal ambiguities.

The electoral law had stated that seats would be "distributed to parties on the basis of the proportion of total valid votes that each party gained in the relevant region, when the election is not taking place in some part of the region... If however, the election cannot take place in the whole region, *the seats for that region shall be divided among the parties on the basis of the proportion of total valid votes each gained throughout the country.*" While all three parties agreed on the application of the first part of this provision in Sanaag and Togdheer, a dispute arose concerning its application in Sool, where the majority of the population would not be voting. While Kulmiye and UDUB claimed that the provision could be applied, as some groups in Sool were voting, UCID and the NEC argued that the italicised clause should be applied, as there was a risk of a small group of voters determining the fate of an entire region.

Suspensions also emerged over the political makeup of the areas in Sool where voting would take place. It was widely known that most of these areas were traditional Kulmiye strongholds, which made sense of Kulmiye wanting them to determine the seats allocated to the wider region. What was harder to explain was UDUB's support for this prospect, which – understandably – led to accusations in some quarters that the ruling party must be planning some sort of vote-rigging.

Another factor complicating the Sool issue was the issue of how to – and who should – determine whether an area was secure enough to have free and fair elections. The electoral law stated that, "If serious circumstances or situations do not permit the holding of the election in any locality of the country, the [NEC] shall evaluate the situation and arrive at a decision about it after having gained the agreement of the government and national parties."

While UDUB claimed it should be the government that ultimately decides whether an area is secure or not, the opposition parties argued that the NEC should have the final say after consulting the government, regional authorities and the political parties. The parties pointed out that, as the government was an interested party in the election, it should not have the final decision. The NEC, keen to avoid another confrontation with the government before the resolution of the Sool crisis, remained undecided – hoping, it appeared, that the three parties would resolve the issue on their own.

In the first preliminary security assessment presented to the three parties, the NEC recommended that normal voting should take place throughout Awdal, Hargeysa and Saahil, while in Sanaag it should take place everywhere but the districts of Lasqoray, Badhan and Dhahar, and in Togdheer there should be no voting in half of Buuhodle. In Sool, the Commission recommended that there should be voting only in the district of Caynabo and 10 polling stations in Laas Caanood.

All three parties accepted this assessment, but raised doubts about the 10 polling stations in Laas Caanood. They also requested that the NEC include the parties in a final assessment of the voting situation. After lengthy discussions, it was decided to send another mission to those parts of Laas Caanood where the NEC believed that polling was possible.

Meanwhile, some individuals from the disputed areas also raised concerns about holding elections in the Dhulbahante areas of Sool because people were unlikely to vote and, they said, any parliamentary seats assigned to these areas were thus likely to be regarded as a “gift” to the Isaaq. Despite these warnings, however, suggestions to designate the areas as “non-contesting” or to delay voting here were largely ignored – and no real solutions were sought to this issue. In the event, as predicted, Isaaq candidates won all six of the seats allocated to the voting areas in Sool.

When it came to the allocation of seats in Sool, the opposition parties and the NEC were more circumspect. Although they believed it was good for the Somaliland cause to maximise the voting areas, they knew



*Women return home after casting their votes in Berbera*

that voting would be very difficult in the Dhulbahante areas, where they were leaning towards a proposal to allocate 1-3 seats to voting areas and 9-10 seats to non-voting areas. Unfortunately, however, some Dhulbahante officials in the government and UDUB continued to insist on holding elections in these areas, under the pretext of upholding the national interest. Some officials even claimed that 10 polling stations were insufficient for these areas.

The second mission to the disputed areas consisted of commissioners from the NEC and two representatives from each political party. The APD provided the transport. However, when the mission was due to depart, the UDUB representatives did not show up and the mission had to leave without them. It transpired that UDUB’s leaders had been against the mission, as it went against their belief that the government should determine which areas were secure and which were not. Although the UDUB chairman drafted a letter to the NEC protesting against the mission, the commission did not receive this letter until later.

In its report back to the party meetings, the joint mission confirmed that it would be difficult to guarantee free and fair elections in the disputed areas. Although the local military commander told the mission that it would be possible to secure three polling stations on tarmac roads, it was his impression that other areas were not suited to voting. However, the government repudiated his evaluation and requested that he come to the NEC to retract his assessment – which is precisely what he did.

To make the government’s position official, the Minister of Interior and the State Minister of Interior presented their own security assessments to the NEC and the political parties in which they reported that voting could take place in 31 polling stations in the Yagoori area of Laas Caanood – contradicting both the NEC’s and the joint mission’s assessments. As the government had stated that it was responsible for security, the NEC had no choice but to deliver ballot boxes to Yagoori – despite vehement objections from the opposition parties.

It was now the turn of the political parties to present their propositions for Sool. UDUB's proposal to allocate 10 seats to the region's voting areas and two to its non-voting areas drew widespread suspicion, with several opposition members accusing it of providing a "cover" for vote-rigging. The issue was concluded when Kulmiye – convinced that most of the seats in the non-voting areas would go to locals from Caynabo – proposed raising the allocation for these areas from 2-3 seats to five. Finally, they agreed to allocate six seats to the voting areas of Sool and six to the non-voting areas.

For Sanaag, meanwhile, it was agreed to allocate two seats to the non-voting districts and the remaining 10 to the voting areas, while in Togdheer one seat was committed to non-voting areas and 14 to the voting areas. However, some people still questioned the rationale for allocating just one seat to Buuhodle, while Caynabo would receive three seats.

### Devising a Media Code of Conduct

Following widespread complaints about biased and imbalanced media coverage during the presidential election, many stakeholders had emphasised the need for consensual guidelines to govern the conduct and control of the local media. As well as vociferous complaints from the opposition parties about UDUB's monopolisation of national radio, there was also a perception that some private media channels were resorting to sensational and biased reporting in favour of the opposition. It was clear that a national Code of Conduct was urgently required to promote fair reporting and equal media access to all the contesting parties and their candidates.

The BBC's World Service Trust, which has lengthy experience in providing training to Somaliland's journalists, had expressed a willingness to assist in developing national media guidelines for the elections. However, the Trust had already experienced differences with some local journalists during its training programmes – making it difficult for the organisation to bring together all local media groups in an impartial manner. So the Trust approached the APD to organise a workshop on the process, while it would hire an international consultant to facilitate and assist in writing a formal code. At the end of the workshop, it was intended that all the major media houses would sign a Code of Conduct pledging their commitment to an agreed set of reporting guidelines.

Organising the media, however, proved to be a complex task. Some journalists were suspicious of the APD's role in the process, accusing the Academy of over-stepping their mandate and even benefiting financially from the workshop. Whether or not to invite the controversial Radio Horyaal also proved a major sticking-point. In order to avoid these potential minefields, the APD organised the workshop under the auspices of the NEC.

Before the workshop, the APD and the NEC hosted a consultative meeting with representatives of the media and the political parties. Several controversial issues were discussed, including the assertion by Kulmiye and some media groups that Radio Horyaal – the station run by members of the diaspora in Europe – should be able to participate. The NEC assured the opposition that Radio Horyaal would be invited to the workshop. One media house objected to the World Service Trust's involvement, claiming that it had denied them participation in a 3 million training programme, while several journalists said they considered the whole process an unnecessary "imposition" on the media. The NEC chairman, for his part, urged the participants to resolve their differences, telling them that the workshop was being openly funded by the British government, which was determined to support a free and fair election process. The following day, the Deputy Minister of Information wrote to the APD and NEC, saying that the ministry would not welcome the participation of Radio Horyaal at the workshop.

Despite these residual disputes, however, the workshop began as scheduled on July 3<sup>rd</sup> 2005 in Hargeysa. After the opening, however, the Deputy Minister of Information discovered that representatives of Radio Horyaal were present – invited, like everyone else, by the NEC – and walked out in protest. Although the workshop participants did manage to draft a consensual Media Code of Conduct, the government refused to sign it if Radio Horyaal was a signatory. Fortunately, at this stage, the two major journalism associations agreed to put aside their differences and devise a solution – that they would sign the code on behalf of all the public and private media organisations in Somaliland. The code was subsequently signed on July 18<sup>th</sup>.

Rather than create a separate monitoring committee for the media, however, the NEC suggested that a number of media representatives should be seconded to the Election Monitoring Board.

### Monitoring Regional and District Electoral Officers

Unlike the presidential elections, the final outcomes of the parliamentary elections would be announced at the regional level – making the competency and impartiality of the regional and district electoral officers particularly critical. To enhance the transparency of the selection of these officials, the NEC agreed to include the political parties and local leaders in the selection process. However, the Commission did not embrace the suggestion to involve civic organisations in the process, fearing that this might introduce unnecessary complications. This being said, an exception was made for the APD, which was invited to monitor the selection process, as well as providing transport to the political parties' representatives.

The NEC's primary goal was to appoint competent, independent electoral commission offices to manage the election at the regional and district levels. In appointing the officials to man these offices, however, the overriding issue became one of clan balance rather than of the individuals' impartiality, integrity or competence. Even the political party agents, who were supposed to be promoting their parties' policies, were often found to be advocating for their clan's or sub-clan's interests. Unfortunately, this quest for clan balance also prevented some women's and marginalised groups from being considered for selection in the regional and district electoral offices.

The selection process itself had mixed results. In some places, particularly at the district level, the selection of officials proved relatively easy. However, at the regional level, where clan rivalry is more acute, the selection was often very contentious, taking several days to finalise. To ensure continuity, the NEC tried to give priority to established officials who had clean records from the previous election. For other positions, it would consult with the political parties and local leaders to try to reach consensus. The selection was particularly difficult in the regions of Awdal, Togdheer, and Sanaag, where several clans wanted to see their own people appointed to the electoral offices. This clan wrangling was often motivated purely by the desire to seek employment. In the event, the NEC exercised admirable patience and diplomacy to come up with the most competent, representative and acceptable officials for each electoral zone.

### Providing Candidate Training and Civic Education

After selecting the electoral officials, the NEC asked the APD to conduct a one-day national training workshop for all of the 246 election candidates and regional electoral officials. The purpose of the workshop was to ensure that the candidates and regional officials were properly versed in the electoral law and the Code of Conduct for the running of the elections – which all the candidates were required to sign. Held simultaneously in each of the six regions on August 14<sup>th</sup>, the training workshops were attended by 137 of the candidates and 12 regional officials.

The APD also conducted two civic education workshops in Hargeysa and Boorome to enhance public awareness about the elections. During these workshops, civic organisations and members of the public were invited to discuss what constitutes a free and fair election and the roles of different organisations in the election process, including the NEC, the security forces, civic organisations and the media.

Following the workshops, the Academy proposed compiling the various points and materials that emerged from the discussions in a Voter Education Handbook. Over a three-week period, an APD researcher, a consultant from the NEC, and a trainer from the Forum for Peace and Governance (FOPAG, affiliated to the Life and Peace Institute) met regularly to produce a draft Somali-language handbook, providing information on democracy, the roles of different stakeholders, citizens' rights, voting, and the election process. After the draft was reviewed by the NEC, the APD staged a further two-day workshop to invite and incorporate comments from other key stakeholders, including political parties, media groups, civic organisations, law enforcement institutions, and the public at large.

When the first tranche of funding for the NEC arrived in late May 2005, the handbook was published with an initial print run of 5,000 copies. The books were distributed to civic organisations as well as to the regional and district electoral commission offices.

However, with no clear indications of the impact of the handbook (or confirmation that it was winding up in the hands of literary voters), the NEC approached the EC directly to finance a more comprehensive voter education exercise. When this matter was brought to the attention of the WSP/APD, the WSP's Nairobi team came to Hargeysa to address the NEC's funding concerns. A financial manual was duly developed and approved by WSP, the APD and the NEC.



*After counting the ballots at the polling stations, tally sheets were taken to district electoral offices and aggregated before being sent for final tallying [pictured] at the regional electoral office*

In an effort to broaden the reach of public education on the election, the NEC engaged a range of local NGOs in a concerted push to raise awareness among voters. Nagaad, a local NGO umbrella organisation, had already secured significant funding for domestic election observation – an area also covered under the EC budget – but agreed instead to commit its resources to voter education. With the NEC's coordination, Nagaad duly trained 25 representatives from several NGOs, including Cosongo and Havyoco, to take a concerted civic education campaign to all regions. Havyoco subsequently ran a voter education outreach programme through drama and circus shows in both rural and urban areas, and the APD also produced an 18-minute film to deliver critical voter information through mobile film units in rural areas. The film was also shown on Somaliland TV.

### Supporting a High-Level Donor Mission on Pre-Election Preparations

In late August 2005, a delegation of members of the Democratisation Programme Steering Committee, including representatives of the EC, the UK, the US, Norway, Switzerland and Italy, together with WSP, visited Hargeysa for briefings on progress towards the parliamentary elections. They met with members of the NEC, civil society representatives (Cosongo, Nagaad, APD, Fopag and Havyoco), the Ministers of Interior and Information, the police commissioner, political parties, and the president. The mission was also briefed by three women candidates and a representative of Nagaad's Women's Decision Making Forum on the challenges facing women in the elections, relating to lack of financial backing, the importance of the clan in the selection of candidates and campaigning, and low levels of political awareness among women.

The mission reported that they were highly encouraged by the progress made to date in pre-election preparations and by the general public's willingness and commitment to holding free and fair elections. They agreed to assist in the mobilisation of Nairobi-based volunteer observers, to be coordinated by ICD (since re-named Progressio), as well as the establishment in Hargeysa of a working group of relevant stakeholders to coordinate security and logistical issues.

## Maintaining Inter-Clan Peace

The NEC and the government faced particular difficulty in demarcating six polling stations to the north of Hargeysa, where communities from the Gudabirsi and Habar-Awal sub-clans had expressed a strong desire to be allocated to the Awdal, Saahil or Hargeysa regions. The feelings in these areas ran so high that it appeared impossible to make a decision on demarcation without offending at least one of the sub-clans – and potentially leading to civil unrest. Initially the Minister of Interior had allocated the disputed polling stations to Awdal, but, after strong protests from the Habar-Awal, the decision was revoked and a compromise proposed through which each station would have a ballot box for each of the three regions – giving each voter the opportunity to vote “within” the region he or she preferred. Eventually, however, the NEC was forced to cancel the disputed polling stations on security grounds, despite a strong challenge from the government on the legality of the move. The decision was also roundly condemned by leaders from the disputed areas, who called for a boycott of the election.

In order to calm the situation and persuade the contesting sub-clan leaders to participate in the election, the APD sponsored a mission from the House of Elders to the disputed areas in September. Fortunately, the *Guurti* members were able to convince the leaders to overcome their suspicions and encourage their electorates to vote at the nearest polling station. Although the mission was supposed to be confined to the north of Hargeysa, the *Guurti* members also voluntarily travelled to several other areas, urging the public to exercise patience and to maintain peace during the elections.

Later in September, the APD also sponsored a second mission to Ceergaabo, where Wersangeli leaders had issued a boycott call after receiving only two seats for their non-voting districts. On the advice of the NEC, the Academy was able to compile a mission of Wersangeli leaders from Hargeysa, who successfully persuaded their counterparts in Ceergaabo to withdraw their threat and persuade their countrymen to take part in the elections.

## Observing the Polling Process

On September 29<sup>th</sup> 2005, Somalilanders turned out to elect a new parliament for the first time since 1969. The conduct of the poll was gratifyingly peaceful, free and orderly. At the end of the polling process, both domestic and international observers declared the exercise to have been fair and transparent, and the atmosphere at the polling stations peaceful.

The elections attracted 76 international observers from a variety of organisations and governments. Although some minor irregularities were noted, the observers’ reports were consistently positive, and all concurred that the irregularities had no substantial bearing upon the election outcome. For their part, the APD’s observation teams expressed broad satisfaction with the exercise, making the following general observations:

- The election was generally free, transparent and peaceful, with no major irregularities, despite apparent attempts at multiple voting on the part of some voters and occasional underage voting.
- The teams were deeply impressed by the determination of the people of Somaliland to exercise their democratic rights. At polling stations across the country, voters queued patiently and peacefully, and sometimes for very long periods. They were also impressed by the dedication and conscientiousness of most of the polling staff, party agents, security forces and domestic observers, many of whom also had to work long hours without rest or sleep.
- The majority of the polling stations opened on time. Some stations were late for a variety of reasons, including: preparing the voting booths; lack of furnishings; lateness of party agents and polling staff members.
- Despite concerns that not all voters would get a chance to vote, most polling stations had very high turnovers, with one station in Hargeysa polling more than 1,000 votes – or nearly 100 voters per hour.



One explanation for this impressive rate was that the chairperson of the station was personally very proactive, helping most of the illiterate voters to cast their votes.

- In some polling stations, in order to speed up the process, 8-10 voters were allowed to enter the station together – although this sometimes led to confusion and compromised voting supervision and secrecy.
- Because the polling staff had been well trained in voting procedures, they proved to be very helpful for illiterate voters, old people and the disabled. Similarly, party agents were present in all the polling stations visited, with the exception of one in Hargeysa where UDUB was not represented. Where present, the domestic observers appeared well trained and attentive, observing the process without



*After ballots had been counted at each polling station, under the supervision of the electoral officers and political party agents, the ballot boxes were moved amid tight security to the regional electoral office*

any interference.

- Security forces were present in all of the polling stations, maintaining order in a professional but friendly manner. Later in the day, some stations became congested as voters congregated in the entrances, pushing and shoving, and making it difficult for the security forces to keep order. But by and large, the crowds were good natured and well behaved, and there was no intimidation of voters or staff. No voters were turned back, with the exception of underage and would-be double-voters, some of whom were detained.
- In one incident at a polling station in Saaxil, the police “roughed up” voters and hit one woman, who had to be taken to hospital. There were also a few occasions where first-time voters were turned back after ink was spotted on their hands – even though they had not voted before.
- There were significant attempts at double-voting in several areas. Some double-voters escaped detection due to lapses in scrutiny, the complicity of accomplices, or attempts at double-voting in the late hours, when the supervisors were understandably exhausted. Most of the polling stations closed on time, with the exception of Berbera, where the weather was very hot and many people came to vote in the evening.
- Many polling station staff delayed starting the counting process as they felt they had not had sufficient training. Although the process was long and tedious, it was by and large conducted with admirable transparency.

### Defusing Post-Election Tensions

While most Somalilanders were glad to find polling day passing so peacefully, there were no immediate celebrations – as everyone was all too aware that the post-election period was just as precarious as polling day. After the presidential election, in which the post-election period was marred by arguments and recriminations, everyone hoped that the parliamentary results would be quick in coming and amicably received. For most, the prevailing attitude was: “Give us 82 parliamentarians, regardless of their party or clan affiliations, who are accepted by all in a peaceful manner.”

As soon as the polling stations closed, the focus switched to the NEC. The day after Election Day, the NEC chairman announced that the results would be ready after 14 days – four more days than the period stipulated in the electoral law. But critics were quick to question the new timeframe, which they feared could raise controversies similar to those witnessed after the presidential election.

Unfortunately, however, the counting process at the polling stations proved to be difficult and drawn out, conducted by exhausted staff and party agents in cramped, poorly-lit conditions. The Hargeysa region, where they had to count the votes for 60 candidates, inevitably encountered some disputes, with UDUB officials questioning the accuracy of the vote-counting process. Some of these officials took their cases to national TV and other media outlets, where they discredited the vote-counting and demanded a recount of the entire region. Regardless of the merits of their argument, it appeared as though UDUB and the government were seeking a showdown with the NEC – and potentially jeopardising the entire election result.

With a crisis looming, the NEC called the APD to explore the possibility of some kind of intervention. As it was Ramadan, the Commission’s call came at night, when they found the APD’s executive and a WSP official meeting at the office. Fortunately, the call coincided with the meeting of an APD colleague with the president. The Academy was thus able to bring the matter to the immediate attention of the president, who appeared to be unaware of the UDUB demands and agreed that a full recount was neither necessary nor appropriate. The following morning, the president assigned the vice president to resolve the voting controversy. The VP in turn convened a meeting with representatives of the three political parties and the NEC, at which they reached a compromise to revisit only those ballot boxes with serious discrepancies in vote tabulation.

This agreement enabled the election results to be announced without further delay. The first preliminary regional results were announced on October 4<sup>th</sup>, starting with Saaxil, followed by Sanaag and Awdal, and then Togdheer. Many of the regional electoral officers were courageous enough to declare the results under intense pressure from the losing parties, which were pressing them to withhold the results. In fact, many of the losing candidates and their supporters blamed the regional chairmen for their losses. “Even my mother-in-law was holding me responsible for the loss of my brother-in-law,” lamented one chairman. Unlike the presidential election, where the final outcome depended upon the results of every region, the early announcement of these regions’ results helped to release some of the intense pressure that had built up on the NEC.

Every time the Commission postponed the announcement of the results from Hargeysa, however, the allegations of fraud and vote-fixing grew louder – and the crowd around the NEC offices grew more restless. With every passing day, greater doubts were expressed as to whether all the candidates and their supporters would accept the results. In this pressure-cooker environment, the NEC finally declared the Hargeysa result on October 14<sup>th</sup> – and forwarded preliminary results from the entire country to the Supreme Court to be ratified. The final result gave the ruling party UDUB 33 seats, Kulmiye 28 seats, and UCID 21 seats – giving the opposition a combined majority of 49 seats.

Table 2: Final Results of the Somaliland Parliamentary Elections

Party	Parliamentary Seats	Parliamentary Seats (%)
UDUB	33	40
Kulmiye	28	34
UCID	21	26
Total	82	100

Source: NEC, 2005.

## 5. Analysis and Lessons Learned

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As in any democratic election, Somaliland's electoral authorities sought to establish a comprehensive legal framework and a network of autonomous institutions to support the electoral process, including an independent electoral commission and an election monitoring board. Both these legal procedures and institutions, however, had to remain extremely flexible in order to accommodate the country's dynamic social culture and unpredictable political environment. Making compromising concessions to prevailing social and political realities was the order of the day to ensure that the country's first legislative elections passed off fairly and peacefully.

In terms of democracy, elections are a means rather than an end. Through democratic elections that took account of their unique social and political forces, Somalilanders were able to elect a new parliament to represent and advance their hopes and aspirations. The lesson that can be drawn from this particular experience is that, no matter what conditions and traditions shape our democratic "means," the "end" is usually the same: competent representative bodies, accountable leadership, and effective public participation.

Although lack of international recognition denied Somaliland significant support for its previous elections, this election saw more than 70% of the total operational costs covered by international partners. Despite this strong international presence, however, the election process remained essentially a "Somali affair" – from its earliest conceptual phases to the electoral process and the critical period of political consolidation that followed, in which not a single result was contested. The question is how this was made possible.

The answer lies largely in the unique policy of practical, non-interventionist support that enabled WSP and the APD, while channelling funds from the international community to the NEC, to address both sides' concerns *and* remain firmly "in the background" on matters of governance and statehood. The NEC's concerns included fluctuating cash flows, unrealistic financial procedures, and multiple pressures that threatened to undermine its legitimacy. The donors, on the other hand, were concerned with unaccountable financial procedures and low returns on their investments. The WSP/APD arrangement involved the creation of a Project Management Team, consisting of four international experts based at the NEC offices, who were there not to impose but to support and encourage – with local supporting staff to ensure that their advice remained realistic and flexible in the Somaliland context. The NEC, meanwhile, demonstrated its own operational flexibility in utilising the expertise offered to them, and in adopting internationally acceptable financial procedures and controls.

For WSP and the APD, this remained its toughest collaborative assignment to date. From the outset, the challenge was to strike a balance between ensuring a smooth, orderly and transparent electoral process grounded in the local context, and allowing the NEC to do its job effectively. Ultimately, the unique working arrangement developed to facilitate international support to Somaliland's election provided an illuminating illustration of how international assistance can encourage and sustain even the most sensitive locally driven enterprises.

While the NEC itself showed considerable flexibility in addressing the disparate concerns and priorities of the political parties, candidates, clan elders and the electorate, this flexibility also sometimes prevented it from making critical decisions at the right time. Throughout the electoral process, the Commission often had to play the role of mediator rather than of decision-maker. But because of its policy of encouraging opposing parties to reach compromises – and trying to avoid criticism itself – the NEC sometimes took weeks, if not months, to reach relatively simple decisions. As one of the project staff commented: "This

business of seeking consensus sometimes slows down the NEC's decision-making, because they have to consult more people, which makes it harder for them to make up their own minds." But the NEC was dismissive of such criticism, claiming that their consensus-based decision-making process was the most fitting in the circumstances.

The Sool issue was a case in point. In its failure to be decisive, the NEC clearly damaged the Dhulbahante's



Newly-elected MPs prepare for the inaugural session of parliament on November 29th 2005

prospects for better representation in the new parliament. After having ruled out voting in the Dhulbahante areas of Sool and eastern Sanaag in the presidential elections, the NEC bowed to pressure from the government and the political parties to allow voting here in the parliamentary elections – even though these areas had failed its own security assessments. In doing so, the Commission openly ignored the concerns of some of its members and the Dhulbahante leaders that holding elections in these parts of Sool would be tantamount to vote-rigging and “looting Dhulbahante seats.”

## 5.1 The Nomination Process

The presence in the electoral law of “open party lists” – through which each party's candidates competed equally for election regardless of their positions – enabled the parties to avoid having to decide an “order” for their candidates. Despite this, however, the nomination of candidates remained tense and divisive. While the open-lists system was undoubtedly beneficial to clan equity, it increased the influence of individual clans – at the expense of the parties' influence – in the nomination process. To some observers, the clan thus became the vehicle for the public to elect candidates, while the party became the vehicle for its clans to get into parliament.

The heavy influence of the clan system also denied nomination opportunities to two traditionally marginalised groups: women for their gender, and the Gabooye for their minority status. For women, the problem was twofold: the tendency of men to question women's clan loyalty, and the associated unwillingness of most clans to be represented by a woman. As one female activist remarked: “They often say to us, ‘Which clan will you represent – the one you are married to, or the clan of your family?’” These perceptions were reinforced by a widespread lack of financial backing for women candidates by their clans. Neither the constitution nor the electoral law set quotas for the representation of women. As a result, only seven women were presented by the parties out of a total of 246 candidates (two for UDUB, two for Kulmiye, and three for UCID), running for seats in Hargeysa (two), Sool, Sanaag, Boroma, Berbera and Burao. Of these seven candidates, only two were elected.

For the Gabooye, Somaliland's traditional “low caste” clan, it was more a question of their minority social status. Historically, the members of the *Beelaha Gabooye* have formed an endogamous community whose members perform tasks considered menial by more “noble” (“*aji*”) Somalis: leatherworking, metalworking, shoemaking, pottery. Some, notably the *Yibir*, are also reputed to be practitioners of sorcery. Unlike other Somalis, who are typically associated with one or more well-defined localities, the *Beelaha Gabooye* are found throughout the Somali territories, living as “clients” of the dominant *aji* groups. They are usually not permitted to inter-marry with other Somalis, and conventional paths to social mobility are not open to them (WSP/SCAP, 1999). As they are not dominant in any region and have no political, economic or social clout, no party considered them for nominations.

Although the political parties lacked more democratic mechanisms for selecting their candidates, the overriding strength of clan loyalties inevitably overcame any attempts to assert the relevance of the parties as purely political bodies. For any nominee, there were two considerations – clan nomination and political party affiliation – but clan was always the dominant factor. Within Kulmiye, for instance, it was reported that a candidate who had been nominated by the party was rejected by his clan, and – deprived of his clan's votes – ultimately wound up losing in the elections.

One might ask why individual clans and sub-clans were so eager to get into parliament. Were they really interested in the future direction of the country, or were they more driven by regional issues, such as inter-clan land disputes? In fairness, certain candidates *were* clearly motivated by honest patriotism, although others seemed more driven by clanic interests – not to mention the promise of a secure job. The clans, however, appeared to be largely involved for prestige: for the chance to demonstrate that they were still a political force to be reckoned with.

The fusion of clan-based and party politics in the nomination process could be indicative of the direction that Somaliland's body politic will take in the future. The open-lists system clearly has a negative impact on the development of effective political parties, by allowing candidates to promote the agendas of their clans rather than their parties – and, ultimately, keeping the country mired in clan-based politics. This emerged strongly as a concern of many Somalilanders during the nominations. Worries were also expressed that this system could hold back the development of effective parliamentary politics, by encouraging candidates to push local and clan issues rather than promoting a national agenda.

Another hotly contested issue related to the electoral system was the differentiation of clan and regional constituencies. Before the issue of the distribution of seats was resolved, the indigenous clans of Hargeysa had argued that, with more than 40% of the total electorate, their region should get at least 40% of the seats. Although this appeared to make a lot of sense, differences soon emerged over which clans could compete for these seats, with the indigenous clans fighting for their candidates, while others claimed that – as Hargeysa's population comprises members of every clan – every clan should have a right to contest these seats.

It came to be understood that the regional seat distribution was a disguised clan distribution – that each candidate could only contest in the region where his or her sub-clan belonged, not where he or she resided. In Hargeysa, however, where many non-indigenous sub-clans had a good chance of winning a seat, the parties duly nominated people from these sub-clans. This, of course, offended the indigenous sub-clans, which feared that the non-indigenous clans would pick up extra seats in Hargeysa, while also potentially winning seats in their home regions.

One high-profile example involved UCID's nomination of two Habar Yoonis candidates, which outraged Hargeysa's dominant Isaaq sub-clan of Habar Yoonis, as well as the closely related Ciidangale. The two sub-clans feared the nominations would deprive them of most of the Habar Yoonis vote in Hargeysa, which they had counted upon to win their parliamentary seats in the capital. Similarly, UDUB's nomination of a Gudabirsi candidate in Hargeysa angered the Sacad Muusa of Habar Awal, who saw it as a calculated move to secure an additional seat for the Gudabirsi.

The nomination of these candidates rekindled an old issue in Somali politics – of the political rights of indigenous people in the capital city, versus “outsiders” from rural regions. Many people attribute the chaos in Mogadishu to the fact that the city's indigenous people were overtaken by non-indigenous migrants, who gradually deprived them of their political and social rights. Today, in some quarters of Hargeysa, there is a similar fear that people arriving from the rural regions will eventually take over the political and social rights of the city's original inhabitants.

The debate over the right choice of voting system for Somaliland is destined to continue, as it will have a significant impact on the future path of the country's politics. The parliamentary elections have shown that the open-lists system does encourage clan-driven rather than party politics – something that many election experts warn is not conducive to the development of effective multiparty democracy in post-conflict countries.

## 5.2 The Campaign

Campaigning for the parliamentary elections was carried out at both the party and candidate levels. As all three parties generally lacked a common structure, strategy or vision for enunciating a unified campaign message, their candidates were left largely to their own devices to design and run their campaigns. Their electioneering activities thus tended to focus on their own sub-clan enclaves, with only a handful venturing outside their home areas. One universal activity was the opening by most candidates of a one-room office, where they could publicly address their supporters. Several candidates also developed other methods for publicising their campaigns, such as printing their images on posters and T-shirts, or staging small rallies. As in every election campaign, money was a serious factor, although in this election it was an issue for different reasons. First, the lack of rules on party expenditure reportedly enabled the ruling UDUB party to use public funds and resources to run a more intensive campaign than its opponents. Second, in a society characterised by extreme poverty, members of the electorate were more interested in extracting money from the candidates than contributing to them. As a result, candidates were compelled to solicit the political support of voters by paying cash or providing them with *qat*, the stimulant plant leaves that are consumed widely throughout Somaliland. Third, the parties quickly found that they did not have sufficient funds to run a nationwide campaign for the entire campaign period, and thus saved up for a concerted burst of campaigning in the final days before the election.

One benefit of the election campaign is that it gave the electorate a rare opportunity to see their national leaders. Hundreds of party or candidate supporters participated in the campaigns, whether out of a sense of party or clan loyalty, personal conviction, or purely to have some fun. However, there was little to suggest that any of the party leaders made a genuine effort to publicly present their policies on major national issues during the campaign. For their part, the public also largely failed to raise their concerns or to press the leaders to better articulate their policy platforms. Privately, however, all of the party leaders were saying that they had clear ideas, positions and priorities on the key issues of the day (IRI, 2005).

Although there was little to distinguish between the contenders and their policies, the election was a closely contested one, with very high political stakes. The first reason for this was the fierce political battle between UDUB and Kulmiye, which would ultimately also decide the fate of the presidency. The second reason was the equally fierce rivalry between the main clans over their level of representation in parliament.

The NEC's creation of an Election Monitoring Board (EMB) was seen as a very positive development to boost overall confidence in the electoral process. The role of the board was to monitor the adherence of the political parties, the government, the media and the public to the electoral law and the Code of Conduct. The appointment of the EMB members did not happen until after the election campaign had already started, and their number was insufficient to cover the whole country. However, the board quickly proved itself an efficient, serious and committed body.

Although the EMB was not mandated to take action against violators of the Code of Conduct, it could tell the public who was violating the code. Although the board did issue a strong statement warning ministers and party officials to refrain from inflammatory statements or personal attacks, it was perhaps unfortunate that it did not have the means at its disposal to properly investigate opposition complaints about the ruling party's misuse of public resources.

## 5.3 Election Results

The outcome of the parliamentary election was unusual in that all three contenders felt they were winners, although none of them was able to secure an overall majority. The ruling party, UDUB, claimed victory for receiving the largest number of seats (33), although it fell short of gaining a working majority. Similarly, Kulmiye and UCID, with 28 and 21 seats respectively, saw their combined majority as representing a clear rejection of the ruling party. To some observers, the result was a boost for Somaliland's stability, as neither the government nor the more hardline elements in Kulmiye had a clear advantage – and all parties were now obliged to pursue avenues of alliance, negotiation and consensus (Bradbury et al, 2005). Others, however, expressed concern that the result could create a “gridlock” between the president and the opposition-controlled parliament.

The election result did, however, clearly strengthen the political fortunes of UCID, which emerged as an obvious “power-broker” between the other parties. With both UDUB and Kulmiye failing to win a clear majority, both parties will now find themselves competing for the support of UCID in controlling the outcomes of parliament.

In the event, Kulmiye and UCID *did* succeed in forming an opposition alliance before the new parliament



*Ballot boxes are returned to the NEC warehouse in Hargeysa, where tight security was provided in case there was a need for any recounts*


opened for business in mid-November. Despite an intense campaign by the government to disrupt their collaboration, the two parties aimed to gain leadership of the house at its very first sitting. Although Kulmiye and UCID had the quorum, however, UDUB had the oldest member in the house – who by parliamentary tradition was elected honorary chairman to preside over the opening session.

However, to the surprise of the opposition and some UDUB MPs, as soon as the new members had

been sworn in, the chairman formally closed the session and called for a second sitting to be held within a period of four days. The opposition, which had the quorum, stayed behind and followed parliamentary procedures to elect the house leadership – without the presence of the UDUB MPs.

Although the government and UDUB initially refused to accept the new house leadership, the day was saved by the formal intervention of the *Guurti*, which persuaded them to accept the leaders elected by the opposition. Persistent fears that the two sides may not be able to work together were finally overcome when the new parliament formally approved its first state budget in April 2006.

Figure 1: Total Votes in Somaliland's Elections



Sources: Bradbury et al, 2003; NEC, 2005.

According to the NEC, the total number of valid votes counted was 670,328. The turnout was lower than early projections of about 800,000 (Bradbury et al, 2005), but considerably higher than those of the two previous elections – exceeding the presidential election count by over 180,000 votes. It is worth mentioning, however, that none of these counts actually represents the true turnout, as figures were invariably distorted by double-voting, underage voting and ballot-stuffing.

Table 3: Regional Distribution of Votes in Somaliland's Elections

Region	District 2002	%	Presidential 2003	%	Parliamentary 2005	%
Hargeysa	186,383	42	208,864	43	253,229	38
Awdal	100,495	23	65,934	13	133,026	20
Saaxil	27,234	6	30,537	6	52,479	8
Togdheer	66,598	15	115,064	24	121,751	18
Sanaag	53,096	12	57,938	12	89,286	13
Sool	6,261	2	9,702	2	20,557	3
<b>Total</b>	<b>440,067</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>488,039</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>670,328</b>	<b>100</b>

Sources: Bradbury et al, 2003; NEC, 2005.

Regionally, Awdal witnessed the largest increase in voter turnout, boosting its share of the total vote from 14% in the presidential election to 24%. This increase, which surprised many observers, was due to greater voter numbers in the remote districts of Baki, Lughaya and Saylac. However, there were allegations of widespread vote-rigging in these districts, with six times as many votes cast in Lughaya as in 2003 and three times as many in Baki and Saylac (IRI, 2005). One factor contributing to the alleged vote-rigging may have been the lack of “staff-swapping” in Awdal, which was practiced in the other regions to prevent collusion among party agents and election officials. There were also some allegations from the opposition that their party agents were detained or kept from their duties in these districts. According to NEC officials, the Commission stopped short of annulling the Awdal vote, and instead attached a statement querying the results – which would not have had a bearing on the national outcome.



Table 4: Voting Results and Distribution of Seats in the Parliamentary Elections

Regions	UCID			Kulmiye			UDUB			Total		
	Votes	%	Seats	Votes	%	Seats	Votes	%	Seats	Votes	%	Seats
<b>Awdal</b>	31,492	23.7	3	26,837	20.2	3	74,691	56.1	7	133,020	20	13
<b>Hargeysa</b>	75,796	29.9	6	95,881	37.9	8	81,552	32.2	6	253,229	38	20
<b>Saaxil</b>	18,331	34.9	4	12,355	23.5	2	21,793	41.5	4	52,479	8	10
<b>Sanaag</b>	17,907	20.1	2	36,652	41.1	5	34,727	38.9	5	89,286	13	12
<b>Sool</b>	2,436	11.8	2	8,964	43.6	4	9,157	44.5	6	20,557	3	12
<b>Togdheer</b>	34,583	28.4	4	47,639	39.1	6	39,592	32.5	5	121,751	18	15
<b>Total</b>	180,545	26.9	21	228,328	34.1	28	261,449	39	33	670,322	100	82

Source: NEC, 2005.

Another notable development since 2003 was the increased levels of support for UCID, mainly at the expense of Kulmiye. The strong showing of UCID was partly attributable to a shrewd campaign strategy, which succeeded in presenting the party as a moderate alternative to its opponents, who were locked in aggressive political battles for much of the campaign period. UCID's campaign saw it gradually distancing itself from the government and ruling party, while occasionally collaborating with Kulmiye to criticise the government's actions. UCID also succeeded in presenting itself as a cohesive and disciplined party, with stronger candidates than its opponents.

Unlike the 2003 elections, the performance of the three parties did not correspond so conspicuously with the regional and clan bases of their leaders. The reason for this was probably simply the choice of candidates; unlike the three candidates offered in the presidential election, the parliamentary elections offered a wide range of candidates, representing each of the sub-clans within the three parties.

In Awdal, UDUB enjoyed a much bigger swing in its favour, with 31,344 more votes than in the presidential election. But its gain in Awdal did not give UDUB the landslide victory it had expected. Rather, it was just able to split the 13 available seats with the two opposition parties (see Table 4). Probably, the result could have been a lot worse for the ruling party were it not for the alleged vote-rigging in some districts that favoured some UDUB candidates.

In Hargeysa, Kulmiye came out on top and increased its support in comparison to the presidential election. The main factor behind Kulmiye's success was the fact that its list of candidates more fairly represented the region's indigenous clans – thereby giving the party substantial votes from most of Hargeysa's sub-clans (see Table 5). According to some observers, were it not for UDUB and UCID supporters crossing the border to vote in Hargeysa, the margin of Kulmiye's victory could have been even greater.

In Saaxil, the biggest surprise was the strong showing of UCID, which increased its share of the region's vote to 35% and captured four of the 10 available seats. The decisive factor in this region, particularly in Berbera, was the large number of people coming in to vote from other regions, which meant stronger performances for those candidates with the resources to move and accommodate large numbers of voters. UCID had two or three candidates with such resources. UDUB as expected had a strong showing in the district of Sheekh, where it received about 50 percent of the votes, while Kulmiye's poor performance was probably due to a lack of strong local candidates. One of the two Kulmiye victors was an "outsider" without clan constituents, who won his seat by transporting a large number of voters from Hargeysa with the financial and logistical support of a businessman from his sub-clan.

Kulmiye had to perform extremely well in the eastern regions of Togdheer, Sanaag and Sool if it was to have any chance of beating the ruling party. However, in the event, the party won more seats than UDUB only in Togdheer. In Sool, surprisingly, UDUB narrowly outpolled Kulmiye, winning six seats to Kulmiye's four – although here again there were allegations of ballot-stuffing in UDUB's favour.

Although there was no concrete data to reveal clan-voting patterns, the widely accepted fact that much of the electorate did vote along clan lines enables us to extrapolate these patterns from the cumulative votes received by candidates from the same clans and sub-clans (see Table 5). For instance, 34% of the votes received by UCID were attributed to candidates from Habar Yoonis, while 31% and 21% of Kulmiye's votes were credited respectively to Habar Jeclo and Sacad Muuse of Habar Awal. The candidates from Gudibiirsi and Habar Yoonis contributed 31% and 20% respectively of the total votes received by UDUB.

Table 5: Cumulative Votes Received by Candidates from each Sub-Clan

Candidates' Sub-Clans	UCID			Kulmiye			UDUB			Total		
	Votes	%	Seats	Votes	%	Seats	Votes	%	Seats	Votes	%	Seats
<b>S. Muuse*</b>	23,149	13	2	48,558	21	5	40,448	16	2	112,155	17	9
<b>C. Muuse*</b>	14,703	8	3	10,936	5	1	21,980	8	3	47,619	7	7
<b>H. Yoonis</b>	61,025 <sup>1</sup>	34	8	18,504	8	1	51,588	20	8	131,117 <sup>1</sup>	20	17
<b>H. Jeclo</b>	12,831	7	2	69,881	31	9	32,299	12	5	115,011	17	16
<b>Gudibiirsi</b>	31,315	18	3	26,198	12	3	80,143 <sup>2</sup>	31	7	137,656	21	13
<b>Arap</b>	3,476	2	---	29,005	13	3	11,612	4	2	44,093	7	5
<b>Ciidagele</b>	29,559	17	2	3,981	2	---	6,791	3	---	40,331	6	2
<b>D/hante</b>	1,746	1	1	3,368	2	3	3,705	1	2	8,819	1	6
<b>Wersengeli</b>	25	--	----	5,198	2	2	4,480	2	2	9,703	2	4
<b>Ciise</b>	----	---	----	140		----	5,717	2	1	5,857	1	1
<b>Ayuub</b>	----	---	---	5,095	2	1	----	----	---	5,095	1	1
<b>Toljacle</b>	----	---	---	4,409	2	---	----	----	----	4,409	1	----
<b>Gabooye</b>	615	--	---	--	---	---	1,967	1	----	2,582	-	----
<b>Hawiye</b>	----	----	----	726		----	----	---	1	726	-	1
<b>Total</b>	178,444	100	21	225,999	100	28	260,730	100	33	666,173		82

\* These sub-clans belong to Habar Awal, and have been divided to reflect their different voting patterns.

<sup>1</sup> This includes the Habar Yoonis candidate in Hargeysa who received 9,251 votes, most of which were from non-H.Y. sub-clans.


<sup>2</sup> This result was disputed due to allegations of massive vote-rigging.

Source: NEC, 2005.

This table shows where UCID increased its support at the expense of Kulmiye. In particular, the levels of support received by UCID's Habar Yoonis candidates, and the Garxajis in general, were far greater than those of the Kulmiye candidates. For some reason, the Habar Yoonis candidates in Kulmiye did not attract the votes of the Habar Yoonis electorate – just 18,540 votes (14%), compared to the 61,025 (47%) and 51,588 (39%) received by the Habar Yoonis candidates from UCID and UDUB. For this reason, just one of the 17 Habar Yoonis MPs belongs to Kulmiye, while there are eight each from UCID and UDUB. Kulmiye clearly had difficulties in recruiting Garxajis candidates to its party. In Sanaag, it could not find any credible Habar Yoonis candidates who enjoyed the support of the Habar Yoonis electorate or leaders. And in Hargeysa, Kulmiye faced the same problem, with its Habar Yoonis/Ciidangale candidate receiving most of his votes from non-Garxajis sub-clans.

Furthermore, Kulmiye did not receive decisive support from its presumed political base to offset the voting deficit of its Habar Yoonis candidates. Kulmiye faced stiff competition from UDUB in the eastern regions, where the Habar Jeclo government and UDUB officials actively and stealthily campaigned – including a renowned *Guurti* member whose active campaigning ensured that UDUB’s Habar Jeclo candidates attracted significant votes for the ruling party. The cumulative votes of the Habar Jeclo candidates from UDUB was 32,299 (28%), compared to Kulmiye’s 69,881 (60%). Another telling statistic was that the three winning Habar Jeclo candidates from UDUB and UCID in Togdheer were the highest vote recipients. In UDUB, the first two leading candidates were Habar Jeclo, with a combined vote of 10,313 – accounting for 29% of UDUB’s votes in Togdheer. A Habar Jeclo candidate was also the leading UCID contender in Togdheer, receiving 5,908 votes or 14% of the party’s total.

Figure 2: Share of Votes Received by Candidates from each Sub-Clan



### Clan Representation

Although the parliamentary elections were being fought on party tickets, many Somalilanders were far more concerned about the performance of their own clans. Such is the importance attached to clan and sub-clan representation that it is clear that equitable representation along clan lines will long continue to be essential to the stability of Somaliland.

In terms of Isaaq representation, Somaliland’s largest clan increased its share of parliamentary seats by 7 percentage points in comparison to 1960 and 1998 (see Table 6). The Isaaq gained principally at the expense of the Harti, and particularly the Dhulbahante, due to their non-participation in Sool and eastern Sanaag. As a result, the Harti are destined to feel a growing sense of marginalisation that could further alienate them from Somaliland’s national politics.

Table 6: Isaaq and Non-Isaaq Seats in the Parliaments of 1960, 1998 and 2005

	1960	1998	2005
<b>Isaaq</b>	21 (64%)	52 (63%)	57 (70%)
<b>Non-Isaaq</b>	12 (36%)	30 (37%)	25 (30%)
<b>Total</b>	33 (100%)	82 (100%)	82 (100%)

As expected, the elections did alter the clan composition of the new parliament to favour the larger clans (see Table 7). In Awdal, the Gudibiirsi increased their seats from 11 to 13, at the expense of the Ciise clan, who saw their seats reduced from five to one. The Gudibiirsi did well because of the regional arrangement of seats, as well as picking up an extra seat in Hargeysa.

There were several reasons for the poor showing of the Ciise candidates. First, the Ciise population is being increasingly drawn to Djibouti, in turn becoming less active in Somaliland's politics. This has allowed the Gudibiirsi to steadily tighten their grip on the Awdal region – further marginalising the few remaining Ciise. While other Somaliland refugees have been repatriated from other countries, the Ciise refugees in Djibouti have not fully returned. Knowing there would not be sufficient participation from their clan to deliver five seats, and fearing some kind of vote-rigging, the Ciise candidates withdrew from the elections. To some observers, the Ciise's election problems are similar to those of the Harti – although the Ciise settlements are under the control of the government.

Table 7: Clan Composition in the New House of Representatives

Sub-Clan	Old House	New House	Difference
<b>Habar Awal</b>	8	16	+8
<b>Habar Yoonis</b>	7	17	+10
<b>Ciidagale</b>	5	2	-3
<b>Habar Jeclo</b>	11	16	+5
<b>Cimraan</b>	3	0	-3
<b>Toljacle</b>	3	0	-3
<b>Arab</b>	7	5	-2
<b>Ayub</b>	3	1	-2
<b>Gudibiirsi</b>	11	13	+2
<b>Ciise</b>	5	1	-4
<b>Warsengeli</b>	5	4	-1
<b>Dhulbahante</b>	9	6	-3
<b>Hawiye/Fiqishini</b>	1	1	0
<b>Minorities:</b>	4	0	-4
<b>Somali-Arabs:1</b>			
<b>Gabooye:1</b>			
<b>Original Somalis:</b>			
<b>Jibraahil:1</b>			
<b>Gurgure:1</b>			
<b>Total</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>82</b>	

As already mentioned, other notable losers in the parliamentary election included women and members of the Gabooye clan. While the overwhelming majority of voters were women, women candidates won only two seats – and one of these was from the “reserved seats” in Sanaag. The poor outcome for women candidates led women's groups throughout Somaliland to call for a specific quota for female candidates in all future elections.

Although the Gabooye should have had sufficient numbers in Hargeysa to pick up at least one or two seats, their two candidates failed miserably. The poor showing was attributed to internal divisions within the Gabooye, and a lack of resources for political campaigning. Unlike Somaliland's women, however, the Gabooye remain divided over the idea of a quota system.



*A discussion group in Burco at one of a series of regional workshops hosted by the APD to review lessons learned from the parliamentary elections*

Within the Isaaq, the three major sub-clans – Habar Awal, Habar Yoonis and Habar Jecllo – received the lion's share of the seats (see Table 7), largely at the expense of the smaller sub-clans and minorities, which lost 13 of their 14 former seats. In total, the three major sub-clans gained an additional 23 seats, with Habar Yoonis gaining 10 seats, Habar Awal eight seats, and Habar Jecllo five seats.

At the heart of the debate over Somaliland's electoral system lies the issue of equitable clan representation. It is clearly vital to maintain more inclusive clan representation to preserve the country's political stability – and to build its democracy. Although the

impact of these changes will only become apparent over time, analysts believe that the more equitable representation of the Habar Awal, Habar Yoonis and Habar Jecllo in the new parliament should lessen clan-based feuds in Somaliland (Bradbury et al, 2005).

However, the domination of elected bodies by major clans also has the potential to increase perceptions of “winners” and “losers” – in contrast to the more inclusive system of clan representation. In addition, the denial of political representation at the national level to smaller clans, women's groups and other marginalised minorities potentially bodes ill for Somaliland's political stability and democracy in the long run.

### Costs of the Election

Somaliland's lack of formal international recognition has clearly had a cost, denying it bilateral assistance and other international funding for much needed institutional rebuilding and democratic reform. Without direct and meaningful external assistance, many poor countries would face difficulties in conducting elections to international standards and in challenging political environments. Somaliland spent close to \$2.4 million on its two previous elections, with less than 23% of this contributed by international donors (NEC, 2003). This amounted to about \$2.50 per voter. With this minimal financial output, the country was able to put in place the necessary infrastructure and personnel, overcome the logistical obstacles, and implement the public confidence-building measures required to hold two successful elections.

In contrast, the financial contribution of international donors to the parliamentary electoral process was far more significant, with direct contributions through the NEC of \$1.8 million – representing 64% of the total \$2.7 million budget. This amounted to about \$4 per voter. Additional funds were provided through international assistance to local NGOs, although these contributions were limited.

In terms of electoral costs, the parliamentary elections were notable for two reasons. First, when compared with multiparty elections in other post-conflict settings, the Somaliland elections were significantly less expensive. For example, electoral costs in Afghanistan, Mozambique and Haiti amounted to over \$20 per voter in Afghanistan (2004), \$10 in Mozambique (1994), and \$11 in Haiti (2005) (Lopez-Pinter, 2005). The higher costs per voter in these countries were in part due to extensive voter registration and the cost of peace-keeping operations during the elections.

Second, Somaliland covered almost a third of its electoral costs, compared with the almost total external funding of elections in other post-conflict contexts. The recent elections in Afghanistan and Kosovo were fully financed by external donors (Lopez-Pinter, 2005). The post-conflict elections in Mozambique in 1994 were supported financially and materially by donors and international institutions from 17 different countries, with the government contributing \$5.4 million of the \$64.5 million costs (Pottie and Lodge, 2000).

### Strengths of the National Electoral Commission

Ultimately, the success of Somaliland’s parliamentary elections stemmed from the collaborative efforts of the National Electoral Commission and the political parties, assisted by the APD, and the strength of the public’s commitment to free, fair and – above all – peaceful elections. For its part, the NEC demonstrated a number of critical strengths and competencies during the challenging parliamentary electoral process.

For a start, the NEC commissioners avoided any personalisation of the electoral process, with the institution maintaining its identity throughout as “the NEC” – rather than as individual personalities. The Commission not only acted independently but made its independence clear. For example, during the process of assessing the security of voting areas in Sool, the NEC decided what it regarded as feasible in the face of serious political pressure and in accordance with the electoral law framework.



One of the participants leads a review of the election process in Burco in December 2006

During the critical period of political lobbying during the process of candidate nomination, the Commission made several vital contributions towards its successful outcome. Although this was outside the NEC’s mandate, it rose to the occasion to fill a gap by providing critical conflict resolution mechanisms.

The Commission also demonstrated its competence in handling the local media, ensuring that the electoral process remained the central focus – rather than the political

campaigning of individual candidates or the parties. This was seen as essential in supporting a peaceful and fair electoral process. The NEC also worked with the project management unit of technical experts from WSP International in a strongly collaborative and transparent environment.

### Building on the Peace

After the remarkable success of Somaliland’s parliamentary elections, it was broadly agreed that a forum should be created to openly share the experiences and the lessons that had emerged during the election process – and to propose ways in which the country’s democratisation could be further consolidated. In order to conduct such a review as inclusively and comprehensively as possible, there was a need to come up with a unique forum in which *all* those individuals and institutions involved could meet on common ground, to share their experiences candidly and constructively.

It was against this background that the APD and the WSP Project Management Team decided to organise nationwide workshops that would bring together all the actors involved in the election process to assess and reflect upon recent events. This post-election assessment would look at the strengths and weaknesses, and the lessons that could be learned, from all phases of the electoral process: from the pre-election campaigns to the management and monitoring of the polls, the invariably lengthy counting process, and the inevitable queries and controversies that accompanied the announcement of the results.

## 6. Further Engagement

For Somaliland, the parliamentary elections were a vital step in the birth of a fragile new democracy. Despite the elections' success, however, there is a clear need for additional efforts to consolidate the country's democratic transition, which may also require further support from its international partners. The following sections deal with some of the most pressing and critical of these outstanding issues.

### 6.1 The Election of the House of Elders

Although the recent election was often referred to as “the parliamentary elections,” in reality they were only for the Lower House – more commonly referred to as the House of Representatives. The selection of the new membership of the Upper House, or the House of Elders (*Guurti*), remains to be completed. At present, the lawmakers in the House of Representatives are divided on the issue of whether the members of the *Guurti* should be directly elected or nominated. The House of Representatives is due to produce this vital piece of legislation before the next term of the *Guurti* expires in mid-October 2006. However, the formulation of this legislation may yet become a bone of contention between the opposition, the government and the *Guurti*. As shown in the next section, the issue has already plunged the country into a constitutional crisis.



Participants at the post-election assessment workshop in Burco in December 2006

To support the process, the APD could develop a programme of work to assist the lawmakers in formulating this electoral law before the term of the *Guurti* expires. The Academy is well placed to provide technical support and advice in assisting the new lawmakers to draft and formulate a suitable and practical bill for this purpose.

### 6.2 Improving the Electoral Process

Having successfully conducted three relatively free and transparent elections, the new lawmakers are now in a position to review and reform the current electoral laws. The APD has offered to provide them with technical support to review the electoral laws and procedures in the light of recent experiences, in order to produce a single comprehensive law to govern the conduct of all future elections in Somaliland.

In addition to the MPs, this review and reform process should by definition also involve other key stakeholders, including the National Electoral Commission, the political parties, the government, and select authorised civic organisations.

### **6.3 Reviewing the Constitution**

Somaliland's national constitution is the product of protracted and complex negotiations between the executive and legislative branches of the government. However, many issues between the two parties remain unresolved, and the constitution itself contains numerous omissions and contradictions.

Certain key elements of the constitution have never been subjected to open public debate, such as the choice of a presidential executive, limitations on the number of political parties, or the extraordinary powers granted to the president under Articles 83, 90 and 92.

One of the proposed activities of APD's objective to strengthen Somaliland's constitutional democracy is to work with the parliament and concerned groups to review key elements of the constitution, in order to identify contradictions and omissions and to propose suitable amendments. It is proposed that this review process should be subject to open public scrutiny, through forums to provide inclusive debates on each of the proposed changes.



## 7. Conclusions and Recommendations

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Despite its obvious achievements on the road to an open and functioning democratic society, major challenges remain for Somaliland in the near and medium-term future. For one thing, the country's democratic transition has thus far largely been confined to the holding of elections. A transition to a stable and functional democracy entails many other critical developments, including the reform of state institutions, the devolution of power, and major societal initiatives to lay the foundations for a long-term democratic culture.

The major challenges now involve the need to set up democratic institutions and to undertake key constitutional, legal and administrative reforms to build upon the democratic advances of the recent elections. These challenges can be grouped into three main categories, according to their urgency.

### 7.1 Immediate Challenges

Following the recent elections for the House of Representatives, the most pressing development now involves the election of the House of Elders (*Guurti*). Unlike the House of Representatives, it has not yet been decided whether the election of new *Guurti* members should be based upon a system of nomination or of direct election. A formal system for electing the *Guurti* is now required as a matter of urgency – before its current term expires – in order to provide a membership that reflects the new political realities in Somaliland.

It is the responsibility of the new House of Representatives to draw up the legislation for the election of the new *Guurti*. However, it appears that the lawmakers are divided upon the election process, with some, particularly opposition MPs, favouring direct elections, while others question the wisdom of retaining two similarly elected legislative bodies. These critics propose either to abolish the *Guurti* outright, or to make the chamber different from the Lower House in terms of its size, authority and representation – in a system similar to the senates in the United States.

Others still favour a nomination process, although they differ on the nominating body and the selection process. Some MPs are also pushing for the retention of the current clan composition of the *Guurti*, in the light of recent changes in the clan composition of the House of Representatives.

Unfortunately, efforts to create this new legislation have been undermined by a new political storm, which blew up in May 2006 when the president, without consulting the political parties or House leaderships, drew up a proposal for the *Guurti* to extend its current term for a further four years. A letter from the Supreme Court attached to the proposal stated that the *Guurti* had the authority to extend its own mandate. Both the proposal and the Supreme Court letter were read to the *Guurti* members, who promptly voted to extend their term of office until October 2010. The president's justification on the *Guurti* extension was that the country has neither the finances nor the capacity to stage another round of legislative elections. He also argued that the postponement of the *Guurti* election would provide ample time to draw up legislation to address the future role of the *Guurti*, as well as its selection process.

The decision of the *Guurti* to extend its mandate met with shock and condemnation from several quarters. The leaders of the House of Representatives and the opposition parties immediately denounced the move as unconstitutional. At the time of writing, the extension has provoked a political impasse. Claims by the government and the Supreme Court that the move is constitutional appear to be contradicted by a law (No. 19) endorsed by both Houses and the president in March 2003, which clearly states that the House of

Representatives shall extend the *Guurti's* mandate when requested to do so by the president. This law had already been used to extend the term of the *Guurti* in April 2002.

Opponents of the extension of the *Guurti's* term do not object to an extension per se, but rather to its lengthy period, and to the manner in which it was carried out. Most of these opponents instead support a two-year extension to be formally approved by the House of Representatives. This episode has polarised the opposition and the ruling party memberships in the House of Representatives, and it remains unclear how they will reach a compromise on legislation pertaining to the *Guurti's* selection.

The public also remains divided on the issue, and on how it will unfold. Some say the president and the *Guurti* will get their way and the extension is already a “done deal.” Others believe there will be serious repercussions unless the president and the *Guurti* withdraw their “illegal” extension. Only time will tell how this dispute will be resolved.

Another issue that requires urgent attention prior to the next round of elections is the fate of Somaliland's three political parties. Article 9.2 of the constitution limits the number of political parties to three – a provision that led the public to elect UDUB, Kulmiye and UCID to contest the recent elections. However, recent observations have suggested that all of these parties have largely failed to meet certain minimum democratic requirements regarding their internal structures, administrative procedures (e.g. internal rules and regulations), and finances. It has been suggested that the three parties could, over time, become the “properties” of certain individuals – undermining democratic competition, and leading to the worrying prospect of the same three candidates contesting the next presidential election.

The lawmakers have several options to address this issue, including legislation to reopen the electoral process and allow unlimited political associations to contest the next local elections. Legislation could also be enacted to allow for the disqualification of parties that fail to meet certain minimum “democratic criteria,” or to compel the existing parties to adopt more democratic and *national* policies and constituencies, in order that everyone has an equal chance of nomination to these parties.

As the three existing parties all have members in the new House of Representatives – raising the prospect of serious opposition to any legislation that is perceived to threaten their privileges – analysts have suggested the formation of an independent body to examine and review this issue, in order to propose fair legislative means for addressing it.

## 7.2 Overhauling the Electoral Management

To further consolidate Somaliland's democratisation, there is a need for a sound political, constitutional and legal dispensation that supports free, fair, credible and legitimate elections. This can only be achieved through comprehensive reforms, designed in accordance with the chronology of electoral management, which reflect the key lessons learned during the country's recent election experiences. It is suggested that these reforms should include:

- Comprehensive constitutional and legal reforms to guide the development of an improved election regime and supporting electoral institutions, including:
  - A reformed electoral law that is fair and equitable, contains detailed instructions on election management, and conforms to globally accepted standards on democratic multiparty politics, including affirmative action for women and marginalised groups;
  - A reformed electoral system that accords with Somaliland's political dispensation and history;

- Reforms of the National Electoral Commission;
  - The creation of national policies and standards on electoral conflict management.
- Policies to manage key issues during the pre-election phase, including:
    - The timely delineation of electoral regions and districts;
    - Implementation of a national census and voter registration exercise;
    - The future of the three national political parties;
    - Party nomination processes;
    - Campaign processes;
    - Involvement of the media;
    - The use of public resources;
    - The prevention of political intimidation;
    - The role of the security forces;
    - Political party finances;
    - Civic and voter education.
- Policies to manage key issues during the election phase, including:
    - The location and allocation of polling stations;
    - Measures to ensure secrecy of the ballots;
    - The handling of ballot papers, boxes and election materials;
    - Counting procedures.
- Policies to manage key issues during the post-election phase, including:
    - Announcement of the overall results;
    - Procedures for managing disputed results;
    - Post-election reviews;
    - Resolution of post-election disputes.

### 7.3 Other Critical Reforms

Another critical aspect of the transition to a functional democracy is the reformation of government and the state, and the development of other bodies and activities that foster a democratic culture (Carothers, 2003). To date, Somaliland has struggled to produce the kind of democratic developments required, which should ideally include:

- Strengthening the rule of law, especially through judicial reforms;
- Strengthening the effectiveness of parliament, through measures to build better internal capacity and bolster constituency;
- Reducing state corruption, through anti-corruption commissions, legislative rationalisation, and advocacy campaigns;
- Promoting decentralisation, through training for local government officials and legislative actions to increase the authority of local governments.

Another area for attention is the implementation of programmes to expand the involvement and efficacy of civil society, which should encompass:

- The establishment and expansion of NGOs devoted to public interest advocacy, including human rights, environmental protection, and the eradication of graft;
- Support for women's and minority rights organisations;
- The strengthening of independent media institutions and organisations;

- The underwriting of formal and informal efforts to advance democratic and civic education;
- Capacity building to help political parties and politicians improve their organisational skills, constituency relations, and coalition-building opportunities.

Finally, there are three further factors that could make or break the long-term prospects for democracy in Somaliland. The first is the availability of direct and meaningful international support, without which the country will obviously have difficulty in sustaining a viable and stable democracy. The second is the question – long hanging over Somaliland – of whether or not it will obtain international recognition. Many people here believe that completing their democratic electoral process should have stood them in good stead to begin building official bilateral relations. The question now is to what extent their failure to attract such recognition will dishearten Somali leaders in their desire to continue with the democratisation process, and reduce their appetite for further democratic reform.

The final question concerns the widely perceived failure of the parliamentary elections to address the enduring problems of eastern Somaliland. Because the Harti people in this part of the country did not fully participate in the elections, it is understandable if they continue to perceive themselves as marginalised from the country's democratic process. If this problem is allowed to persist, Somaliland's fledgling democracy will be developing without the full participation – or the full commitment – of one of its principal clans.

The consolidation of Somaliland's democracy will be a lengthy process, and numerous obstacles clearly remain. In order to assist the country to begin to overcome these hurdles, the Academy for Peace and Development will continue to work with all stakeholders – the executive, legislature and judiciary, the political parties, civic organisations, and the public at large – to undertake research to define and clarify the main challenges that lie ahead, and to facilitate the dialogue necessary to overcome them.

The Academy aims to play a central role in several key strategic areas of the country's continuing democratisation. The first will involve supporting the consolidation of the recent election successes and the establishment of the democratic structures and institutions necessary to make future electoral processes routine. In particular, the Academy's researchers will be working with Somaliland's lawmakers to review relevant sections of the constitution and to refine the country's electoral legislation before the next round of elections.

With the next local and presidential elections due to take place in early 2008, the National Electoral Commission must build its institutional capacity and organisational tools to administer these elections on schedule and in accordance with the law. The Academy will be working closely with the NEC to improve its technical capacity and resources – and, in turn, its local and international credibility – in the organisation and management of future elections.

Finally, the Academy intends to collaborate with Somaliland's dynamic civil society organisations in boosting their future roles and involvement in the democratisation process – and, in doing so, to deepen public participation in this most public of processes.

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## Annex 1:

# Election Timeline

### 2003

- August 2<sup>nd</sup> The three political parties release a joint agreement on moving the election process forward
- October 5<sup>th</sup> Aid worker Ms. Annalena Tonelli is assassinated in Boorome
- October 23<sup>rd</sup> Two more aid workers, Mr. and Mrs. Eyeington, are assassinated in Sheekh
- November 23<sup>rd</sup> Forces from Puntland take control of Laascaanood

### 2004

- March President Rayaale goes to London and announces the election will be held in March 2005
- March 19<sup>th</sup> Five gunmen ambush a vehicle carrying aid workers Mr. Harald Hinkel and Ms. Flora Cheruiyot on the road between Berbera and Hargeysa, killing Ms. Cheruiyot
- April 5<sup>th</sup> A Somaliland delegation led by the National Electoral Commission leaves for South Africa to observe the election process in that country
- May 13<sup>th</sup> President Rayaale fires Chief Justice Saciid Faarax Axmed, replacing him with Faysal Xaaji Jaamac
- July 18<sup>th</sup> President Rayaale issues a decree pronouncing March 29<sup>th</sup> 2005 as the Election Day
- July 19<sup>th</sup> The Minister of Interior issues a decree banning all political debates and meetings by civic groups. The government also instructs the political parties to confine their activities to their respective premises
- July 22<sup>nd</sup> The chairman of the *Guurti* and architect of Somaliland's political rebuilding, Shiikh Ibrahim Shiikh Yusuf Shiikh Madar, dies in London after a prolonged illness
- August Electoral Commission member Maxamed Sheekh Abdilaahi dies
- September House Speaker Ahmed Adan Qaybe formally asks the APD and WSP for assistance in obtaining a consultant to help lawmakers draft a new electoral law
- October 2<sup>nd</sup> The NEC and party leaders issue a press release expressing their concern about the House's inability to pass the electoral bill
- October 29<sup>th</sup> Somaliland and Puntland forces clash on the outskirts of Laascaanood, with significant casualties on both sides

November 15 <sup>th</sup>	Consultant Ruben Zamora arrives in Hargeysa, and the House Speaker names a special committee to work with him on a draft electoral law
December 28 <sup>th</sup>	A draft electoral law is completed by the committee and distributed to lawmakers to review before a debate on the floor of the House
<b>2005</b>	
January 12 <sup>th</sup>	The President addresses a joint session of parliament, urging lawmakers to pass the electoral law within a week so that elections can take place as scheduled on March 29 <sup>th</sup>
January 18 <sup>th</sup>	The House of Representatives passes an electoral law containing caveats that make it impossible to hold elections in the time remaining
January 25 <sup>th</sup>	The President leaves unexpectedly for South Africa. The APD holds a public debate on the electoral law
February 5 <sup>th</sup>	The vacant Commissioner position at the NEC is filled. The <i>Guurti</i> passes the controversial electoral law with a two-thirds majority
February 7 <sup>th</sup>	The APD hosts a weeklong meeting between the three political parties and the NEC to resolve the issue of parliamentary seat distribution
February 12 <sup>th</sup>	An APD team meets the President in Djibouti during his return from his trip to South Africa
February 19 <sup>th</sup>	The three political parties sign a joint agreement on the allocation of parliamentary seats
February 26 <sup>th</sup>	The Constitutional Court rules that some articles of the electoral bill contravene the constitution
March 8 <sup>th</sup>	The government postpones Election Day, without specifying a new date
March 21 <sup>st</sup>	The controversial Haryaal radio station starts broadcasting to Somaliland
March 27 <sup>th</sup>	President Rayaale forwards proposed changes to the electoral law to the House of Representatives
April 2 <sup>nd</sup>	The House approves the amended electoral law
April 4 <sup>th</sup>	Police raid the Kulmiye party's head office in Hargeysa in search of transmission equipment for the Horyaal radio station
April 7 <sup>th</sup>	In response to the raid on its office, Kulmiye suspends all channels of communication with the government, UDUB and the NEC
April 12 <sup>th</sup>	The President formally signs the electoral law

April 25 <sup>th</sup>	The government selects September 15 <sup>th</sup> 2005 as the new Election Day
May 9 <sup>th</sup>	The first Deputy of the House of Representatives adjourns the House to prevent some MPs from tabling a motion to impeach the President
May 11 <sup>th</sup>	A consultative meeting between the three political parties under the auspices of the NEC begins at the APD offices
May 18 <sup>th</sup>	The President publicly admits some wrongdoing in the raid on Kulmiye's head office
June 3 <sup>rd</sup>	The NEC begins the selection of regional and district electoral officers
July 3 <sup>rd</sup>	A three-day workshop begins to develop a Media Code of Conduct for the elections
July 17 <sup>th</sup>	The three political parties submit their respective candidates
July 18 <sup>th</sup>	The political parties sign a Code of Conduct in a ceremony organised by the APD, at which the two media associations also sign the Media Code
August 11 <sup>th</sup>	Election Day is postponed from September 15 <sup>th</sup> to September 29 <sup>th</sup>
August 15 <sup>th</sup>	The NEC posts the final list of 246 candidates
August 29 <sup>th</sup>	The election campaigns officially begin
August 30 <sup>th</sup>	The Somali Democratising Programme Steering Committee visits Hargeysa to assess the progress of election preparations
September 3 <sup>rd</sup>	The Election Monitoring Board begins its work
September 4 <sup>th</sup>	The three political parties agree to reduce their official campaigning to three days rather than 10 days, due to financial constraints
September 17 <sup>th</sup>	The NEC receives election materials including ballot papers, ink, etc.
September 19 <sup>th</sup>	Five candidates from the Ciise clan withdraw from the election. The Election Monitoring Board rebukes the new National TV channel for being biased towards the ruling UDUB party, in violation of the Code of Conduct
September 23 <sup>rd</sup>	Several alleged militants are arrested by police in a gun battle in Hargeysa
September 29 <sup>th</sup>	Election Day
October 15 <sup>th</sup>	The NEC announces the preliminary results of the election
November 29 <sup>th</sup>	The new House of Representatives is convened.



## Annex 2:

# Code of Conduct for the Political Parties

The Republic of Somaliland

National Electoral Commission

## Code of Conduct for the Political Parties *Hargeisa 2005*

### **PREAMBLE:**

After holding a series of meetings in which the upcoming parliamentary elections were discussed, the three political parties of Somaliland,

Fully aware of the importance of the parliamentary elections to the people of Somaliland;

Mindful that successful completion of the democratic process will further advance the cause of Somaliland;

Recognising that free and fair elections will enhance the prospect for enlarged freedom and justice in Somaliland;

Cognisant of the inherent risks and threats in transitional democracy and the prevailing climate of mistrust among the parties;

Fully aware of the urgent need to create an environment that is conducive to holding free and fair elections;

Mindful of the gaps/deficiencies in the electoral law that need to be addressed in order to ensure smooth elections;

Have agreed to abide by the letter and the spirit of this Code of Conduct which was jointly developed by the National Electoral Commission and the three political parties and which was signed by the parties and witnessed by the National Electoral Commission on *July 18, 2005*.

### **Objective**

The objective of this code of conduct is to promote conditions that are conducive to free and fair elections including:-

- a) Tolerance of democratic political activity;
- b) Free political campaigning and open public debate; and
- c) Respect for human rights.

### **SECTION ONE: GENERAL PRINCIPLES**

#### **1 Compliance with the Code**

1. Every party and every candidate:

- a) is bound by this Code;
- b) will take decisive steps to prohibit leaders, officials, candidates and members from infringing the code;
- c) will take all reasonable steps to discourage any type of conduct by their supporters which would, if undertaken by a party official, candidate, or member be in breach of this code;
- d) will not abuse the right to complain about violation of the code, nor make false or frivolous

- complaints;
  - e) agrees to publicly condemn any action that undermines the free and fair conduct of the election;
  - f) must accept the results of the election or challenge the results in the Supreme Court.
2. The leaders of the political parties will issue directives to their parties' officials, candidates, members and supporters, requiring each one of them to:
    - a) observe this code of conduct;
    - b) take all necessary steps to ensure compliance.
  3. Every candidate, once accepted by NEC, must issue a letter signed by himself/herself in which he or she declares his or her acceptance to comply with this code of conduct and to ensure that the persons working in his or her candidacy will comply with this code.

## **2 Compliance with the Law**

1. Every political party has agreed to adhere to the electoral laws, rules and regulations, and to take all necessary steps to ensure:
  - a) that the party, its candidates, persons who hold political office in the party, members, activists and supporters, comply with the code and the electoral law;
  - b) that representatives and supporters of the party candidates comply with the code and the electoral law.
2. Every political party will take all necessary steps to promote inclusion of women candidates in their respective list of candidates for each region.

## **3 Campaign Management**

1. Every political party will:
  - a) respect the rights and freedom of all other parties to campaign, and to disseminate their political ideas and principles without fear;
  - b) respect the rights and freedom of all other parties to lawfully erect banners, billboards, placards and posters;
  - c) conduct itself in a manner that respects the rights of other parties, and respects the rights of voters and other members of the community;
  - d) respect the rights of the press, election monitors and observers;
  - e) use its good offices to seek to ensure freedom of access by all parties to potential voters.
2. Every political party will ensure that its party will not:
  - a) engage, before, during or after the election, in activities that may jeopardise the peace and stability of the country;
  - b) use language or defamatory acts in a way that may provoke violence during the election;
  - c) intimidate candidates and/or members, representatives or supporters of other parties;
  - d) disrupt, destroy or frustrate the campaign efforts of any other party;
  - e) prevent the distribution of handbills and leaflets, and the display of posters of other parties or candidates;
  - f) deface or destroy the posters of other parties or candidates;
  - g) prevent any other party from holding rallies, meetings, marches or demonstrations;

- h) prevent any other party from canvassing support for a party or candidate;
- i) seek to prevent any person from attending the political rallies of another party;
- j) permit its supporters to do anything prohibited by this code;
- k) carry or display arms or weapons at a political meeting, in a march, demonstration, rally or any other public event.

#### **4 The Election Process**

Every party must:

1. Recognise the full authority of the Commission in the conduct of the election;
2. Cooperate with election officials in order to ensure peaceful and orderly polling, and complete freedom for voters to exercise their franchise without being subjected to any annoyance or obstructions;
3. Give effect to any lawful direction, instruction or order of the Commission;
4. Establish and maintain effective lines of communication with the Commission and other political parties;
5. Ensure the safety and security of electoral officials before, during and after the polls;
6. Not interfere unjustifiably or in bad faith with the duties of the election officials;
7. Respect and cooperate with officials or accredited election observers or monitors;
8. Maintain and aid, where possible, in maintaining the secrecy of the voting; and
9. Not procure votes by forcible occupation of polling stations or through illegal activities in the polling stations.

#### **SECTION TWO: GAPS/DEFECIENCIES IN THE ELECTORAL LAW**

The following section of the Code of Conduct deals with the gaps and deficiencies in the electoral law and the solutions devised by the NEC and the political parties to remedy such deficiencies.

##### **Article 12, Paragraph 4**

This article does not address the remote but possible situation of having two or more candidates in the same party list receiving the same number of votes and there is only seat to be allocated. To address this deficiency in the electoral law, the parties have agreed to the following sequential steps to break the tie:

1. The National Electoral Commission will, in the presence of the concerned party's regional executive committee, recheck the spoiled ballot papers that were marked for the candidates who are tied for a seat to see if there are any valid ballot papers that were inadvertently counted as spoiled ballot papers. During the recheck, if valid ballot papers are found, they will then be counted for the candidate that they were marked for. If, however, the recheck process does not produce a clear winner, then
2. The National Electoral Commission will openly conduct a *drawing of lots* between or among the candidates to determine who wins the tied seat. This will be done in front of the concerned party regional executive committee, Election Monitoring Board, media, etc.

##### **Article 12, Paragraphs 6 & 7**

These two paragraphs need further elaboration which can only be provided when the National Electoral Commission undertakes the inspection of the polling stations in late June and early July. Using the information gathered by NEC, the three political parties and the Commission will devise a joint solution on the allocation of seats in these districts or regions. The agreed upon solution appears in Annex 1 of this code of conduct.

##### **Article 14**

This article deals with candidates who were unsuccessful in winning seats in the election and therefore remain as reserve candidates. However, this article does not address the possible situation of two or more reserve candidates obtaining the same number of votes. To address this shortcoming, the parties have agreed that the same mechanism for breaking a tie that is specified in the Code of Conduct for Article 12 Paragraph 4 (above) shall also apply to this situation.

### **Article 16, Paragraph 1**

The electoral law mandates that the parties submit to the NEC a list of their candidates 60 days before the voting day. The law, however, does not mention the possibility that a candidature could become vacant due to death or incapacitation. To remedy this situation, the political parties have agreed to the following:

1. If, after the period established by the law to present the candidates and before 14 days prior to the voting day, a candidate's position becomes vacant due to the above-mentioned reasons, then the parties have the right to replace that candidate. However, there shall be no change to the ballot paper and the replacing candidate will use the name and the symbol of the replaced candidate. When the final election results are announced, the replacing candidate's name will appear in all official election documents.
2. If, however, the position becomes vacant less than 14 days before the election date then the party cannot replace the candidate. However, if there are any votes for the vacant position then they will be counted for the concerned party.

### **Article 23**

This article grants the mayor the right to ban the holding of demonstrations if he is satisfied that they might damage the health, morals or public order. However, if any action taken by a mayor is considered unreasonable, the article does not specify the procedure for submitting complaints. To address this deficiency in the electoral law, the three parties have agreed to the following:

1. That the mayors shall prepare and publish a schedule of planned rallies and demonstrations for the three political parties during the campaign period. Furthermore, the schedule shall allocate an equal number of days to the political parties for organising rallies, demonstrations, etc. Copies of the schedule must be sent to the NEC and to the parties at least 15 days before the start of the campaign period.
2. The political parties shall inform the mayors 48 hours in advance of their intention to proceed with scheduled events (rallies or demonstrations).
3. Any party that has been denied by a mayor the right to hold a demonstration has the right to appeal to the National Electoral Commission.

### **Article 27, Paragraph 1**

This article does not address the issue of who can grant permission for the movement of vehicles on Election Day. To address this deficiency, the parties have agreed to the following:

1. The NEC is the only authorised body to grant permission for the circulation of vehicles on Election Day. In accordance with the electoral law, the NEC will inform the public through the media and through its regional and district offices about the ban on the movement of vehicles on voting day.
2. The NEC will also make it publicly known that any person who violates the ban will be dealt with in accordance with the law.

### **Article 28, Paragraph 1**

This article does not address the central issue of when parties can substitute their agents. The law clearly states that the NEC shall train the political parties' agents. This implies that only trained agents can be poll watchers. To address this weakness, the parties have agreed to the following:

1. Parties may, if a need arises, substitute their agents provided that the substitutes are the reserve agents that were trained.
2. The parties further agree that the party agents at the polling stations cannot be candidates in the election.

### **Article 29**

This article does not specify the roles and responsibilities of the party agents, which are crucial to the efficient and peaceful conduct of the election. To address this, the parties have agreed that the NEC shall draft detailed terms of reference for the party agents, which shall form Annex 2 of this Code of Conduct.

### **Article 44, Paragraph 3**

This article is very specific and restrictive in terms of where the voter can put his/her mark on the ballot paper. Given the fact that a large percentage of the people are unable to read or write, the probability of disenfranchising a lot of voters due to the high rates of illiteracy cannot be ruled out. To avoid this situation, the parties have agreed to the following, which is in line with the practice used in earlier elections:

1. The voter is allowed to put his/ her mark on the ballot paper anywhere within the row designated for each candidate;
2. Any mark, be it a dot, cross, tick, sign, etc., is acceptable so long as it is clearly within the row;
3. If a voter's mark spills over to an adjacent row then neither of the two candidates gets the vote. However, the vote shall be counted for the party of the candidates whose votes were counted as invalid;
4. If the mark spills across two party columns, then that vote is treated as being an invalid vote.

#### **Article 49, Paragraphs 3 & 4**

Paragraphs 3 and 4 of this article do not address the remote but possible situation of party agents from two political parties who have been present at the polling station and who deliberately refuse or disappear from the polling station before the signature of the outcome of the vote.

To remedy this, the parties have agreed that, in order to avoid the loss of votes cast by the citizens, the signature of only one party agent and the signatures of the polling station officeholders shall suffice. However, the reasons for such an event shall be recorded.

#### **Article 51, Paragraph 3**

This article requires that each presiding officer of the polling stations submit to the Supreme Court a copy of the written record of the polling station results. This is not logistically possible. Therefore, the parties have agreed that the presiding officer will send the copy of the written record of the polling station results intended for the Supreme Court to the District Election Officer who will then forward it to the Regional Election Officer for onward transmission to the Supreme Court.

### **SECTION THREE: PUBLIC FUNDS/PROPERTY, GOVERNMENT RADIO AND MEDIA**

Article 26 of the Electoral Law mandates the National Electoral Commission to ensure that the political parties have equal access to the government-owned mass media and the use of public assembly grounds during the election campaign. The article further states that no party may use for its own purposes the property of the nation. Article 64 gives the NEC the power to impose administrative sanctions against anyone who commits acts that are contrary to the administration (of the election) or to the electoral law or procedures.

To effectively execute this mandate, the Commission shall put in place the following enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance with the electoral law and procedures.

#### **1 Use of the Media**

##### **a) Radio Hargeisa**

**Stage One:** Daily Monitoring of Radio Hargeisa Somali Language Broadcasts

The National Electoral Commission will monitor and record daily Radio Hargeisa Somali language broadcasts. The mechanism for monitoring Radio Hargeisa Somali service broadcasts is detailed in Annex 3 of this Code.

**Stage Two:** Allocation of Equal Radio Hargeisa Airtime for the Three Political Parties

The National Electoral Commission will, in consultation with the Ministry of Information, allocate equal airtime to the three political parties in line with the provisions of the airtime equal access schedule in Annex 4.

##### **b) Maandeeq and Horn Tribune Newspaper**

The National Electoral Commission will make the following two arrangements in respect of Maandeeq:

1. Monitoring, on a daily basis, the content of Maandeeq and the Horn Tribune newspaper;
2. Allocation of equal space in Maandeeq and Horn Tribune to the parties.

The details of this arrangement are contained in Annex 5 of this Code.

##### **c) Private Media**

The privately-owned media shall also provide equal access to the political parties who are prepared to purchase space in the private newspapers. No party shall be discriminated against in terms of this access. This provision shall also be included in the Media Code of Conduct and the Media Guidelines shall clearly state the need for objective and balanced reporting on the part of the media.

## 2 Public Funds/Property

The Electoral Law (Article 26) prohibits the use of public property by any party for its own sole purpose. The article further states that no party may use directly or indirectly property owned by foreigners, such as that of foreign NGOs or UN agencies. Furthermore, Article 64 of the law grants the NEC the authority to take administrative sanctions. To execute this authority, the Commission shall establish an Election Monitoring Board that will ensure that the three parties have equal access to public funds, government-owned mass media and public assembly grounds. The Board members representing a cross section of society will be chosen on the basis of their moral authority (distinguished religious figures), academic qualifications, work experience, etc. The members will include academics, former senior public finance officers, civil society members, etc. The Terms of Reference for the Board of Monitors is in Annex 3 of this Code.

The Board will perform its tasks under the overall direction and supervision of the National Electoral Commission.

### Prerequisites

In order to enable the Board members to effectively carry out their responsibilities, the following prerequisites must be obtained:

- Presidential decree directing government officers to cooperate fully with the NEC and any other body established by the NEC to assist it in carrying out its national duties;
- Presidential decree officially prohibiting the use of government vehicles, etc. for use of campaigning and affixing of party emblem, logos, slogan, etc. on government offices, premises or vehicles.

It shall be the responsibility of the National Electoral Commission to obtain from the President the above-mentioned decrees.

In order to ensure the effectiveness of the Board, the NEC will grant the Board the authority to investigate, on its behalf, any violation of the Electoral Law and the Code of Conduct and if they deem it necessary to recommend to the Commission a course of action to be taken against the offender/s.

During the election period, government ministers are not permitted to use government vehicles for campaigning for the party that they belong to.

Civil servants are also not allowed, in accordance with the Civil Service Law, to publicly campaign for a party. Doing this will be considered a serious contravention of the election management process and the NEC might initiate appropriate disciplinary action against the culprit/s.

To enhance the trust and confidence among the parties and to create a conducive climate for the smooth and efficient conduct of the election, it is necessary that the government refrains from any action that might be construed as an abuse of power. Likewise, it is necessary that political parties refrain from any action that may be construed as being detrimental to peace and stability.

### **SECTION FOUR: INSTRUMENTS FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE CODE**

1. Establishment of the Election Board of Monitors (EBM)
2. Regular Board meetings: The objective of the meetings (preferably once in a week) will be to evaluate compliance with the Code of Conduct and the Electoral Law and to lessen the inevitable polarisation that a competitive campaign generates among the contenders.

#### **UCID**

*Failsal Ali Warabe*  
Chairman

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

#### **KULMIYE**

*Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud*  
Chairman

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

#### **UDUB**

*Ahmed Yussuf Yasin*  
Vice President

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

#### **Witnessed by:**

*National Electoral Commission*  
*Ahmed Haji Ali Adami*  
Chairman

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

## Annex 3:

# Code of Conduct for the Media

The media plays an important role in monitoring the electoral process. By covering the election events and the political campaign, the media ensures that the public is aware of what is happening.

Good media coverage of the electoral process can increase public knowledge and information on the elections, the candidates, and the issues. The coverage of elections in the media, and its analysis of candidate platforms and election issues, provides voters with the information they need to make an informed choice on voting day. It can also provide factual information needed by voters to participate, such as the day, hours and locations of the polling stations.

In order to fulfil this role, several conditions must be met:

- All media must have access to the electoral process and its participants;
- Reporters must have access to electoral managers, electoral sites, candidates and voters;
- It is essential that the media have access to public information;
- The media must be able to investigate and report in a safe environment, without fear of intimidation or retribution;
- The media should be free to cover and report on election events without restrictions or censorship;
- The media needs to be able to circulate freely throughout the country so that it can follow national campaigns or candidates and see how the election administration is working in outlying areas;
- All media representatives should be treated equally, whether they are from government or private media. This applies to access to political parties, candidates, the electorate, electoral sites and information;
- Public authorities should refrain from interfering with the activities of journalists and other media personnel with a view to influencing the elections;
- In order to combat the danger of speculation, the election results must be released in a timely manner.

The foreign broadcast media, particularly the BBC Somali Service, have significant geographic coverage, listenership and potential influence on voters. For this reason, these services should be encouraged to report on the Somaliland election campaign in a considered and in-depth manner, giving due regard to their own codes for election coverage and the code adopted by the Somaliland media.

The NEC is encouraged to monitor the election coverage of foreign broadcast media and to establish a liaison mechanism for dealing with complaints.

In return and with due respect for editorial freedom, the Somaliland media has adopted the following code of conduct for the election period:

- To cover the electoral campaign in a fair, balanced and impartial manner;
- To ensure accurate, balanced and impartial coverage of the news and current affairs and in the content of interviews and debates that may have an influence on the attitude of voters;
- To avoid excessive and privileged coverage of incumbent politicians;
- Not to disseminate any partisan electoral messages on the day preceding voting, to allow voters to make their decisions without undue pressure;
- As far as possible, to report the views of candidates and political parties directly and in their own words, rather than as others describe them;
- To guarantee a rapid right of reply to a candidate or political party, if so required, in order that this right can be exercised during the campaign period;
- To ensure that news content is factually accurate, complete, relevant and in context;

- To use neutral words for impartial, dispassionate election reporting and to take care with technical terms and statistics and ensure headlines reflect the facts of the story;
- To avoid inflaming emotions over controversial issues through impassioned handling of these issues;
- To label opinions and personal interpretations as such, and limit opinions and editorials to the editorial and opinion pages/programmes;
- To label advertising clearly so it is not confused with the news and to ensure that advertising coverage complies with the Code of Conduct for political parties adopted by the NEC;
- Journalists are obliged to introduce themselves as such and to be honest and fair in the way news is gathered, reported and presented;
- To honour pledges of confidentiality to a news source, and otherwise identify sources of information;
- Not to plagiarise and to give due credit to secondary sources of information;
- Not to alter photographs or graphics to mislead the public;
- Not to accept any inducement from a politician or a candidate;
- Not to give favourable advertising rates to one political party and not to another;
- Not to give money to the sources of stories.

The National Electoral Commission should consult with the media and select two representatives from the media to serve on the Election Board of Monitors. In return, the media will respect the Board's right to monitor and adjudicate on the media's compliance with this Code of Conduct.

This code is adopted by the members of the Somaliland media in Hargeisa on the 6<sup>th</sup> day of July, 2005.



## Article from the Sub-Saharan Informer



### The Process of Developing a Code of Conduct for the political parties in Somaliland

**I**mmediately after the presidential election in April 2003, the National Electoral Commission called for the holding of the parliamentary elections as soon as possible. The NEC intention was to finalize, as early as possible, the last phase of the democratization process in the country and set the country on the path of democratic governance. The NEC's dream was realized two years later when a date was set for the parliamentary elections in Somaliland. However, from the onset the process met with a lot of hurdles and difficulties.

The key to the electoral process was the drafting of the parliamentary electoral law. Getting the law passed was a very difficult and challenging task that required tact, diplomacy, and even going to the court.

The electoral law that was eventually passed by both houses of parliament effectively ruled out holding parliamentary election in the scheduled timeframe since it made a number of pre-conditions such as conducting a nation-wide census and that the election should take place all over Somaliland.

With no way out of this troubling development, the NEC took the initiative and called the political parties to a meeting to discuss ways and means of saving the electoral process and find a way out of this dilemma. Even though the political parties were continents apart and their relations could at best be described as cool, they rose up to the challenge and patriotically put aside their difference to find a legally acceptable method of distributing the parliamentary seats among the regions of Somaliland. Lack of consensus on the distribution of seats by the members of the House of the Representative was the main reason that prevented the enactment of conducive electoral law in the first place. After a couple of sessions that NEC and the political parties agreed on an acceptable formula for the distribution of parliamentary seats limited only to this election. The joint agreement by the parties and NEC helped the president in his final showdown with the parliament in the Supreme Court. Citing certain articles in the parliamentary electoral law that contravened the constitution, the Supreme Court ordered these articles to be removed from the electoral law. Interestingly, these were the ones that were the major impediments to holding parliamentary elections. This paved the way for election process to move forward.

Unfortunately, the much-anticipated electoral law that was signed by the president was found to be full of gaps, which needed to be addressed in order to avoid confusion and conflict during the election. Once again, NEC, as the agency entrusted with the task of managing the elections, took the lead in organizing a series of meetings between the parties and NEC to develop a Code of Conduct for the political parties that would, *inter alia*, regulate the behavior of the political parties and the candidates during the election and also address the gaps in the electoral law.

After one month and half of intensive and often prolonged discussions, the Code of Conduct was finalized and was signed in a public gathering at Mansoor Hotel on July 18, 2005. During the same ceremony a Media Guide for Somaliland parliamentary election was signed. The Media guide was a product of a joint effort by the National Electoral Commission, The Academy for Peace and Development, BBC and the national media of Somaliland.

The Code of Conduct was signed by the Vice President for the Ruling party, the chairmen of the two opposition political parties, and the Chairman of National Electoral Commission.

The Somaliland Code of Conduct for the Political parties goes further than the standard code of conduct for the most of the countries in the world. In addition to the general principles, it addresses the gaps in the electoral law as well the contentious issue of how can the political parties be guaranteed equal access to public property, public media and public funds.

The process of developing the code of conduct was far from smooth and easy. There were times when horns were locked and utmost tact and diplomacy was required to save the day. Before this process the prevailing political environment was characterized by deep suspicion and mistrust among the political parties on hand and between the opposition political parties and the government on the other hand. With this highly polarized and charged atmosphere, NEC shrewdly started the process with the easy and less divisive issue of general principles. The aim was two folds: 1) to reduce the tension and mistrust and get the parties negotiators to get to know each other and to become comfortable with each other and 2) to create conducive environment that will enable the process to move forward.

The Political parties have shown a high degree of maturity and a deep sense of patriotism. The discussions were frank and fruitful. Typically, each party strived to obtain a better deal for itself but in the end the overall national interest and the need to hold safe, free and fair elections prevailed. Dialogue, compromise and grudging respect for each others' position sustained the process. The home grown Somaliland traditional culture of compromise and give and take enabled the process to move to its fruitful conclusion.

The NEC had played a moderating role and at times had calming effect on the tenuous situation. Although the major role of NEC is to organize and manage free and fair elections in Somaliland, as an honest broker, it had for the past seven months struggled to reconcile the competing interests of elections stakeholders. NEC, as the umpire, in the electoral process has a vested interest in bringing the political parties to forum where they can discuss their differences, concerns, worries, and desire in a peaceful manner and come up with solution that is acceptable to every body. The successful finalization of the Code can be attributed to the patience of NEC, the maturity of the political parties, deep seated culture of consensus, and ability to rise above the narrow petty party interest and reach out to others in order to safeguard the overall national interest and ensure that parliamentary elections take place as scheduled.

To effectively carry out the requirements of the Code of Conduct, the National Electoral Commission, in consultation with the political parties, will establish an Election Monitoring Board. The Board members representing a cross section of the society will be chosen on the basis of their moral authority, integrity and academic qualification and work experience.

## Annex 5:

# Evaluation of Election Preparedness in Yagoori District, Sool

**To: The National Electoral Commission**

**CC: The Executive Committees of the three Political Parties**

### **Re: Evaluation of the State of Election Preparedness in the District of Yagoori in Sool Region**

We the undersigned five individuals, consisting of two members from each of the national parties, Kulmiye and UCID, as well as a member of the National Electoral Commission (NEC), hereby submit to you a brief report concerning the evaluation of the electoral situation in the district of Yagoori, Sool region:

Today, July 17<sup>th</sup> 2005, we extended a fact-finding visit to the district of Yagoori, in order to be informed of the state of security in that district. After listening to briefings from the Commander of the Eastern Sector of the National Army, the Commander of the Brigade of Frontline Troops, his Chief of Staff, the Mayor of Yagoori District, the Police Commander of Yagoori District, elders and other knowledgeable people, we concluded from their recommendations, that it is possible to hold the [parliamentary] election in four towns situated along the tarmac road. These towns are:

1. Guumays
2. Yagoori
3. Tuuolo-Samakaab
4. Adheadeeye.

The elections cannot be planned to take place further from either side of the tarmac road for the following reasons:

1. The total lack of Somaliland administration in the district;
2. Officials from the Somaliland government have not paid a visit to the area;
3. People are armed and there is a political feeling not in line or opposed to Somaliland [state];
4. The presence of Puntland police in some of the villages. For example, on June 27<sup>th</sup> 2005, WFP visited Yagoori town to distribute food but armed civilian men in the town opened fire and refused the [agency] permission to unload the food. It was impossible for the Somaliland police there to defend the trucks. After that, the food was diverted to Yeyle which lies approximately 40km to the west of the tarmac road, as reported by eyewitnesses and corroborated by the Mayor of Yagoori. According to the mayor, Puntland forces took over the security for the distribution of the food, while the accompanying Somaliland police were hidden in one of the trucks until the Puntland forces left.
5. It became difficult for us to visit places of interest which are located further from the tarmac road and which in earlier reports were identified as possible electoral sites, after questions arose concerning security including those mentioned above.

### Conclusion:

After examining the situation from many sides, receiving briefings from these officials and other knowledgeable people, and reflecting on the situation of the area, it became apparent to us that there are not yet favourable conditions that will enable reasonable elections to take place in the area, except in the four towns along the road mentioned above. These towns themselves need extra caution and bolstering of their security systems.

N.B. It is possible that the Puntland administration may interfere in the district during the elections, which will have repercussions generally for the security of the area and specifically for the village of Adhiadeeye, where the troops of [Somaliland and Puntland] are facing one another. This could generally destabilise the election system; therefore, the situation in the District of Yagoori remains complex.

- |                                  |                       |
|----------------------------------|-----------------------|
| 1. <i>Muse Jama Mohamed</i>      | <i>NEC member</i>     |
| 2. <i>Abdirisq Warsame Hayir</i> | <i>Kulmiye member</i> |
| 3. <i>Ali Saeed Raygal</i>       | <i>Kulmiye member</i> |
| 4. <i>Jama Hassan Adan</i>       | <i>UCID member</i>    |
| 5. <i>Mohamed Hersi Jama</i>     | <i>UCID member</i>    |

## Annex 6:

# List of Election Candidates

Region	Party	Name	Nickname (Somali)	Clan	Sex	Candidacy
Awdal	Kulmiye	Abuubakar Cabdiraxmaan Good Wacays		Gadabursi-Maxamed Asse-Reer Maxamed	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Awdal	Kulmiye	Axmed Muxumed Geelle	Dacar	Gadabursi-Habr Cafaan-Muuse Fin	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Awdal	Kulmiye	Cabdi Siciid Faahiye Allaale		Ciisse-Fur Labe-Reer Geedi	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Awdal	Kulmiye	Cabdiraxmaan Maxamed Jaamac (1)		Gadabursi-Makahil-Reer Noor-Faarax Nur	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Awdal	Kulmiye	Cismaan Abraar Aadan Faarax		Ciisse-Udaadh-Reer Kuul	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Awdal	Kulmiye	Ibraahin Aadan Qaalib Cabsiiye		Gadabursi-Makahil-Bah Habr Abdalla	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Awdal	Kulmiye	Ikraan Xaaji Daauid Warsame Nageeye		Gadabursi-Habr Cafaan-Habr Yesif	Female	MP-Candidate_contested
Awdal	Kulmiye	Mahdi Xuseen Cadare		Gadabursi-Maxamed Asse-Bah_habar_Celi	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Awdal	Kulmiye	Maxamed Daahir Cabdalle Gaafane		Gadabursi-Makahil-Jibril Yoonis	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Awdal	Kulmiye	Maxamed Ibraahin Allaale Faahiye		Gadabursi-Maxamed Asse-Reer Axmed	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Awdal	Kulmiye	Maxamed Ibraahin Madar Maxamuud		Ciisse-Mamason	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Awdal	Kulmiye	Maxamed Jaamac Abgaal Geelle		Gadabursi-Makahil-Jibril Yoonis-Reer Haamuud	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Awdal	Kulmiye	Xasan Galab-Duule Xareed		Ciisse-Horrane	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Awdal	UCID	Axmed Cabdi Siciid Muuse		Gadabursi-Habr Cafaan-Jibraahiin	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Awdal	UCID	Bashir Sheekh Ibraahin Bakaal Jigni		Gadabursi-Habr Cafaan-Ferole	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Awdal	UCID	Cabdilaahi Aadan lidle Meecaad		Gadabursi-Makahil-Bah Habr Cabdalle	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Awdal	UCID	Cabdilaahi Axmed Yuusuf	Axmed-Madar	Gadabursi-Makahil-Jibril Yoonis	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Awdal	UCID	Cabdisalaan Maxamed Cigeh Amare		Gadabursi-Makahil-Jibril Yoonis-Reer Mohammoud	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Awdal	UCID	Cabdixakiim Xaaji Cabdilaahi Axmed Good		Gadabursi-Habr Cafaan-Makeyl	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Awdal	UCID	Mahdi Cabdilaahi Maxamuud Geelle		Gadabursi-Maxamed Asse-Reer Maxamed	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Awdal	UCID	Maxamed Madar Xoosh Faarax		Gadabursi-Habr Cafaan-Reer Ciisse	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Awdal	UCID	Muuse Maxamed Ismaaciil Waabari		Gadabursi-Makahil-Reer Nur-Maxamed Nur	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Awdal	UCID	S a l e e b a a n M a x a m u u d Cimrane		Gadabursi-Habr Cafaan-Heib Jire	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Awdal	UCID	Shirwac Cumar Cigeh	Arki-jire	Gadabursi-Makahil-Afgudud	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Awdal	UCID	Siciid Maxamed Bile Raage		Gadabursi-Habr Cafaan-Muuse Fin	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Awdal	UCID	Xasan Xuseen Maxamed Yoonis		Gadabursi-Makahil-Reer Nur-Faarax Nur	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Awdal	UDUB	Axmed Cabdi Kahin		Ciisse-Mamason	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Awdal	UDUB	Axmed Maxamuud Maxamed	Afweyne	Gadabursi-Maxamed Asse-Reer Maxamed	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Awdal	UDUB	Axmeed Barkhad Obsiiye		Gadabursi-Makahil-Reer Noor-Mohammoud Nur	Male	MP-Candidate_contested

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Awdal	UDUB	Cabdi Jaamac Cilmi	Carandis	Gadabursi-Makahil-Reer Noor	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Awdal	UDUB	Cabdi Maxamuud Jaamac	Gaagaale	Gadabursi-Maxamed Asse-Habr Muuse	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Awdal	UDUB	Cabdiqaadir Jibriil Tukaale		Gadabursi-Habr Cafaan-Muuse Fin	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Awdal	UDUB	Cali Sheekh Ibraahin Araye		Ciisse-Reer Ugaadh-Reer Geedi	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Awdal	UDUB	Cumar Nur Cismaan	Aarre	Gadabursi-Maxamed Asse-Bah_habar_Celi	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Awdal	UDUB	Mahdi Xaaji Xasan Sugaal		Gadabursi-Makahil-Jibriil Yoonis-Reer Dubuub	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Awdal	UDUB	Maxamed Barkad Miigane		Gadabursi-Makahil-Jibriil Yoonis-Reer Axmed	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Awdal	UDUB	Maxamed Yaasiin Sheekh Cali Ayaanle		Gadabursi-Makahil-Aadan Yoonis	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Awdal	UDUB	Xasan Cumar Colow		Gadabursi-Makahil-Makeyl Dheere	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Awdal	UDUB	Xasan Muuse Hufane	Karaamo	Gadabursi-Habr Cafaan-Heib Jire	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Hargeisa	Kulmiye	Axmed Cabdi Nur Kijaandhe		Issaq-Arab-Axmed Cabdille	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Hargeisa	Kulmiye	Axmed Ibraahin Daahir Axmed	Axmed weyne	Issaq-Habr Awal-Saad Muuse-Reer Samatar	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Hargeisa	Kulmiye	Axmed Maxamed Diiriye	NacNac	Issaq-Arab-Reer Aadan	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Hargeisa	Kulmiye	Cabdi Haybe Aw-Muxumed Aadan		Issaq-Arab-Samane	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Hargeisa	Kulmiye	Cabdicasiis Maxamed Samaale Ducaale		Issaq-Habr Awal-Saad Muuse-Cabdalla Abokor	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Hargeisa	Kulmiye	Cabdillahi Xuseen Cigeh Warfaa	Balaki	Issaq-Habr Awal-Saad Muuse-Jibriil Abokor-Reer Yonis	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Hargeisa	Kulmiye	Cabdirisaaq Jaamac Cumar Rooble	Ciyaale	Issaq-Habr Awal-Ciisse Muuse-Aadan Ciisse-Reer Faarax	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Hargeisa	Kulmiye	Cali Yuusuf Axmed Jaamac		Issaq-Arab-Subeer Celi	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Hargeisa	Kulmiye	Faysal Cali Sheekh Maxamed Sheekh Cabdi		Issaq-Habr Awal-Saad Muuse-Bah Gobo	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Hargeisa	Kulmiye	Ibraahin Axmed-Haybe Sheekh Muuse		Issaq-Habr Awal-Saad Muuse-Jibriil Abokor-Dalal-Dixood	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Hargeisa	Kulmiye	Ismaaciil Mahdi Xuseen Cilmi		Issaq-Habr Awal-Saad Muuse-Reer Gadiid	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Hargeisa	Kulmiye	Maxamed Cabdi Aadan Liiban	Iskeerse	Issaq-Habr Awal-Saad Muuse-Makahil	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Hargeisa	Kulmiye	Maxamed Muuse Abees Faarax		Issaq-Garxajis-Eidagalla-Reer Gabdoon	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Hargeisa	Kulmiye	Maxamed Xaaji Maxamuud Cumar-Xaashi		Issaq-Habr Awal-Saad Muuse-Reer Axmed	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Hargeisa	Kulmiye	Maxamuud Axmed Obsiye Gaboobe		Issaq-Ayuub-Reer Muuse	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Hargeisa	Kulmiye	Maxamuud Jaamac Warfaa Diiriye		Issaq-Tol Jecle	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Hargeisa	Kulmiye	Nimco Xuseen Qawdhan Xaaji Nur		Issaq-Habr Yonis-Bah Dulbahante	Female	MP-Candidate_contested
Hargeisa	Kulmiye	Rashiid Maxamed Cabdillahi		Issaq-Habr Awal-Saad Muuse-Jibriil Abokor-Bahar Cumar	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Hargeisa	Kulmiye	Xuseen Axmed Caydiid Warsame		Issaq-Arab-Maxamed Faarax	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Hargeisa	Kulmiye	Yuusuf Nur Maxamed Sugule	Guruuje	Issaq-Habr Yonis-Isxaaq-Cabdalle	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Hargeisa	UCID	Aadan Faarax Buux Kadiye		Issaq-Habr Awal-Ciisse Muuse-Aadan Ciisse	Male	MP-Candidate_contested

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Hargeisa	UCID	Aniisa Xaaji Caabi Cawad Bahdoon		Issaq-Habr Awal-Saad Muuse-Reer Axmed	Female	MP-Candidate_contested
Hargeisa	UCID	Bashir Sheekh Xuseen Tukaale		Issaq-Habr Awal-Saad Muuse-Jibril Abokor	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Hargeisa	UCID	Cabdilaahi Faarax Jire Xandulle		Issaq-Habr Awal-Saad Muuse-Reer Axmed	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Hargeisa	UCID	Cabdilaahi Siciid Ismaaciil Faarax	Dheere	Issaq-Garxajis-Eidagalla-Baha Dhamal-Reer Xasan	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Hargeisa	UCID	Cabdiraxmaan Cismaan Caalin Shirwac		Issaq-Garxajis-Eidagalla-Abokor Muuse	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Hargeisa	UCID	Cismaan Cabdi Meygaag Cilmi		Issaq-Garxajis-Eidagalla-Reer Rooble	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Hargeisa	UCID	Cismaan Cali Maxamed Jaamac	Cali Cade	Issaq-Habr Awal-Saad Muuse-Makahil	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Hargeisa	UCID	Cumar Maxamuud Cismaan Maxamed		Issaq-Arab-Guulane	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Hargeisa	UCID	Ibraahin Mahdi Buubaa Hurre		Issaq-Garxajis-Eidagalla-Reer Guuleed	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Hargeisa	UCID	Isaaq Maxamed Xuseen Xaddi		Issaq-Habr Awal-Saad Muuse-Jibril Abokor-C Aadan	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Hargeisa	UCID	Jaamac Axmed Saalax Moumin		Issaq-Habr Yonis-Isxaaq	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Hargeisa	UCID	Khadar Aadan Xuseen Ismaaciil		Issaq-Habr Yonis-Cali Siciid	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Hargeisa	UCID	Mahdi Nur Maxamed Lixle		Issaq-Habr Awal-Saad Muuse-Cabdalla Saad-Reer Deri	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Hargeisa	UCID	Maxamed Baaruud Shide Qamac		Issaq-Habr Awal-Saad Muuse-Reer Cabane	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Hargeisa	UCID	Maxamed Yuusuf Cabdilaahi Warsame		Issaq-Habr Awal-Saad Muuse-Cabdalla Abokor	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Hargeisa	UCID	Mustafe Ciisse Xuseen Faarax	Xabbo	Issaq-Arab-Samane	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Hargeisa	UCID	Weli Axmed Aadan Caalin	Ina-xaawo	Issaq-Garxajis-Eidagalla-Abokor Muuse	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Hargeisa	UCID	Xaashi Xuseen Caabi Xasan		Issaq-Habr Yonis-Gunbuur	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Hargeisa	UCID	Xasan Sheekh Maxamed Aw-Cali		Gaboye	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Hargeisa	UDUB	Aadan Muxumed Hoorri	Mataan	Issaq-Arab-Guulane	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Hargeisa	UDUB	Anwar Maxamed Cigaal		Issaq-Habr Awal-Ciisse Muuse-Aadan Ciisse-Reer Cadawe	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Hargeisa	UDUB	Axmed Cabdi Muuse Cigeh		Issaq-Habr Awal-Saad Muuse-Jibril Abokor-Dalal-Xildiid	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Hargeisa	UDUB	Axmed Cali Askar		Issaq-Habr Awal-Saad Muuse-Jibril Abokor-Reer Yonis-Baha Cali	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Hargeisa	UDUB	Cabdikariim Aw-Cali Shabeel		Issaq-Habr Awal-Saad Muuse-Reer Shirdoon	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Hargeisa	UDUB	Cabdiqaadir Xaaji Ismaaciil Jirde Aw-Cali		Issaq-Arab-Afyare	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Hargeisa	UDUB	Cabdiraxmaan Maxamed Jaamac (2)		Issaq-Habr Yonis-Isxaaq Qasin	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Hargeisa	UDUB	Cali Ibraahin Xuseen Gamuute		Issaq-Habr Awal-Ciisse Muuse-Aadan Ciisse-Reer Maxamuud	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Hargeisa	UDUB	Cali Obsiye Diiriye	Cali Gabiley	Gadabursi-Maxamed Asse-Bah habad aden	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Hargeisa	UDUB	Farxaan Aadan Haybe Cilmi		Issaq-Isxaaq	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Hargeisa	UDUB	Ibraahin Faarax Cabdi		Issaq-Habr Awal-Saad Muuse-Cabdalla Saad	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Hargeisa	UDUB	Mahdi Buuri Cismaan		Gaboye	Male	MP-Candidate_contested

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Hargeisa	UDUB	Maxamed Aadan Aw-Axmed	Dhukur	Issaq-Arab-Samane	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Hargeisa	UDUB	Maxamed Cabdilaahi Geelle Cali		Issaq-Garxajis-Eidagalla-Reer Wagar	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Hargeisa	UDUB	Maxamed Odowaa Cigaal		Issaq-Habr Awal-Saad Muuse-Cabdalla Abokor	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Hargeisa	UDUB	Maxamed Xaaji Cabdiraxmaan Maxamed	Gadhyare	Issaq-Garxajis-Eidagalla-Cabdi Bari	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Hargeisa	UDUB	Xasan Cawaale Caynaan		Issaq-Habr Awal-Saad Muuse-Jibril Abokor-S. Ismaaciil	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Hargeisa	UDUB	Xasan Mawliid Axmed		Issaq-Habr Awal-Saad Muuse-Makahil	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Hargeisa	UDUB	Xasan Xuseen Shide Daarood		Issaq-Habr Awal-Saad Muuse-Reer Samatar	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Hargeisa	UDUB	Xuseen Xaaji Axmed II-dab		Issaq-Habr Awal-Saad Muuse-Reer Gadiid-Kuul	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Saaxil	Kulmiye	Cabdiraxmaan Cawil Xasan Diiriye		Issaq-Habr Awal-Ciisse Muuse-Abikor Ciisse	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Saaxil	Kulmiye	Ciisse Maxamed Xuseen Ducaale	Ciise-curaagte	Issaq-Habr Awal-Ciisse Muuse-Maxamed Ciisse-Reer Wacays	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Saaxil	Kulmiye	Cismaan Cabdi Barkhadle	Shiine	Issaq-Habr Awal-Ciisse Muuse-Maxamed Ciisse-Reer Sahal	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Saaxil	Kulmiye	Cumar Aadan Kahin Faarax		Issaq-Habr Awal-Ciisse Muuse-Aadan Ciisse-Reer Cadawe	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Saaxil	Kulmiye	Faysal Axmed Xaaji Aadan Faarax	Madoobe	Issaq-Habr Awal-Ciisse Muuse-Aadan Ciisse-Xasan Jibril	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Saaxil	Kulmiye	Khadar Cabdi Yuusuf Axmed		Issaq-Habr Jeclo-Reer Rageh	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Saaxil	Kulmiye	Maxamed Xuseen Xaaji Ciisse Yaasiin		Issaq-Habr Awal-Saad Muuse-Cabdiraxmaan Saad	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Saaxil	Kulmiye	Maxamuud Ibraahin Axmed Ducaale	Sandheere	Issaq-Habr Yonis-Muuse Cabdalle-Faarax Maxamed	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Saaxil	Kulmiye	Siciid Cilmi Rooble Yuusuf		Issaq-Habr Awal-Ciisse Muuse-Maxamed Ciisse-Cabdalle Qoyan	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Saaxil	Kulmiye	Xasan Ismaaciil Xasan Muuse	Mataan	Issaq-Habr Jeclo-Reer Yonis	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Saaxil	UCID	Aamina-milgo Xaaji Maxamuud Warsame		Issaq-Habr Awal-Ciisse Muuse-Maxamed Ciisse-Reer Sahal	Female	MP-Candidate_contested
Saaxil	UCID	Axmed Maxamed Aar Diiriye		Issaq-Habr Awal-Ciisse Muuse-Maxamed Ciisse-Reer Wacays	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Saaxil	UCID	Axmed Maxamed Cali Beegsi		Issaq-Habr Awal-Ciisse Muuse-Aadan Ciisse-Reer Cadawe	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Saaxil	UCID	Cabdiraxmaan Maxamed Cabdillahi Cigaal	Cirro	Issaq-Habr Yonis-Muuse Cabdalle-Abokor Looge	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Saaxil	UCID	Faarax Maxamuud Cabdulle Cali		Issaq-Habr Jeclo-Reer Yonis	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Saaxil	UCID	Fu'aad Sheekh Maxamed Cabdalle Maxamed		Issaq-Habr Yonis-Idarays Cabdalla	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Saaxil	UCID	Maxamed Daahir Guuleed Warsame		Issaq-Habr Awal-Ciisse Muuse-Abikor Ciisse	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Saaxil	UCID	Maxamed Faarax Qabiile Maxamuud		Issaq-Habr Awal-Ciisse Muuse-Maxamed Ciisse-Deerayahan	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Saaxil	UCID	Maxamed Jaamac Cabdi Gaaxnuug		Issaq-Habr Awal-Ciisse Muuse-Aadan Ciisse-Reer lidleh	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Saaxil	UCID	Xaamud Cismaan Cigaal Diiriye		Issaq-Habr Awal-Ciisse Muuse-Maxamed Ciisse-Cabane Cali	Male	MP-Candidate_contested

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Saaxil	UDUB	Aadan Xaaji Diiriye Dirir Xasan	Sanqoole	Issaq-Habr Awal-Ciisse Muuse-Maxamed Ciisse-Deerayahan	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Saaxil	UDUB	Axmed Xasan Aadan Muuse	Wayso-cadde	Issaq-Habr Awal-Ciisse Muuse-Aadan Ciisse-Dan Wadaag	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Saaxil	UDUB	Cismaan Ciisse Cawaale		Issaq-Habr Awal-Ciisse Muuse-Maxamed Ciisse-Reer Sahal	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Saaxil	UDUB	Jamaal Xaaji Qawdhan Maxamed		Issaq-Habr Yonis-Muuse Cabdalle-Abokor Looge	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Saaxil	UDUB	Maxamed Aadan Jaamac	Saxar	Issaq-Habr Jeclo-Muuse Abokor-Reer Yonis	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Saaxil	UDUB	Maxamed Nur Carraale Bullaale		Issaq-Habr Yonis-Muuse Cabdalle-Faarax Maxamed	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Saaxil	UDUB	Maxamuud Jaamac Xaaji Cilmi	Dable	Issaq-Habr Awal-Ciisse Muuse-Maxamed Ciisse-Reer Wacays	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Saaxil	UDUB	Maxamuud Xuseen Muuse Cali	Oday	Issaq-Habr Awal-Saad Muuse-Makahil	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Saaxil	UDUB	Siciid Cartan Cismaan Faarax		Issaq-Habr Awal-Ciisse Muuse-Aadan Ciisse-Reer Cadawe	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Saaxil	UDUB	Xasan Maxamuud Meygaag		Issaq-Habr Awal-Ciisse Muuse-Abikor Ciisse	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Sanaag	Kulmiye	Cabdiraxmaan Maxamed Talyaanle		Dhulbahante-Maxamed Garaad-Noclye Axmed	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Sanaag	Kulmiye	Cabdiraxmaan Yuusuf Cali Cartan		Issaq-Habr Jeclo-Muuse Abokor-Basanbuur	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Sanaag	Kulmiye	Cali Maxamed Aadan	Cali Barre	Warsangeli-Cumar-Bah lidoor	Male	MP-Candidate_uncontested
Sanaag	Kulmiye	Dalmar Saalax Diiriye Cabdi		Issaq-Habr Jeclo-Muuse Abokor-Biciide-Baho	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Sanaag	Kulmiye	Ibraahim Jaamac Cali Maxamed	Reyte	Issaq-Habr Jeclo-Muuse Abokor-Udurxmeen	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Sanaag	Kulmiye	Maxamed Axmed Cabdi	Carabeyto	Issaq-Habr Yonis-Muuse Ismaaciil-Cabdalle Xaamuud	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Sanaag	Kulmiye	Maxamed Cabdiraxmaan Ismaaciil Maxamed		Warsangeli-Ugas Labe	Male	MP-Candidate_uncontested
Sanaag	Kulmiye	Maxamed Cismaan Maxamed Xasan	Bulqaas	Warsangeli-Cumar-Bah Ugas Labe	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Sanaag	Kulmiye	Maxamed Ducaale Maxamed		Warsangeli-Cumar-Nuux Cumar	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Sanaag	Kulmiye	Saalax Guure Camaale Ibraahin		Issaq-Habr Jeclo-Muuse Abokor-Biciide-Axmed Faarax	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Sanaag	Kulmiye	Sahal Maxamed Jaamac Faarax		Warsangeli-Dubeys-Reer Maxamed	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Sanaag	Kulmiye	Yuusuf Maxamed Cali Xayd	Tuke	Issaq-Habr Jeclo-Muuse Abokor-Biciide-Reer lidleh	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Sanaag	UCID	Axmed Cali Warsame Carraale		Dhulbahante-Maxamuud Garaad-Noclye Axmed	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Sanaag	UCID	Axmed Faarax Cali Jooj		Issaq-Habr Yonis-Muuse Ismaaciil-Jibril Tuurwaa	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Sanaag	UCID	Axmed Jaamac Ismaaciil Dafac		Issaq-Habr Yonis-Muuse Ismaaciil-Maxamuud Xaamud	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Sanaag	UCID	Cabdi Cismaan Faarax	Hamershool	Issaq-Habr Jeclo-Muuse Abokor-lidleh Biciide	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Sanaag	UCID	Cali Salaad Maxamed Saalax		Warsangeli-Cumar-Garaad Cabdalle-Bah lidoor	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Sanaag	UCID	Maxamed Cabdi Maxamuud Samatar	Kuus	Warsangeli-Dubeys	Male	MP-Candidate_uncontested
Sanaag	UCID	Maxamed Cali Jibriil Ducaale		Issaq-Habr Yonis-Muuse Ismaaciil-Cabdi Xaamuud	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Sanaag	UCID	Saalax Bare Cabdi Maxamed		Issaq-Habr Yonis-Muuse Ismaaciil-Reer Ibraahin	Male	MP-Candidate_contested

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Sanaag	UCID	Sahal Cabdi Maxamed Nur		Warsangeli-Dubeys-Reer Xasan	Male	MP-Candidate_uncontested
Sanaag	UCID	Saleebaan Axmed Maxamuud Hagoog		Issaq-Habr Jeclo-Muuse Abokor-Biciide-Reer Iidleh	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Sanaag	UCID	Saleebaan Cawad Cali Bukhaari		Issaq-Habr Yonis-Saad Yonis	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Sanaag	UCID	Yaasiin Cali Warsame Guuleed		Issaq-Habr Yonis-Muuse Ismaaciil-Cabdalle Xaamuud	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Sanaag	UDUB	Axmed Saleebaan Barre Cali		Issaq-Habr Jeclo-Muuse Abokor-Biciide-Reer Iidleh	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Sanaag	UDUB	Baar Siciid Faarax		Warsangeli-Dubeys-Reer Maxamed	Female	MP-Candidate_uncontested
Sanaag	UDUB	Cabdilaahi Maxamed Jaamac Faarax	Carey	Issaq-Habr Jeclo-Muuse Abokor-Biciide-Basanbuur	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Sanaag	UDUB	Cabdiqaadir Jaamac Xaamud		Warsangeli-Cumar-Nuux Cumar	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Sanaag	UDUB	Cumar Jaamac Faarax Axmed		Issaq-Habr Jeclo-Muuse Abokor-Biciide-Baho	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Sanaag	UDUB	Ibraahin Carraale Cabdi Faarax	Ruush	Issaq-Habr Jeclo-Muuse Abokor-Biciide-Axmed Faarax	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Sanaag	UDUB	Ibraahin Maxamed Xuseen	Ina-Dhaadheere	Issaq-Habr Yonis-Muuse Ismaaciil-Muuse Tuurwa	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Sanaag	UDUB	Jibriil Cali Salaad Aadan		Warsangeli-Cumar-Reer Garaad	Male	MP-Candidate_uncontested
Sanaag	UDUB	Maxamed Cabdi Maalik Axmed		Dhulbahante-Maxamuud Garaad-Noclye Axmed	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Sanaag	UDUB	Maxamed Cumar Jaamac Jabaabul		Issaq-Habr Yonis-Muuse Ismaaciil-Cabdalle Xaamuud-Reer Ibraahin	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Sanaag	UDUB	Maxamed Saalax Cigeh		Issaq-Habr Yonis-Muuse Ismaaciil-Jibriil Tuurwaa	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Sanaag	UDUB	Yuusuf Liiban Cumar Cali		Issaq-Habr Yonis-Saad Yonis-Idarays	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Sool	Kulmiye	Axmed Ducaale Bullaale		Issaq-Habr Jeclo-Cali Barreh	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Sool	Kulmiye	Baashe Maxamed Cabdi		Dhulbahante-Bahararsame	Male	MP-Candidate_uncontested
Sool	Kulmiye	Bile Cabdi Ducaale Samatar		Issaq-Habr Jeclo-Cumar	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Sool	Kulmiye	Cabdirisaaq Warsame Xayir		Dhulbahante-Jaamac Siad	Male	MP-Candidate_uncontested
Sool	Kulmiye	Cabdiwaaxid Cabdiqaadir Cabdiraxmaan		Hawiye-Fiqi Shini	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Sool	Kulmiye	Faarax Cabdi Maxamed Cali		Dhulbahante-Bahararsame	Male	MP-Candidate_uncontested
Sool	Kulmiye	Ibraahin Axmed Reygal		Issaq-Habr Jeclo-Reer Yonis	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Sool	Kulmiye	Jaamac Cilmi Xaashi		Dhulbahante-	Male	MP-Candidate_uncontested
Sool	Kulmiye	Maxamed Jaamac Cabdi		Dhulbahante-Khalid	Male	MP-Candidate_uncontested
Sool	Kulmiye	Maxamed Warsame Jaamac Aw-Cali		Dhulbahante-Jaamac Siad	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Sool	Kulmiye	Mubaarik Obsiye Dhunkaal		Issaq-Habr Jeclo-Reer Yonis	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Sool	Kulmiye	Xasan Maxamuud Dhilood		Dhulbahante-Maxamed Garaad-Noclye Axmed	Male	MP-Candidate_uncontested
Sool	UCID	Cabdicasiis Ducaale Qambi		Dhulbahante-Reer Hagar	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Sool	UCID	Cabdiqaadir Askar Xasan Cali		Issaq-Habr Yonis-Saad Yonis	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Sool	UCID	Ibraahin Maxamed Faarax		Dhulbahante-Ugaadh yahan	Male	MP-Candidate_uncontested
Sool	UCID	Maxamed Cali Ducaale Cabdula	Curdin	Dhulbahante-Maxamed Garaad-Noclye Axmed	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Sool	UCID	Maxamed Cumar Cabdi Waaxid Axmed		Dhulbahante-Maxamuud Ugas	Male	MP-Candidate_uncontested



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Sool	UCID	Maxamed Ismaaciil Cilmi	Deeq	Dhulbahante-Maxamed Garaad-Noclye Axmed	Male	MP-Candidate_uncontested
Sool	UCID	Maxamed Maxamuud Cilmi	Jiidhe	Dhulbahante-Maxamed Garaad-Noclye Axmed	Male	MP-Candidate_uncontested
Sool	UCID	Maxamed Xirsi Jaamac Maxamed	Muslim	Dhulbahante-Jaamac Siad	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Sool	UCID	Maxamed Xirsi Xaaji Faarax		Issaq-Habr Yonis-Saad Yonis	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Sool	UCID	Saleebaan Diiriye Bare Cali		Issaq-Habr Jeclo-Reer lidleh	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Sool	UCID	Siciid Maxamed Cilmi Ismaaciil		Dhulbahante-Maxamed Garaad-Noclye Axmed	Male	MP-Candidate_uncontested
Sool	UCID	Xasan Axmed Nur		Dhulbahante-Qayad	Male	MP-Candidate_uncontested
Sool	UDUB	Aadan Tarabi Oogle Faarax		Issaq-Habr Jeclo-Reer Yonis	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Sool	UDUB	Axmed Maxamuud Cabdi Caateeye		Dhulbahante-Maxamed Garaad-Noclye Axmed	Male	MP-Candidate_uncontested
Sool	UDUB	Cabdi Cabdilaahi Liiban Cabdi		Dhulbahante-Jaamac Siad	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Sool	UDUB	Cabdi Hirad Warfaa Faahiye		Dhulbahante-Jaamac Siad	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Sool	UDUB	Cabdilaahi Faarax Mire Maxamed		Hawiye-Fiqi Shini	Male	MP-Candidate_uncontested
Sool	UDUB	Cabdiraxmaan Muuse Jaamac Cali		Dhulbahante	Male	MP-Candidate_uncontested
Sool	UDUB	Hodan Cabdi Xuseen		Dhulbahante-Maxamuud Garaad-Nur Axmed	Female	MP-Candidate_uncontested
Sool	UDUB	Maxamed Axmed Maxamuud	Dhakool	Dhulbahante-Faarax Garaad	Male	MP-Candidate_uncontested
Sool	UDUB	Maxamuud Dhunkaal Guutaale Guuleed		Issaq-Habr Jeclo-Cumar	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Sool	UDUB	Saleebaan Yuusuf Cali Koore		Dhulbahante-Maxamuud Garaad-Nur Axmed	Male	MP-Candidate_uncontested
Sool	UDUB	Siciid Warsame Ismaaciil		Issaq-Habr Yonis-Saad Yonis	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Sool	UDUB	Xariir Siciid Bullaale Warsame		Issaq-Habr Jeclo-Barre Cabdille	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Togdheer	Kulmiye	Axmed Maxamed Jaamac Ismaaciil		Issaq-Habr Jeclo-Reer Yonis	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Togdheer	Kulmiye	Cabdi Aw Daahir Cali Guuleed		Issaq-Habr Yonis-Reer Ainashe	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Togdheer	Kulmiye	Cabdilaahi Ismaaciil Faarax Seed		Issaq-Arab-Cabdalle Arab	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Togdheer	Kulmiye	Cabdiraxmaan Cabdiqaadir Faarax Nur		Issaq-Habr Yonis-Muuse Areh	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Togdheer	Kulmiye	Cali Xasan Maxamed Jaamac	Cali Mareexaan	Issaq-Habr Jeclo-Reer Daahir	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Togdheer	Kulmiye	Cismaan Xirsi Aadan Dudu		Issaq-Habr Jeclo-Axmed Faarax	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Togdheer	Kulmiye	Cumar Axmed Saleebaan	Sanweyne	Issaq-Habr Jeclo-Reer Daahir	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Togdheer	Kulmiye	Maxamed Cismaan Xaaji Axmed Cali	Indho-Balac	Issaq-Habr Awal-Ciisse Muuse-Maxamed Ciisse-Dhogori	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Togdheer	Kulmiye	Maxamed Cumar Aadan Xasan	Jiir	Issaq-Habr Jeclo-Sanbuur	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Togdheer	Kulmiye	Maxamed Ismaaciil Cali Xirsi		Issaq-Habr Jeclo-Cali Barreh	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Togdheer	Kulmiye	Maxamed Xaaji Yuusuf Axmed Cali	Waabeeye	Issaq-Habr Yonis-Bah Dulbahante	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Togdheer	Kulmiye	Maxamed Yuusuf Liibaan Rooble		Issaq-Habr Jeclo-Reer Binin	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Togdheer	Kulmiye	Maxamuud Ismaaciil Xasan Cabdi	Bede	Issaq-Habr Jeclo-Cimraan	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Togdheer	Kulmiye	Xamse Maxamed Gaada-weyne		Dhulbahante-Faarax Garaad-Reer Hagar	Male	MP-Candidate_uncontested

Region	Party	Name	Nickname (Somali)	Clan	Sex	Candidacy
Togdheer	Kulmiye	Yuusuf Jaamac Siciid Maxamuud		Issaq-Habr Jeclo-Bareh Cabdullah	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Togdheer	UCID	Axmed Xuseen Maxamuud	Fag-fagaash	Issaq-Habr Yonis-Muuse Areh	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Togdheer	UCID	Cabdilaahi Jaamac Muuse Ismaaciil		Issaq-Habr Yonis-Bah Ainashe	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Togdheer	UCID	Cabdiraxmaan Jaamac Ducaale Cali		Issaq-Habr Jeclo-Reer Yonis	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Togdheer	UCID	Cabdirisaaq Siciid Faarax Cabdi Waraabe		Issaq-Habr Jeclo-Reer Daahir	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Togdheer	UCID	Cali Cabdi Nur Guhaad		Issaq-Habr Yonis-Reer Warabe	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Togdheer	UCID	Deeq Diiriye Warsame Yuusuf		Issaq-Garxajis-Eidagalla-Guuyobe	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Togdheer	UCID	Jaamac Xasan Aadan Xaad		Issaq-Habr Yonis-Muuse Cabdalle-Faarax Maxamed	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Togdheer	UCID	Luul Xaashi Cawad Carraale		Issaq-Habr Yonis-Reer Ainashe	Female	MP-Candidate_contested
Togdheer	UCID	Maxamed Jaamac Cali Guuleed		Issaq-Habr Jeclo-Axmed Faarax	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Togdheer	UCID	Mustafe Maxamed Axmed Xudur		Issaq-Habr Yonis-Cali Siciid	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Togdheer	UCID	Muuse Faarax Xayd Ducaale		Dhulbahante-Faarax Garaad-Cali Geri	Male	MP-Candidate_uncontested
Togdheer	UCID	Naasir Xaaji Cali Shire Naaleeye		Issaq-Habr Awal-Ciisse Muuse-Maxamed Ciisse-Cumar Jibril	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Togdheer	UCID	Saleebaan Nur Cabdi Lutfi		Issaq-Habr Yonis-Reer Xuseen	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Togdheer	UCID	Xasan Suudi Xirsi Shire		Issaq-Habr Jeclo-Ugaadh Cumar	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Togdheer	UCID	Xuseen Maxamed Cigeh Xasan		Issaq-Habr Yonis-Muuse Ismaaciil-Reer Awl	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Togdheer	UDUB	Axmed Maxamed Aadan	Qaybe	Dhulbahante-Faarax Garaad-Wacays Cabdulla	Male	MP-Candidate_uncontested
Togdheer	UDUB	Axmed Maxamed Nur Maxamed		Issaq-Habr Yonis-Reer Sugule	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Togdheer	UDUB	Cabdi Axmed Siciid Seed		Issaq-Habr Yonis-Reer Warabe	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Togdheer	UDUB	Cabdicasiis Ismaaciil Ducaale Warsame		Issaq-Habr Jeclo-Xasan Cabdalla	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Togdheer	UDUB	Cali Xaaji Maxamed Muuse	Tuke	Issaq-Habr Yonis-Cali Siciid	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Togdheer	UDUB	Farxaan Maxamed Cali Warfaa		Issaq-Habr Jeclo-Axmed Faarax	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Togdheer	UDUB	Faysal Nuux Diiriye Sooyaan		Issaq-Habr Yonis-Reer Xuseen	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Togdheer	UDUB	Haybe Nur Xaaji Cabdilaahi Maxamed		Issaq-Habr Yonis-Bah Dulbahante	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Togdheer	UDUB	Jaamac Cabdilaahi Warsame Biin		Issaq-Habr Jeclo-Cimraan-Reer Xarbi	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Togdheer	UDUB	Jamaal Maxamed Warsame	Xiin-waal	Issaq-Habr Jeclo-Axmed Faarax-Biciide	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Togdheer	UDUB	Maxamed Cali Ciisse		Issaq-Habr Yonis-Muuse Areh	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Togdheer	UDUB	Muuse Cabdi Maxamuud	Madoobe	Issaq-Habr Jeclo-Reer Daahir	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Togdheer	UDUB	Saleebaan Ibraahin Maxamuud Xasan		Issaq-Habr Awal-Ciisse Muuse-Maxamed Ciisse-Dhogori	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Togdheer	UDUB	Xasan Jaamac Cali Nur	Bacad	Issaq-Habr Yonis-Reer Ainashe	Male	MP-Candidate_contested
Togdheer	UDUB	Xuseen Ismaaciil Yuusuf Cawad		Issaq-Habr Yonis-Ugaadh Cumar	Male	MP-Candidate_contested



## **A VOTE FOR PEACE**

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An APD/Interpeace Report as part of the Dialogue for Peace*

## **ERRATA**

- P.37 para 6 line 2      Isaaq should read Isxaaq  
P.42 para 2 line 5      Gudabiirsi should read Gadabiirsi  
P.42 table 5            Gudabiirsi should read Gadabiirsi  
P.43 figure 2            Gudabiirsi should read Gadabiirsi

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## **CONTACT DETAILS**

### **Academy for Peace and Development**

Hargeisa, Somaliland:

Phone: (+252-2-) 520304

Thuraya: +8821643338171/

+8821643341206

email@ apd-somaliland.org

Burco, Somaliland:

Phone: (+252-2-) 712980/81/82

Thuraya: +8821643341202/

+8821643341204

peaceandresearch@hotmail.com

**<http://www.apd-somaliland.org>**



interpeace

International Peacebuilding Alliance  
Alliance internationale pour la consolidation de la paix  
Alianza Internacional para la Consolidación de la Paz

Interpeace Regional Office for Eastern and Central Africa

P.O.Box 28832 00200 - Nairobi Kenya

T: +254(0) 20 375 4166

+254(0) 20 375 4167


F: +254(0) 20 375 4165

E: eca@interpeace.org



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