
SomalilandLaw.com
Comments on
On 6 August 2006, President Rayaale
announced the dismissal of many ministers and the re-appointment of some to
other ministerial posts. A prominent and much commented on dismissal was that
of the Foreign Affairs Minister, and a star in the cabinet, the honourable Edna
Adan. But the legal issue that caught
our eye was the recent radio interview reports in which President Rayaale opined
that that the five or six ministers who were moved from their ministerial
appointments to new ones need not be submitted to the House of Representatives
for confirmation of their new appointments.
It is not clear what the legal basis of this argument is, but, we guess that
it might be that as the original appointments as ministers were approved by the
House, the ministers can then be transferred to other ministerial portfolios
without the House considering their suitability again.
When looking at the US Senate’s role in
confirming presidential appointments, the eminent US Constitution commentator,
Alexander Hamilton, wrote that the purpose of such a power was that:
“… the
necessity of their concurrence would have a powerful, though, in general, a
silent operation. It would be an excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism in
the President, and would tend greatly to prevent the appointment of unfit
characters from State prejudice, from family connection, from personal attachment, or from a
view to popularity. . . . He would be both ashamed and afraid to
bring forward, for the most distinguished or lucrative stations, candidates who
had no other merit than that of coming from the same State to which he particularly
belonged, or of being in some way or
other personally allied to him, or of possessing the necessary
insignificance and pliancy to render them the obsequious instruments of his
pleasure." (Federalist No: 76)
This is essentially the same reason why
also in Somaliland, a very limited number of very senior appointments (in
contrast to the US, where there are thousand of appointments requiring Senate
approval) are also subject to confirmation by the House of
Representatives. Ministers and Deputy
Ministers are at the top of this list as set out in Articles 53(1) and 94(1),
but the President only needs confirmation of their appointments and not their
dismissal. Significantly, the
Constitution does not give the President power to transfer such appointees to
similar other posts, after their confirmation by the House, as that would
negate the role of the House. Rule 43 of the House Rules sets out the procedure
for the confirmation of such appointments and states that each appointment shall
be voted upon separately after the House has considered the qualifications of
the nominee and his suitability for the office. Such a nominee can not hold office in a
temporary capacity for more than three months whilst awaiting confirmation
(Article 114(3) of the Constitution) and has to be sworn into office within 30
days of his confirmation (see Article 94(3)).
As the nomination and appointment is to a
specific office of Minister (or Deputy Minister) in charge of one or more
ministries (see Article 94(6)), then the House of Representatives’ confirmation
and assessment of suitability is in respect of that office and none other. Even if a President considers Ministerial
posts as generic posts in which anyone can hold any portfolio at any time, he
does not have the power to simply re-shuffle ministers in the same way that prime
ministers in parliamentary systems can. The
reason is that in parliamentary systems, the oversight checks of parliament over
the cabinet appointments works through votes of confidence for or against the
whole cabinet or government, whilst in a presidential system, where the President
is elected for a fixed term (which also extends to the whatever government he
appoints), the
checking mechanism is in relation to individual appointments. That is why Alexander Hamilton waxed
lyrically about this limitation of presidential power to appoint whoever he
wants to.
In the recent ministerial appointments on
6 August 2006, the President appointed the following ministers and deputy ministers
to different ministerial posts:
From the House of Representatives’ point
of view, as the President has unlimited power to dismiss any minister/deputy
minister, the termination of, say, the Minister
of Resettlement’s appointment is entirely up to the President. However, once that discretion is exercised by
the President, a vacancy arose immediately at the office of Minister of
Resettlement and the new presidential nominee, whoever he is, has to be
confirmed by the House of Representatives.
If the nominee turns out to be a former Minister whose previous
appointment was terminated by the President, as in this case, the House will
then has to consider afresh whether the nominee is suitable for this new post
in the same way that it would in respect of any other nominee.
Unless the Constitution is changed to allow
the President the right to transfer and re-shuffle confirmed appointments, at
will, the position remains thus – each single transfer involves, in effect, a termination
of previously confirmed appointment and a nomination to a new office. Any
other interpretation will mean that there is nothing stopping the President
from “transferring” the Auditor General to a vacant post of an Attorney General,
or for that matter, to a post of a Deputy Minister, on the basis that he was
confirmed once in his original post! The
President can of course just do that in the large number of other senior public
posts which do not require any confirmation by the House.
Some members of the opposition controlled House
of Representatives have already complained that few ministerial appointments have
not been submitted to them for confirmation within the three month
constitutional time limit under Article 114(3) and any controversy over these
new re-appointments is likely to worsen the relationship of the presidency and
the House.
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August 2006 Legal News Commentaries 28/08/06
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