THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN SOMALILAND
Workshop Report
April 2002
Introduction
A critical measure of the transitional administration of war torn country is its success in providing security and the rule of law to its people. These can only be realized when there are functioning institutions to uphold them. Somalia’s legal, judicial and law enforcement institutions had collapsed during the civil war. State responsibility for guaranteeing personal safety, protection of private property, and freedom of movement was lost. Social norms were violated and a state of lawlessness had prevailed.
Rebuilding these institutions and restoring law and order has been daunting task in Somaliland. Nevertheless, since 1993 there has been steady progress in re-establishing the foundations of the judicial system. Re-established were legal codes, courts, jails and law enforcement agencies. Yet the re-establishment of the rule of law and order continue to face many challenges. They include:
q The existence of diverse legal traditions that are contradictory;
q Untrained and under-qualified personnel;
q Insufficient offices and courts;
q Lack of necessary equipment and resources;
q Low public confidence;
q Absence of legal reform or development; and
q Limitations on the independence of the judiciary.
Realizing the importance of the judiciary in post-conflict reconstruction, the Swiss Embassy in Nairobi provided a contract to the Academy for Peace Development (APD in Hargeisa to examine the status of the judicial system in Somaliland. APD began the job by forming a Working Group comprising two practicing lawyers, a senior judge and two APD researchers. After lengthy discussions, the Working Group prepared a discussion paper that raised critical issues pertaining to following five topics on the status of Somaliland’s judiciary:
- Overview of the judicial system
- Problems and constraints
- Legal reform and development
- Structure of the judicial system
- Independence of the judiciary
After the discussion paper was finalized, a workshop involving key actors in the legal system in Somaliland was organized. The workshop was held in Hargeysa on 7-9th April 2002. The workshop participants included officials from the Ministry of Justice, judges, lawyers, lawmakers, human right groups activists, media people, women groups, international actors, and local NGOs. [1]
The three-days workshop was fully audio-taped and partially video-taped. This report is based on the deliberations of the working group and of the workshop participants.
Rule of Law, or Rule of Laws?
Somaliland’s current judicial system is a hybrid, combining several distinct legal traditions. While the Constitution stipulates Islamic jurisprudence as the “basis” of law, other laws – namely, customary (xeer) and secular legal codes - have been applied across the country. The practice of parallel legal systems reflects, in part, the historical evolution of legal and judicial systems in Somaliland.
In pre-colonial Somaliland, customary law (xeer) was used alongside Islamic Shari’a (of the Shafi’i school). Clan elders and experts in Shari’a law (the qaadis and sheikhs) applied the laws in an informal manner. In some matters, such as marriage, divorce and inheritance rights, Shari’a is more progressive than xeer, but was usually disregarded in favour of xeer.
The British colonial administration introduced an additional body of codified law and a judicial system based on British Common and Statute Law and the Indian Penal Code. In addition, the British established Akil’s courts and, subsequently, Qaadi’s courts to apply customary law, while Shari’a law continued to be applied in domestic matters.
At independence in 1960, when British Somaliland and Italian Somalia were united to form the Somali Republic, four distinct legal traditions – British Common Law, Italian (Continental) law, Islamic Shari’a, and Somali customary law – were in simultaneous operation. These four legal systems were partially integrated by the passage of a “Law on the Organization of the Judiciary” by the National Assembly of Somalia in 1962. According to this legislation, the civil and penal codes and commercial law were to be based on Italian law, whereas the criminal procedure code was to be based on Anglo-Indian law.
In Somaliland, however, the lower courts continued to practice British law until 1977 because judges were most conversant with this system. At the same time, Islamic Shari’a continued to apply in family and civil matters, while customary law (sanctioned by civil courts) was retained for optional application in such matters as land tenure, water and grazing rights, and the payment of diya. In parts of the country, particularly rural areas, where state law did not reach, customary law was predominant.
The military regime that seized power in 1969 suspended the Constitution of 1961, assigning all legislative, executive, and judicial powers to the Supreme Revolutionary Council. In 1973, the regime introduced a unified civil code. Its provisions pertaining to inheritance, personal contracts and water grazing rights sharply curtailed both the Shari’a and Somali customary law. In particular, the new civil code altered the customary system of diya payment as compensation for death or injury, in which responsibility was collectively borne by the clan. The offence was made punishable by death and compensation payable only to close relatives. The Socialist regime’s determination to limit the role of Shari’a in domestic matters was further reflected in the Family Act of 1975, which gave equal inheritance rights to women.
The military government did not change the basic structure of the court system, but it limited the powers of the courts. At the outset the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court were abolished and the authorities of the Court of Appeals and District Courts were reduced. Although the Supreme Court was later restored, the regime introduced a major new institution, the National Security Courts (NSCs), which operated outside the ordinary legal system and under the direct control of the executive. These Courts, which were situated in Mugadisho and the regional capitals, had jurisdiction over offences that were deemed by the regime to threaten state security.
After the collapse of central government in 1991, different regions of Somalia reverted to different legal traditions. In Somaliland, the judiciary - like other institutions - had to be started from scratch. Popular sentiment favoured the implementation of the Shari’a as a mean for re-establishing order and justice, but that hope proved unrealistic as most the available jurists were returnees from the South and educated in an Italian medium. Inevitably, they became the foundation of Somaliland’s judicial system. Their initial endeavours were shattered by an outbreak of fighting in Bur’o and Berbera in 1992.
The 1993 “Grand Conference National Reconciliation”, which took place in Boroma in the aftermath of the fighting, was an important benchmark in the process of re-establishing governance in Somaliland. The Boroma charter specified among other things the formation of a police force and an independent judiciary, based on pre-1969 laws. In practice, however, judges continued to apply the civil code and procedure enacted in the mid-seventies.
The 1993 Charter was subsequently replaced by a provisional Constitution, which was adopted in 1997 by the “Hargeysa Conference” and ratified by public referendum in May 2001. The constitution stipulates that the only laws applicable are those that do not contradict the Islamic Shari’a. In reality, however, the application of diverse legal codes continues, and interpretation of the laws remains ad hoc, non-uniform, and highly subjective.
Current Situation
Contrasting views emerged from the workshop’s debate on the application of parallel legal system. Some participants denied that the parallel legal systems are contradictory, asserting that any law that that contravenes the Islamic Shari’a is not law. According to this view, judges respect a hierarchy of legal systems, referring first to Islamic shari’a, then to positive law, and finally to customary law.
Other participants asserted that the realities on the ground do not allow the full application of the Shari’a law. They argued that despite the precedence assigned to Islamic jurisprudence and despite the revival of Islam throughout the country, few of the judges who administer the courts have expertise in Shari’a law. Furthermore, they argue that although the universallyMuslim public believes in the Shari’a, they are afraid of how it may be applied. In the words of one participant:
“The stipulation of Islamic jurisprudence as the ‘basis’ of law is just lip-service and nobody applies it; its verbal affirmation only appeases the religious groups and the populace at large.”
This participant underscored what most participants had acknowledged: chiefly because the positive laws have legal codes, the majority of judges in the system administer these laws in practice. The primacy of positive law in practice is reinforced by the existence of a complementary law enforcement and penal system. Thus the courts, police, and legal professionals (defence lawyers and public prosecutors) all rely on the positive laws. In contrast, judges are unfamiliar with the interpretation and application of the Shari’a legal code. In addition, customary law has not been codified. Their application is even more ad hoc and inconsistent than the Shari’a laws.
Some participants asserted that, in practice, customary law is predominant, undermining the application of other legal codes. For instance, someone guilty of homicide may be brought before court for trial under positive law, but if settlement is reached outside the court in accordance with xeer (traditional social contracts), he or she may be set free without punishment. This particularly so where law enforcement and the courts are weak or non-existent, where warrants cannot be enforced, and relatives apprehend the offender. When the relatives settle an offence according to customary laws outside the judiciary system, judges and law enforcement officers cannot prevent the release of the offender brought to them by the relatives who now insist on his release. Workshop participants repeatedly but inconclusively debated whether or not this practice encourages recidivism. Women can be particularly vulnerable to the substitution of customary law for positive or Shari’a law. Elders routinely exert pressure on women to settle out of court and thus forfeit their legal rights.[2]
The pervasive influence of customary law in the judiciary system is encouraged by the lack of strong central government authority. Judges feel compelled to accept it, since to do otherwise may lead to confrontation or conflict, and undermine public safety. In some cases, courts may simply sanction decisions reached by clans on the basis of xeer. As one district judge explained:
“The highest compensation for an injury the district court offers is 200,000 Sl.Sh. If the social contract between the two clans offers more than that, they settle outside and I have to ratify their solution.”
The relationship between the positive, shari’a and customary laws is complex: they can be contradictory, complementary, or even interchangeable. For example, according to some workshop participants, positive law should apply to civil and criminal matters, the Shari’a to family matters and customary law to clan matters. Were this is the case, they argue, contradictions could be minimized.
Other participants, however, contended that contradictions are inevitable, particularly with respect to criminal law. For example, in case of homicide, penal code article 418 offers one option, the shari’a offers two options, and customary law offers more than three options and considers criminal acts to be communal responsibility rather than individual responsibility. Also, positive legal codes and the Shari’a differ significantly in their approach to intoxication, robbery, and adultery. No major differences were noted by workshop participants between positive law and the Shari’a with respect to civil code.
Judges differ in their application of the law according to their backgrounds, specialties, philosophy, and pragmatism. Since there are no written guidelines, judges often base their verdicts on individual assumptions and beliefs. As one judge admitted:
“I have used many penal codes that contradict the Shari’a and I know it is unlawful, but people accept that.”
Workshop participants identified the following two major problems associated with the application and interpretation of the various legal systems:
First, the co-existence of parallel legal systems is almost as bad as lawlessness (sharci darro), since no uniform standard applies. An individual cannot be sure of which law will apply in a given situation, or (in certain situations) even whether he or she has broken a law. The interpretation and application of the law thus becomes a purely haphazard affair.
Second, it is possible that different laws may be applied to a given situation. In other words, the public persecutor might base his case on one system, the defence on another, while the judge administers the proceeding and reaches a decision according to a third.
At the end of the debate on this issue, there was consensus among participants that the Constitution does not provide sufficient guidance on this issue to render coherent the application and the interpretations of these diverse legal systems, and that there is a need to bring more coherence to the judicial system.
Problems and Constraints
In Somaliland, the judiciary is the most neglected and underfunded of the three orders of government. As one participant described the situation:
“In other countries, courts and justices are very distinguished and they are the most respected places and people. In our country that is not the case: you can’t differentiate the judges from the ordinary people, and the appearance of the court-room is no different from any other social gathering. That should give you a picture of the state our judiciary.”
The common problems that are hampering the effective performance of the judicial system at various levels include:
q Few qualified people and no refresher courses or training
q No association or regulatory body for the legal community
q Lack of basic equipment and facilities
q No legal libraries, text, journals, or other legal resources
q Poor working relationship between the actors within the system
In addition to limited human and technical resources, the judicial system suffers from financial and political constraints. It is worth noting that most of the judges in the system today began working on voluntary basis when the judiciary was re-established in 1992. As one participant put it: “They should be commended for that, and they have done quite well under extremely difficult situations - they have made great sacrifices.” The remuneration for judges is very low, despite a recent and substantial increase in their salaries to about 900,000 Sl.Sh (US$ 140) per month. Only 0.5% of the Somaliland budget is allocated to the judiciary, compared to over 55% for police and armed forces[3].
The Lower Courts – namely, the District and Regional Courts and the Courts of Appeal - administratively come under the Ministry Justice. It is the responsibility of the Ministry of Justice to make available to these courts the fund allocated to them, but this often does not happen. According to one judge:
“Funds allocated in the budget don’t make it to the courts. They are there in the budget but you can’t get them.” (Waxa weeye cad dawlada ka yimi anaga aan na soo gaadhin).
Another judge lamented:
“It is also the Ministry’s responsibility to appoint ten jurists to work with the court. Because it fails in these responsibilities, I have to use money from my own pocket to find court jurists.”
The judiciary is overstaffed with unqualified judges and unqualified support staff. Of 35 practising judges, only 19 possess law degrees, while the rest have some basic education and experience in administering the Shari’a[4]. When the wages for judges were increased, many unqualified people sought employment in the judiciary with the help of Ministers, clan elders and other patrons. A former President of the Supreme Court described the situation in the following terms:
“The judiciary is like a stray she-camel (baadi irmaan) laden with milk and everyone is milking her. So, every clan wants to have a judge and in the process they are flooding the system.”
There are currently no criteria and exams for hiring or employing judges. In addition, the Ministry of Justice hires the supporting staff and the clerks without first assessing the number of staff needed and the qualifications required. As a result, the Ministry has overstaffed the system with unqualified clerks. Again the ex-president of the Supreme Court stated:
“It should have been for the judge to inform the Civil Service Commission of the number of clerks he needs and qualifications required, and then for the Civil Service Commission to examine them, but that has not been the case.”
A host of other constraints jeopardizing the capacity of judges to reach impartial decisions were also raised in the workshop. Unlike other senior government officials, judges do not enjoy physical protection (security guard) and are thus vulnerable to harassment by members of the public. People have easy access to judges - both at their residents and offices - to discuss with them their cases, to threaten them or to offer them bribes. Other pressures come from clans, because a judgment against an individual is usually seen as an action against a clan.
Trained legal professionals (public prosecutors, defence lawyers and civil lawyers) are scarce. Many public prosecutors are not qualified and have only limited knowledge about the existing law, so they do not prepare the cases thoroughly. The few lawyers in the system are overwhelmed by the caseload and are often accused of being greedy for taken on more cases than they can handle. Many clients know little about the justice system and have unrealistic or inappropriate expectations of their lawyers. According to one lawyer:
“The first question they [the clients] ask you is: ‘Do you know the judge?’ And that is why many of them fall prey to what is known as a Mukhalis (facilitator), who convinces them that, as an insider, he [the Mukhalis] could finish their cases in no time. Most of the time, people fall for that and pay dearly.”
Sometimes it is the judge who presents a problem for the lawyer, offering verbal abuse or otherwise indulging in improper conduct, as there is no code of conduct in the courtrooms.
The judiciary also suffers from low public confidence. In general, the laws tend to best serve the rich. This is partly because they can afford the best legal advice money can buy, but it is also because many people attempt to buy the judges, encouraging dishonesty and corruption in the system. In the words of one participant:
“The public aim for the judge, exercising different means to influence him: money, clan-relations and so on. Moreover, each side produces about ten or fifteen witnesses, and there is no means to verify them. So the public does not actually want justice to prevail and undermines it consistently.”
Many people believe, rightly or wrongly, that a case is won by the side that has paid the most. Cases tend to move very slowly, drawing public criticism: “They just drag out the cases to squeeze money from both sides until one side outdoes the other,” asserted one participant.
Even if a fair verdict is reached, there is no guarantee that it will be enforced. Even the custodial system is also vulnerable to pressures and many people convicted before the courts do not serve out their sentences. The problems associated with the law enforcement institutions in Somaliland include high level of illiteracy, poor pay, recruitment that favours males and major clans, inadequate equipment and facilities and lack of training in criminal court procedures.
The key problems and constraints mentioned above are discussed in greater detail below.
Legal reform and development
Somaliand‘s civil and criminal legal codes date from the mid-20th century. There has been virtually no evolution of the law since then. There have been no major legal reforms and few new laws have been enacted. The few that have been passed (like Bill 80/96 which concerns land disputes) are poorly enforced, largely because legislation is not gazetted or otherwise made available to jurist and lawyers. Overall, participants in the workshop agreed that the system is not dynamic and that is has not evolved to keep pace with the changing social, economic and political context.
According to participants in the study, the areas in which legislation most urgently needs to be amended or updated include:
q The Constitution
q The penal and civil codes
q The family code
In the absence of adequate laws, judges are obliged to improvise. “There is no commercial and administrative laws, but that does not prevent us hearing cases in those areas,” admitted one judge. How judges reach their decisions in such cases, and how these decisions are publicly perceived, is a matter for further investigation.
Areas in which new legislation is required were identified as:
q Commercial laws
q Traffic laws
q Administrative laws
q Juvenile laws
q Judicial administrative laws (includes the code of conduct of all judicial staff)
In fact, the process of drafting new legislation proved to be a contentious issue. Most Somaliland parliamentarians know little about law. To date, all major legislation that come before Parliament has originated with the Executive branch. This practice has been a source of concern for some participants, particularly with respect to legislation governing the judicial system itself, which has been put forward by the Ministry of Justice. Some workshop participants asserted that, until Parliament becomes more effective, it should be the responsibility of jurists to prepare legislation and pass it on to the lawmakers. Likewise, they suggested that lawmakers should seek the inputs and advice of the judicial community in the legislative process.
Structure of the judicial system
In Somaliland, the courts are divided into a three tier-system: the Supreme Court, courts of appeal, regional and district courts. The district courts deal with claims up to 3 million Sl.Sh. and offences punishable by sentences of less than three years. The regional courts deal with claims that are more than 3 million Sl.Sh. and jail terms in excess of three years.
Most participants agreed that the structure of the court system provided sufficient checks and balances, but that it suffered from a lack of qualified judges. Hence, it is inefficient. The few qualified judges in the system tend to be concentrated in Hargeysa and other major towns. Outside the urban centres, the judiciary is weak or entirely absent, leaving disputes to be addressed by local elders or religious leaders. Even in Hargeysa, a private Shari’a court handles many domestic disputes and the municipality manages land disputes.
The problems caused by the scarcity of qualified judges are aggravated by the appointment of less experienced judges to higher courts while more experienced judges remain in lower courts. In the absence of an evaluation process, judges can be promoted or demoted according to the number of cases they win or lose in the appeal process in higher courts.[5]
Firing a judge is very difficult, even if he is known to be corrupt or incompetent, because he usually has the backing of his clan. According to one participant in the workshop:
“He (the judge) is protected by his clan and thinks he is there to serve them; others in his clan think they own his place, as though they have struggled and paid a price for it.”
In order to address some of the shortcomings of the system, some participants suggested that a bench of three judges, instead of only one, should preside in regional courts and appeal courts. However, at least in the near term, this would stretch the few qualified judges even more thinly. Other participants suggested that the system of caaqil courts should be revived in order to incorporate customary law into the judicial system and take some of the burden off other courts.
Independence of the Judiciary
The Somaliland constitution stipulates the separation of powers and the existence of an independent, impartial judicial system. An independent judiciary is critical for the impartial application of the rule of law, the effective separation of executive and judicial powers, and the guarantee of fundamental human rights.
According the Deputy Speaker of the House of Representatives, the entity responsible to ensure the supremacy of the Constitution – and thus the independence of the judiciary - is the weakest of all:
“Our system is based on three separate branches of government. The three branches of government are supposed to place some constitutional and practical checks on one another, and to have the resources (for each one) to fulfill its constitutional role. Unfortunate the judiciary is the weakest of the three. They have no say directly in the budget process, and no one speaks on their behalf. At least we, in the parliament, when we are endorsing the budget, we can demand more for ourselves. In another words, the judiciary is an orphan. It has no power and it has no resources in comparison to the other two branches of government. It is a political issue, and it will require a political decision to upgrade the status of the judiciary.”
If the judiciary is to be perceived within Somaliland society as an impartial arbitrator, it should be independent from the influence of any particular level of government or political interference. However, under present circumstances, the independency of the judiciary and the effective separation of executive and judicial powers are challenged in many ways.
Most of the challenges to the independence of the judiciary originate with the executive branch. First the court system, with the exception of the Supreme Court, are administered by the Ministry of Justice. In practice, that means the Ministry controls the funds of these courts and has the authority to dismiss, hire and discipline their judges. In other words, one order of government is openly subordinating the other, thereby undermining a fundamental constitutional imperative. One participant described the situation in the following terms:
“Before reaching a judgment, a judge might be asked to favor one side or not to reach judgment. If he fails to do as he has been instructed, he might be fired or lose his salary [….]. The relationship between the Ministry and judiciary is unconstitutional. It is designed to create a role for the Ministry and to provide some control over the judiciary. The Ministry is supposed to support the attorney general, helping the government in enforcing laws; instead it is managing the salaries of the judiciary. All courts should fall administratively under the President of the Supreme Court, or have an independent administration.”
Another arena of confrontation between the judicial and executive branches is the Justice Committee (Guddiga Cadaalada). According to the Constitution, the chairman of this committee is the President of the Supreme Court, who is also the highest-ranking member of the judiciary. The Ministry of Justice is a member of this Committee, and routinely contests its leadership or refuses to implement its decisions. In order to break the deadlock, the President of the Republic intervened by directing the President of the Supreme Court to relinquish the chairmanship of the Justice Committee to the Minister of Justice, in violation of the Constitution. The Director General of the Ministry of Justice, who sits on the Justice Committee for his Ministry, described the practical dilemma he faces at Committee meetings:
“Before I go to the meeting the Minister orders me to refuse certain things. In fact, everything he told me to refuse was put forward by the President of the Supreme Court, so I refused them as instructed. During one meeting, the proposals looked good and made sense to me, and when I signed it [the Committee’s decision] I lost my transportation allowance [from the Ministry].”
Moreover, the Judiciary Committee includes members with no professional knowledge of the judiciary, a measure that workshop participants believe which weakens the Committee’s overall effectiveness and its competence to oversee the judicial system as a whole.
Participants also described the Supreme Court as being subjected to excessive interference from the Executive branch, notably the President, who appoints and removes Chief Justices virtually as he wishes (the post is now vacant). The most recent candidate, Cismaan Xuseen Shunu, was removed after parliament refused to endorse him as the president of the Supreme Court[6].
There have been several attempts on the part of Parliament to defend the independence of judiciary, but without great effect. The House of Representative nullified the controversial law 1962 Public Order Law, which gave the executive considerable powers to over-ride due process. Parliament also attached to its approval of the 2002 budget a recommendation urging the President not let the Justice Ministry to administer allocations for the judiciary. However this advisory was not binding and has so far not been acted upon.
Executive pressure on judges can sometimes be very direct. According to workshop participants, it is not unknown for members of the executive (or even the parliament) to intervene when they have a direct interest in the outcome of a case. Whether or not such interference succeeds depends largely on the integrity of individual judges.
Human Rights
Violations of human right in Somaliland are neither systematic nor widespread. Nevertheless, the record of the Somaliland administration with respect to human rights is not free from criticism, and the role of the judiciary in defending human rights has been very poor. The most common violations include arrest without warrant and detention without trial of government critics, human rights activist and journalists. Workshop participants also noted that it is also possible for influential individuals to arrange someone’s arrest without any due process. According to one participant: “If you simply pay the police, they will arrest any one you want.”
The “National Security Committee” can detain people without charge for up to 90 days and has the power to sentence people to jail terms ranging from four months to one year. In the past, the Committee has detained people who either voiced support for or attended the ‘Arta Conference, and for questioning the government’s commercial dealings. A similarly powerful (and controversial) Anti-Corruption Committee detained without trial numerous former and serving government officials on allegations of corruption. All of the accused were eventually released without charge.
Somaliland’s custodial system is also responsible for some basic human rights violations. The few prisons that exist are old and some of them were built during the colonial administration. These facilities are in poor condition and overcrowded. There is no provision for separate detention of juveniles or mentally ill prisoners. Their condition is unhygienic and medical treatment is minimal. Some prisoners are held for months or years without trial.
Conclusions and Recommendations
Participants agreed that Somaliland has yet to achieve a society founded on the rule of law. Some argued that the Constitution and the judiciary will continue to lack real force unless they are underpinned by a social and political transformation. One participant put the argument in the following terms:
“Socially and politically we simply cannot implement what is in the Constitution - even if we had the best Constitution. (waxa guriigiisa qofku kala soo kaco ayaa dastoor ah) People today are governed only by the rules they learn at home The constitution can function properly when we [have a] committed parliament, constructive and proactive opposition parties and civic pressure groups, and informed citizen who know their constitutional rights and duties. Moreover, we can’t have it both ways: we have to decide whether we want an ad hoc, makeshift society or one rooted in formal structures and constitutional rule.”
At the conclusion of the workshop, participants were divided into three working groups to develop The areas of focus of the working groups were:
q integrating the various legal systems
q strengthening the independence of the judiciary
q improving the performance of the judicial system.
The following are some of the key recommendations and conclusions.
Integrating the various laws
q Somaliland’s constitution is the highest law in the country
q Laws that contradict the Islamic Shari’a should be removed as specified in the constitution
Independence of the judiciary
q The Justice Committee should be replaced with a purely judicial body. Specifically, Article 107 of the Constitution (concerning the Justice Committee) should be amended and membership should be confined to the judiciary
q The budget of the judicial branch should not be administered by the Minister of Justice
q Lower courts such as the appeals, region and the district should be administratively under the supreme court
q Women should be included in the judiciary
q The president should not have sole authority to dismiss the President of the Supreme Court
q Some participants suggested that members of the public should be included in the justice committee
Improving the performance of the judicial system
q Judges should be required to hold at least a law degree and should fulfill specific qualifications.
q Judges should have at least six months training or apprenticeship on the bench prior to employment as a judge.
q Courts should be required to recruit supporting staff in accordance with employment rules and guidelines established by the Civil Service Commission.
q Refresher courses should be given to judges, assistant judges and registrars.
q A legal library should be established, where books, legal journals and text books can be kept
q Legislation should be gazetted.
q In collaboration with non-governmental organizations, the government should form A legal research centre.
q The government should provide the necessary equipment, facilities and financial needs of the courts in order that they may perform effectively.
q A professional association of lawyers should be established.
q A regulatory body should be established for the legal community.